NJ Fed District Court Finds No Jurisdiction to Recognize Claim of Universal Vacatur of Notice 2007-83 for 6th Circuit Decision (4/29/23)

In OOM Inc., et al. v. United States (D. N.J. Dkt 22-2762 Opinion & Order dtd 4/24/23 Not for Publication), CL here and GS here, the court granted the Government’s Motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), here, seeking “a declaratory judgment ordering, among other things, that the reporting requirement was vacated by the Sixth Circuit [in Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.4th 1138 (6th Cir. 2021)] and that they are entitled to rescission or refund of the assessed penalties.”

The basis for the FAC is the claim that Mann Construction was what is sometimes referred to as a universal or nationwide vacatur, vacating Notice 2007-83 upon which plaintiffs’ § 6707A penalty was based. As I have discussed before, the concept of the universal vacatur of administrative action is a hot-button issue now. Accordingly, some courts vacated administrative action take different approaches—

(i)          vacatur for the parties in the action,

(ii)        if a district court opinion, vacatur affecting all persons in the district including parties and nonparties in the case,

(iii)      if a circuit court opinion, vacatur affecting all persons in the district including parties and nonparties in the case, and

(iv)       if a district or circuit court opinion, applying nationwide, including parties and nonparties.

The OOM Inc. plaintiffs asserted that Mann Construction effected vacatur under (iv).

The problem was that penalties are treated as taxes, subject to the usual predicates applicable to tax refunds and other types of tax relief. For example, to the extent that the OOM Inc. plaintiffs were seeking a refund of the penalties, they had not met the predicates for a refund suit. To the extent that they were seeking to obliterate the unpaid assessments, they ran squarely into § 7421(a). To the extent they were seeking a declaratory judgment, they ran squarely into 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

A Federal Tax Procedure Blog Entry Revised to Style of Hemingway (4/22/23)

I asked two different AI platforms—Google’s BARD and ChatGPT-- to revise a past blog entry in the style of Ernest Hemingway. The Blog Entry is Petition for Writ of Certiorari in NonTax Case Raising Issue of Continued Viability of Chevron (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 3/19/23; 4/17/23), here. (you can click to read; I excluded the text in red from the text I requested the tools to revise to Hemingway style).

GOOGLE BARD

Sure, here is the text you provided in the style of Ernest Hemingway:

The Supreme Court will soon consider whether to overturn Chevron deference, a legal doctrine that allows courts to defer to the interpretations of federal agencies when a statute is ambiguous. The case, Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo, involves a dispute over whether the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has the authority to require domestic vessels to pay the salaries of the monitors they must carry to ensure compliance with regulations.

The petitioners argue that the statute is unambiguous and does not grant NMFS this authority. They also argue that Chevron deference is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. The government, on the other hand, argues that the statute is ambiguous and that Chevron deference is a well-established and important legal doctrine.

The outcome of this case could have a significant impact on the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. If the Court overturns Chevron deference, it will be a major victory for those who believe that the executive branch has too much power. However, if the Court upholds Chevron deference, it will be a victory for those who believe that the executive branch needs to be able to act quickly and effectively in order to carry out its responsibilities.

Here is a more concise version of the text you provided in the style of Ernest Hemingway:

Payments v. Deposits and Below-the-Line Stipulations in a Stipulated Tax Court Decision Document (4/19/23)

In Hill v. Commissioner, ___ F.4^th ___ (11^th Cir. 4/10/23), CA11 Slip Op. here and GS here, the Court held that the taxpayer’s remittance of $10,263,750 to the IRS was a deposit that accrued interest at the lower interest rate for deposits rather than the higher overpayment rate.

Payments v. Deposits Background

In reaching its decision, the Court provided this background introduction (Slip Op. 18-20, cleaned up, particularly to eliminate parallel citations):

C. Payments and Deposits

As further background, it helps to understand why taxpayers, like Hill, will expressly designate a remittance as a "deposit," as opposed to a payment. Whether the taxpayer makes a deposit or a payment can affect whether the taxpayer can challenge the amount of a deficiency.

Generally, when a taxpayer makes an undesignated remittance, the IRS treats that remittance as a payment and applies it "against any outstanding liability for taxes, penalties[,] or interest." See Rev. Proc. 2005-18 § 4.01(2), 2005-13 I.R.B. 798, 799.n4 "If an undesignated remittance is made in the full amount of a proposed liability," it "will be treated as a payment of tax, a notice of deficiency will not be mailed[,] and the taxpayer will not have the right to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency." Id. § 4.03, 2005-13 I.R.B. at 800.

   n4 Throughout their briefs, both parties cited and relied upon Revenue Procedure 2005–18. No party raised a deference issue under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984), and thus we do not address Chevron.

By contrast, a taxpayer who makes a "deposit" can challenge an alleged deficiency in the Tax Court without accruing underpayment interest on the disputed tax, up to the amount of the deposit. See I.R.C. §§ 6601(a), 6603(a)-(b), 6213(a). The Supreme Court has recognized that "the taxpayer will often desire treatment of the remittance as a deposit—even if this means forfeiting the right to interest on an overpayment—in order to preserve jurisdiction in the Tax Court, which depends on the existence of a deficiency," which "would be wiped out" if the remittance were treated as a payment. Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431, 439 n.2 (2000).

Tax Court Holds that IRS Has No Authority to Assess § 6038(b) Penalties for Form 5471 Delinquencies (4/3/23; 4/23/23)

In Farhy v. Commissioner, 160 T.C. No. 6 (4/3/23), TN here and GS here, the Tax Court held in a CDP case that collection efforts for the § 6038(b) penalties for initial and continuation failure to file Forms 5471 were not authorized because there was no assessment authority for § 6038(b) penalties. Section 6038(b) is here. Assessments are required for IRS collection actions such as liens and levies, thus the collection action failed.

My comments:

1. I find the Farhy holding odd; indeed, I think it is wrong. The statute is clear that Congress intended the § 6038(b) penalties to apply. The penalty for the initial failure seems to be automatically imposed by the statute's literal terms without any action by the IRS. § 6038(b) (“If any person fails to furnish, within the time prescribed under paragraph (2) of subsection (a), [the Form 5471] such person shall pay a penalty of $10,000 for each annual accounting period with respect to which such failure exists.”) There is no authority—and the Tax Court in Farhy cites none—for the proposition that Congress intended to exclude the § 6038(b) penalty from usual IRS collection tools. Instead, at best, the Tax Court finds a footfault in the interlocking statutory provisions.

2. The Code treats penalties as taxes, and 6201(a), here, authorizes “assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and assessable penalties) imposed by this title.”  (Emphasis supplied by JAT.) “Including” at least suggests that, so long as the tax (penalty) is imposed by Title 26, assessment authority can include more than the types of liabilities specifically listed. More importantly, it would not facially exclude the § 6038(b) penalties and should be capacious enough to cover the § 6038(b) penalties, particularly because there is no reason to think that Congress intended otherwise.

3. An assessment is simply a recording on the IRS books that a taxpayer owes a liability. In Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 100 (2004), here, the Supreme Court described assessments (cleaned up):

          As used in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the term “assessment” involves a recording of the amount the taxpayer owes the Government. 26 U.S.C. §6203. The “assessment” is essentially a bookkeeping notation. Section 6201(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury “to make . . . assessments of all taxes . . . imposed by this title.” An assessment is made “by recording the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” §6203. n2 See also M. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure ¶10.02, pp. 10-4 to 10-7 (2d ed. 1991) (when Internal Revenue Service signs “summary list” of assessment to record amount of tax liability, “the official act of assessment has occurred for purposes of the Code”).
   n. 2 Section 301.6203-1 of the Treasury Regulations states that an assessment is accomplished by the “assessment officer signing the summary record of assessment,” which, “through supporting records,” provides “identification of the taxpayer, the character of the liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the amount of the assessment.” 26 C.F.R. §301.6203-1 (2003).

If the statute says a delinquent filer is subject to the penalty, it makes no sense that the IRS can’t record the liability on its books—easily meeting the definition of an assessment. And, what logic is it that the IRS cannot record on its books a clear liability such as § 6038(b)?