What is the Date of Filing for Returns Solicited by and Delivered to an Agent (8/18/15)

I posted a blog on my Federal Tax Crimes Blog that may have some discussion that Federal Tax Procedure enthusiasts may find interesting.  The FTC Blog entry is:  Ninth Circuit Requires a Filing for Tax Perjury Charge (8/16/15; 8/17/15), here.  The Blog discusses the recent opinion in United States v. Boitano, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14096 (9th Cir. 2015), here.

The criminal tax issue was whether filing of the tax return was an element of the crime of tax perjury, § 7206(1), here.  This invites the question of precisely what is a filing of a tax return.  In Boitano, the taxpayer signed and submitted the returns to an IRS agent not authorized to receive returns for filing.  That agent perceived irregularities in the returns and therefore did not send the returns for processing.

The Government conceded that the returns were not filed because the agent did not send the returns for processing.  The issue on appeal in Boitano was whether filing was an element of the crime of tax perjury.  The text of § 7206(1) does not require filing, but the Ninth Circuit had earlier held that filing was an element of the crime.  The Government argued, in effect, that that earlier holding was incorrect.  This panel of the Ninth Circuit held itself to be bound by the earlier precedent.  (The panel offers some interesting analysis of what constitutes a binding precedent for a three judge panel.)

The key for readers of this tax procedure blog is the question of what constitutes a filing (as opposed to the elements of the crime of tax perjury).  In many civil audits or other encounters with agents, the agents will sometimes request either delinquent original returns or amended returns.  As noted in Boitano, most agents are not authorized to receive returns for filing purposes and thus the mere act of receipt is not a filing.  The agents receiving such returns should process those returns which, when processed, would constitute a filing.  The issue practitioners face when the agent asks for the return(s) is whether, to insure that the return(s) will be treated as filed, they should (i) file the original returns in the normal manner (usually by mailing to the service center) with a copy to the agent or (ii) deliver the original return(s) to the agent with the expectation the the agent will process the return(s).  Readers interested in this issue should review the FTC Blog linked above and consider the following additional matters.

In my practice, I have been wary of giving the agent the original for processing.  I can't recall if I have ever done that.  I much prefer filing the regular way with a copy to the agent.

This issue may lurk in the OVDP where amended or delinquent returns are submitted to the OVDP group.  Are the OVDP agents authorized to receive the returns and, upon mere receipt, have them treated as filed?  I don't know the answer to the question.  Within OVDP, at least sometimes, the agents just hold the returns without processing and make an agent's report incorporating the items in the amended or delinquent returns as adjustments in the agent's report as if the amended or delinquent returns had not been filed.  If the OVDP is closed out with a closing agreement, I suppose that it does not make any difference.  But, if the taxpayer opts out, it might make a difference, particularly in the case of delinquent returns that would start the running of the statute of limitations under § 6501(c)(3), here.  I would hope that, in cases like that, the IRS would not attempt to assert that the receipt was not a filing for purposes of the civil statute of limitations.  But who knows?  In this regard, as I note in the FTC Blog entry, the Government's brief in Boitano said (in footnote 4):

   n4 * * * * Defendant’s handing the returns to Agent Connors did not constitute filing, and Agent Connor’s forwarding the form (but not the returns) to the service center did not result in the returns being filed. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501; 26 U.S.C. § 6091(b)(4); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6091-2. 

I would appreciate readers views and experiences.

Overstatement of Basis Included in Gross Income Omission for 6-Year Statute of Limitations (8/11/15)

In United States v. Home Concrete, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1836 (2012), here, the Supreme Court held that an overstatement of basis that has the effect of reducing income is not an omission of income for purposes of § 6501(e)(1)(A).  The holding was based on the Supreme Court's prior interpretation of the statute in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), here.

In § 2005(a), the Surface Transportation and Veterans Health Care Choice Improvement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-41), Congress legislatively overrule Home Concrete.

I have revised Example 5 in the text (Student edition, p. 138; Practitioner edition, p. 199) to provide at the end of Example 5 (after the citation to Home Concrete) the following in the text:

However, Congress legislatively overruled Home Concrete by amending § 6501(e)(1)(B) to provide that “An understatement of gross income by reason of an overstatement of unrecovered cost or other basis is an omission from gross income.”  This means that, in the foregoing calculation, the $80,000 overstatement of basis is treated as an omission of gross income, so that the omitted income is $80,000 with a resulting gross income omission of 67% and a resulting 6-year statute of limitations. fn735.
   fn735 § 2005(a), the Surface Transportation and Veterans Health Care Choice Improvement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-41).  The effective date for the enactment is for “ the period specified in section 6501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (determined without regard to such amendments) for assessment of the taxes with respect to which such return relates has not expired as of such date.”

Prescient History from the Records of the Constitutional Convention on the Origination Clause (8/10/15)

Note:  I have appended to the end of this blog the legal background for the brouhaha, drawn principally from the bipartisan Senate Finance Committee Report.  Readers not familiar with the background might want to reach that before wading into this discussion.

On Saturday, I blogged on a recent denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in Sissel v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS _____ (D.C. Cir. 2015), here, denying petition for rehearing en banc from the earlier panel decision in Sissel v. U.S. Deparatment of Health and Human Services, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), here.  That blog entry is The Constitution's Command that Revenue Bills Originate in the House - What Does It Mean? (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 8/8/15), here.

Normally, denials of rehearing (whether panel or en banc) are summary one-liners.  But the judges got stirred up in this case.  All who expressed an opinion agreed that as to the bottom-line result -- the ACA did not violate the Origination Clause.  But, the dissenting judges thought that the reasoning to the result was worthy of the Court's en banc consideration.  I won't get back into the Origination Clause again.  I did not say much about it in the prior blog and will not revisit that decision.

Something did, however, catch my eye in reading the opinions.  I am (was) a history major in college.  One of my favorite courses in college was U.S. Constitutional History, taught by Dr. George C. Rogers at the University of South Carolina.  One of the sources we used in the course was Max Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.  These are described here as:

One of the great scholarly works of the early twentieth century was Max Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Published in 1911, Farrand's work gathered the documentary records of the Constitutional Convention into four volumes--three of which are included in this online collection--containing the materials necessary to study the workings of the Constitutional Convention. According to Farrand's introduction, at the close of the convention, the secretary, William Jackson, delivered all the materials to the president of the convention, George Washington, who turned these papers over to the Department of State in 1796. In 1818, Congress ordered that the records be printed. which was done under the supervision of the Secretary of State John Q. Adams, in 1819. 

Farrand's Records remains the single best source for discussions of the Constitutional Convention. The notes taken at that time by James Madison, and later revised by him, form the largest single block of material other than the official proceedings. The three volumes also includes notes and letters by many other participants, as well as the various constitutional plans proposed during the convention.

Farrand's collection of the records of the Constitutional Convention are important source materials.  Hence, it is frequently cited in cases and scholarly discussions of the convention and the meaning of the Constitution coming out of the Convention.

So, in reading the opinions on the denial of the petition for rehearing in Sissel, I was not surprised to see that both sides referred to Farrand's Records.  And, beyond that, one part of the discussion caught my attention because it sheds light on current events.  In discussing the trajectory of the Origination Clause, the majority opinion notes that the consideration of the Origination Clause was not extensive, but certain key considerations of the Clause "occurred in its [the Convention's] closing weeks, between mid-August and early September 1787."  One representative at the Convention proposed that the Origination Clause provide:  "All bills for raising or appropriating money . . . shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate."  The majority opinion then discusses the issue this language raised (bold face supplied by JAT):

Two days later, a coalition of delegates came together to strike the Clause from the draft of the Constitution, and succeeded in doing so by a vote of 7-4. 2 Farrand's Records at 210-11 (Aug. 7, 1787); id. at 214 (Aug. 8, 1787). The Clause's opponents saw it as a needless landmine, one that could seriously weaken the new national government by investing too much power in what they viewed as the less independent, less expert, and less responsible of the two chambers of Congress, while generating pointless gridlock and mortally weakening the Senate. See, e.g., id. at 224 (Aug. 8, 1787) (summarizing objections of Pinkney, Mercer, and Madison, the last of whom "was for striking it out: considering it as of no advantage to the large States as fettering the Govt. and as a source of injurious altercations between the two Houses"); id. at 274-80 (Aug. 13, 1787) (summarizing additional objections of Wilson, Morris, Madison, Carrol, Rutledge, and McHenry to a similar version of the Origination Clause five days later).

The Constitution's Command that Revenue Bills Originate in the House - What Does It Mean? (8/8/15)

The Constitution provides (Article I, § 7): “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.”  This provision is referred to as the Origination Clause.

The D.C. Circuit recently denied rehearing en banc in a case involving the Affordable Care Act which was drafted in the Senate and passed by the Senate as a substitute for a revenue raising bill that did originate in the House.  Sissel v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS _____ (D.C. Cir. 2015), here, denying petition for rehearing en banc from the earlier panel decision in Sissel v. U.S. Deparatment of Health and Human Services, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), here.

In denying rehearing, concurring and dissenting opinions discussed the application of the Origination Clause.  Both the concurring and dissenting opinions found that the Origination Clause was not violated.  The dissenting opinion just thought that the issue was worthy of en banc review.

I have revised my text in the Federal Tax Crimes book to add the following after quoting the Origination Clause (I omit the footnotes citing the Sissel rehearing decisions and original panel decision, and include only footnote at the end):

This command in the Constitution appears clear.  But, as we learn in this class, when words are involved, it is all about interpretation of the words.  What do the Origination Clause’s words mean?  The issue is not commonly presented seriously in mainstream tax legislation.  But, in some outlier – albeit very important – cases it is presented.  For example, it recently arose in litigation involved the attempts to defeat the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) because some of its provisions do raise revenue.  The House passed a revenue bill that was not the ACA and sent it to the Senate.  The Senate substituted the ACA which was completely different from the revenue bill passed by – originated in, if you will – the House.  The ACA provided for large amounts of revenue to fund much of the cost of the ACA.  Did the ACA violate the Origination Clause?  Facially, in a literal sense, yes.  But by interpretation of the provision, it did not run afoul of the Origination Clause.  It is not necessary for this class to enter into an extended discussion because the Origination Clause is not presented in most mainstream tax legislation.  But, generally, the ACA was not deemed to violate the Origination Clause for one of the following reasons: 

1. Under a purposive approach, the bill's primary purpose was to regulate health insurance and not to raise revenue.  The revenue in question was to spur conduct (acquisition of health insurance) rather than raise revenue (although raising revenue was an incidental effect, the Origination Clause is not implicated by such incidental effects). 

2. The Senate amendment adding the ACA was a bill that originated in the House and thus met the requirements of the Origination Clause. 

3. The ACA raised revenue for specific program purposes and not for general revenue purposes and thus met the requirements of the Origination Clause. 

These explanations may or may not be satisfying, but in the end it would be the rare revenue raising measure that proceeded to final enactment would not meet the requirements of the Origination Clause. n14  

 n14 Since the Senate amendments must be passed by the House, the House can has a procedure – called “blue-slipping” to reject and return to the Senate revenue bills that were not originated in the House.  This process is described in the Wikipedia entry titled Blue slip at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_slip.  Of course, for bills that did originate in the House and were simply amended in the Senate (as the ACA), even by full substitution, the blue-slip process would not apply.

Ninth Circuit Says Don't Bother Us -- At Least We Won't Be Bothered (5/31/15)

In Carlson v. Commissioner, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9010 (9th Cir. 2015), here the panel affirmed a taxpayer appeal from the Tax Court.  The Ninth Circuit opens with this line:  "Karen Lee Carlson, appeals pro se from the Tax Court's decision, following a bench trial, concerning her income tax liability for tax years 2001 through 2004."   In the next paragraph, the Court opens with this line:  Contrary to Carlson's contention, the Tax Court correctly concluded that Carlson had received taxable income, such as compensation for work performed for private companies, while she resided in Oregon and Washington."

Then, in the third paragraph the Court opens with this line:  "Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Charles Allen Harman's proposed testimony regarding statutes and case law."

I know that appeals from the Tax Court to the Court Appeals are covered by Section 7482, here, which says: "The United States Courts of Appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court * * *  in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury; "  But that does not make the Tax Court a district court.

Somebody was asleep at the word processor.

Court Rejects Duty of Clarity Argument Where IRS Had Provided Clarity (3/26/15)

In Bombardier Aero. Corp. v. United States, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34801 (D. Tex. 2015), here, Bombardier Aerospace Corporation ("BAC") was a  provider of "management services to aircraft owners and leaseholders of fractional interests in aircraft (collectively, "Aircraft Owners") through its Flexjet program."  BAC was compensated by various fee arrangements, including monthly management fees ("MMF") for certain fixed costs -- "costs associated with ownership of the aircraft, such as insurance, inspection, crew salaries, crew training, aircraft hangaring, and scheduling costs."  The other fees BAC charged were variable operational costs dependent upon use.

Section 4261, here, imposes an excise tax on "taxable transportation."  In this discussion this is sometimes referred to as the "FET."  BAC paid the tax on the required the users to pay it the tax on the variable services and remitted those payments to the IRS.  BAC did not collect the tax from users to pay on the MMF and thus did not initially remit those taxes to the IRS.  In two prior audits, the IRS did not require MMF to pay the FET.  During the audit in question, however, the IRS determined that BAC was liable for the FET.  BAC paid a portion of the tax and sued for refund.  The Government counterclaimed for the balance.

The tax in question was not BAC's tax - it was the user's.  In cases where a collection agent is required to collect and pay over another person's tax, Section 6415(a), here, permits the collection agent to maintain a refund suit provided that the collection agent has either refunded the collected tax to the taxpayer upon whom it was imposed or obtained the consent of that taxpayer to obtain the refund.  Of course, the taxpayer -- the user -- had never paid the portion of the tax BAC paid, so BAC could not meet the first requirement.  And BAC had not obtained the consent of the taxpayers, so BAC failed procedurally to meet that requirement for a refund.  (There is some discussion of the issue of when the consent procedural requirement must be met, but I don't want to discuss that issue in this blog.)

I focus here on certain arguments that BAC made as to IRS past practice and IRS's failure to assert the tax in prior audits of BAC.

BAC's first argument was that the IRS was precluded "by the Duty of Clarity from recovering FET on MMF."  I don't recall that I had encountered the alleged "Duty of Clarity" before.  Apparently subsumed in this rubric was the following specifics:

Eric Segall Blog on On Judicial Candor, Judge Posner, and the Supreme Court (3/26/15)

Eric Segall posted this blog on the Dorf on Law Blog:  On Judicial Candor, Judge Posner, and the Supreme Court (Dorf on Law 3/23/15), here.  I think readers of this blog might be interested in it. The whole blog entry is very short.  Offer selected snippets as as teasers to read the whole blog entry:

On Judicial Candor:

Agreement broke down, however, when we discussed what level of candor we should expect from judges in general and the Supreme Court in particular. I argued that it is inappropriate for the Supreme Court to hide behind standard and misleading methods of constitutional interpretation such as precedent, text, and historical analysis when we all know (per our acceptance of the realist critique) that decisions are generated more by what Judge Posner calls “priors” and what I call values writ large, than by legal doctrine. This problem is more pronounced at the Supreme Court than other courts because the Justices choose the hardest cases, there is the most at stake, and there is no effective review of their decisions. 

Judge Posner argued strenuously that I was holding judges in general and the Supreme Court in particular to a standard of candor that we do not place on members of Congress, the President, and other public officials. Judge Posner stated that we know politicians are not candid about the reasons motivating their political choices and we should not be surprised that judges do the same. Judge Posner did distinguish between affirmatively lying, which judges should not do, and not disclosing the true bases of decisions, which he felt was inevitable.

So, Judge Posner is a  proponent that judges can lie, so long as they do not affirmatively lie.  (OK, I pulled a snippet and that is unfair; read the whole blog entry.)

On Originalism (Real or Feigned):

I argued that federal judges are governmental officials appointed for life who exercise coercive power over us and the rule of law requires they tell the litigants and the public the true reasons for their decisions (as best they can). For example, I have argued that Justices Scalia and Thomas quite clearly do not follow an originalist methodology across huge portions of constitutional law and they should stop pretending that they do. Judge Posner suggested that it is quite possible they think originalism drives their decisions and their failure to own up to the priors that actually generate their decisions is based more on a lack of self-reflection than bad faith. I quibbled that since just about everyone outside the Court agrees doctrine does not really drive decisions, that lack of self-reflection on the part of the Justices was a bit alarming. Professor Chen, who earlier in the discussion made a similar point, was sympathetic to this suggestion.

Is the Word "Taxpayers" Politically Loaded (3/26/15)

Tax Professionals commonly refer to the U.S. tax paying public as "taxpayers."  The word (and its singular iteration, "taxpayer') is strewn, perhaps unthinkingly, around in judicial opinions.  We even do that when those "persons"/"taxpayers" opt out of the U.S. tax system or some part of it.  Does the word diminish the fact that when the "taxpayer" is an individual, it ignores the humanity of the person or the importance of the person -- not the taxpayer -- to our myth of who we are as a nation?  Is the word taxpayers a loaded term?  See Elizabeth Stoker Bruening, Dear Politicians, Stop Calling People "Taxpayers" (New Republic), here.

Excerpts

Though addressing people as “taxpayers” is common enough to appear politically neutral, it tends to carry more argumentative weight than it’s typically credited with. The House budget is full of examples of seemingly straightforward deployments of the term which are, upon closer inspection, clearly furthering a particular ideology. “There are too many scenarios these days in which Washington forgets that its power is derived from the ‘consent of the governed,’” the plan reads in one instance of the term’s use. “It forgets that its financial resources come from hard-working American taxpayers who wake up every day, go to work, actively grow our economy and create real opportunity.” In other words, Americans’ taxes are parallel with taxpayers' consent, suggesting that expenditures that do not correspond to an individual’s will are some kind of affront. The report goes on to argue that   

food stamps, public housing assistance, and development grants are judged not on whether they achieve improved health and economic outcomes for the recipients or build a stronger community, but on the size of their budgets. It is time these programs focus on core functions and responsibilities, not just on financial resources. In so doing this budget respects hard-working taxpayers who want to ensure their tax dollars are spent wisely. 

Put simply, taxpayers should get what they pay for when it comes to welfare programs, and not be overcharged. But, as the Republican authors of this budget know well, the beneficiaries of welfare programs tend to receive more in benefits than they pay in taxes, because they are in most cases low-income. The “taxpayers” this passage has in mind, therefore, don’t seem to be the recipients of these welfare programs, but rather those who imagine that they personally fund them. By this logic, the public is divided neatly into makers and takers, to borrow the parlance of last election’s Republicans. 

* * * * 

Whereas "taxpayers" is strewn throughout political documents, “people” is associated with populist and revolutionary movements, and not for nothing. Power to the people, the evergreen revolutionary slogan trumpeted by popular fronts around the world, has a ring that power to the taxpayers does not precisely because it demands an inclusive view of public goods. The same could be said about the first line of the U.S. Constitution: "We the Taxpayers" would have been an odd construction for a nation born from a revolt against British taxation. So let's leave "taxpayer" to the IRS and remove it from everyday speech. With every thoughtless repetition of the word, we’re carrying political water.

Two Courts' Approaches to Taxpayer Culpability in the Son-of-Boss Bullshit Tax Shelter (3/26/15)

I posted this blog entry on my Federal Tax Crimes Blog, but the topic is also applicable to Federal Tax Procedure:

I write today on two recent cases that evidence different approaches to taxpayer culpability for tax underpayment from "investing" in bullshit tax shelters.  These cases are CNT Investors LLC et al. v. Commissioner, 144 T.C. No. 11 (2015), here, and Kerman v. Chenery Associates, Inc. (WD Ky NO. 3:06-CV-00338-CRS 3/23/15), here.

For context, readers will recall that the Son-of-Boss ("SOB") tax shelter and the Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure ("CARDS") tax shelter are variations on the theme of no-cost (except promoter fees and reams of paper and commotion) tax benefits from thin air.  They have been the basis for several  prominent criminal prosecutions.  Courts have routinely called them too good to be true.  Most courts have reached that conclusion with respect to the type of sophisticated taxpayers who entered these shelters.  All of these shelters not only involved sophisticated taxpayers but required that those sophisticated taxpayers represent to the promoter and the issuers of the legal opinions that they had a profit motive independent of the tax motive.  In the context of the tax adventure in which that representation was made (tax benefits created from nothing except paper shuffling and payment of large fees to the promoters), that representation was bullshit.  That's my opinion and probably the opinion of most courts that have dealt with the issue.  I am some readers will disagree and I welcome their comments/corrections.

So, let's turn to the cases.  First, I will discuss the Kerman case.

Kerman was a suit by a taxpayer - "investor" against promoters of the adventure.  The originally named defendants were prominent players in the bullshit shelter industry:  Chenery Associates, Inc., Chenery Management, Inc., Sussex Financial Enterprises, Inc, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, R. J. Ruble, Roy Hahn, Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, HVB U.S. Finance, Inc.   The HVB defendants moved for dismissal of the remaining claims against it.

The IRS had prevailed in the Kerman's Tax Court case. here, and appeal, here, which had, successively, imposed the tax and the 40% accuracy related penalty.  (I will discuss this in more detail in discussing CNT Investors.)  For my blog discussion of the appellate case, see A Self-Proclaimed "Simple Man," "Utterly Uneducated" in Tax and Finance, but Still a Self-Made Multi-Millionaire Loses his Bullshit Tax Shelter Case (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 4/13/13), here. As a result, the Kermans conceded in their suit against the HVB defendants that:  "[i]ndisputably, the[y] participated in the abusive tax-shelter in conjunction with HVB."  Seizing on that concession, "HVB now contends that this admission is fatal to the Kermans' remaining claims against it under the theory of in pari delicto."

The Kerman court opened its discussion as follows:

The common law docntrine in pari delicto is a phrase that is short for the maxim in pari delicto potior est condition defendent is, which means: "In a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . is the better one." Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2626, 86 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1985) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 711 (5th ed. 1979) (alternation in original)). When applied, it serves as a defense that prevents two parties whose wrongdoing are found to be in pari delicto from recovering from one another for any damages that arose from that joint wrongdoing. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306, 105 S.Ct. 2622 (footnotes omitted). Courts apply the doctrine based on "two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers; and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality." See id.; see also In re Dublin Securities, Inc., 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir.1997) ("'No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.'"). 

In one germane application of the doctrine, a Kentucky court found that when two parties participate in a tax evasion transaction, they are deemed to be in pari delicto. Eline Realty Co. v. Foeman, 252 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Ky. 1952)(citing Stacy v. Williams, 253 Ky. 353, 69 S.W.2d 697; Middlesboro Home Telephone Co., v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 214 Ky. 822, 284 S.W. 104). This is true even if the plaintiff was induced to enter the transaction. Id. Here, the Kermans' admit that "[i]ndisputably, [they] participated in the abusive CARDS tax-shelter with HVB and the other Defendants." DN 227, p. 5. Moreover, they do not even dispute that, as a result, they are in pari delicto with HVB. Id. Instead, they argue that, regardless of whether they are in pari delicto with the Defendants, the defense does not bar their claims for rescission or under KRS §446.070 in this instance. We address these arguments in turn.

Seventh Circuit Opinion on Role of Notice of Deficiency and Last Known Address Requirement (3/7/15)

In Gyorgy v. Commissioner, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3100 (7th Cir. Feb. 27, 2015), here, the Court addressed certain key aspects of tax procedure relating to the key role of the notice of deficiency.  For practitioners (other than novice practitioners), this is perhaps redundant to information they already know.  In some way, it is probably redundant for students also.  Still it is a pretty good summary of the process, so I offer it here.  In most cases, I will eliminate most case or other citations, except when I think they are important:  I include the Code sections because the Code is important.  The excerpts are:

We begin with an overview of the CDP process and the taxpayer's right to appeal. The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") directs the Treasury Secretary—acting through the IRS—to determine, assess, and collect federal taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 6201(a), 6301. It also requires taxpayers to file returns as prescribed by the IRS. See id. § 6011(a). If the IRS finds that a person has unpaid taxes for a given year, it must notify him of the deficiency before it can collect the debt. See id. §§ 6212(a), 6213(a). Once the IRS mails notice, the taxpayer may petition the tax court to redetermine the correct amount of the deficiency. Id. §§ 6213(a), 6214(a). If he does not file a timely petition (normally within ninety days), then the deficiency "shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand." Id. § 6213(c). 

If the taxpayer does not pay, then his tax liabilities become a lien on his real and personal property. Id. § 6321. To protect the government's rights against other secured creditors with respect to the encumbered property, the IRS must generally file a notice of the tax lien with the appropriate state authority. See id. § 6323(a), (f). It must then inform the taxpayer that it filed the lien notice. Id. § 6320(a). 

The taxpayer is entitled to challenge the lien in a CDP hearing before the Appeals Office, which is an independent bureau within the IRS. Id. § 6320(b). The "hearing" is informal and may consist of correspondence, telephone conversations, or in-person meetings. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), . In general, the taxpayer may raise any relevant issue. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A). That includes a challenge to his underlying tax liability if he did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability. Id. § 6330(c)(2)(B). The appeals officer must consider the issues raised by the taxpayer and verify that the IRS followed proper procedures. § 6330(c)(3). 

After the hearing, the Appeals Office issues a notice of determination containing its findings and conclusions. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e), Q&A-E8. If the taxpayer is dissatisfied, he can appeal the determination to the tax court. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1). If his underlying tax liability was properly at issue in the CDP hearing, the tax court reviews that issue de novo. It reviews the Appeals Office's other determinations for abuse of discretion. Jones v. Comm'r, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2003) ("In a collection due process case in which the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Tax Court ... reviews the underlying liability de novo and reviews the other administrative determinations for an abuse of discretion." (citing Craig v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 252, 260 (2002))). 

The tax court's decision is in turn subject to review in the appropriate court of appeals. I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review tax court decisions "in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." Id. 

With this background in hand, we turn to the two issues on appeal.