I have blogged on statutory interpretation issues. I have not focused on constitutional interpretation issues. Conceptually, statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation are related—the constitution is like a “super statute.” I am not saying that the two types of interpretation are the same; I am saying that conceptually they both deal with determining legal meaning from text for which interpretive tools to determine meaning apply.
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution provides that “a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business.” This is often referred to as the Quorum Clause. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the House adopted a proxy rule permitting non-attending House members to participate by proxy—vote and counted toward the quorum requirement. When the statute in issue passed, a physical quorum was not present in person but, by counting proxies for nonattending members, a quorum was present and over 99% of the House members participated. The statute passed.
The issue of whether the Quorum Clause requires a physically present quorum divided the Fifth Circuit in an en banc opinion in State of Texas v. Blanche, ___ F.4th ___ (5th Cir. 11/20/26), here. This required the court (majority and minority) to determine the meaning of the Quorum Clause. The bare majority adopted an originalist interpretation that looked to the meaning of the text at the time of ratification of the Constitution—1789. The originalist interpretation included, of course, textualism (except that as is usually the case the majority looked the legislative history-equivalents for the Constitution). The majority applied “the Constitution’s original public meaning.” (Id., at 20.) (I don’t propose here to engage in the debate over whose meaning may be relevant for originalists and textualists in statutory interpretation—the drafters who wrote the words, the members of the Convention who debated and voted the words, the persons publicly debating the Constitution (e.g., the Federalist Papers), the members of the ratification proceedings in each state, or even Mr. Everyman (it was all men and only some of the men then), such as the then equivalent of Joe the Ploughman; any such imagined speakers or audiences were those in 1789 and I refer to them generally “as Founders.”) The Court also looked a “post-ratification history” where it considers “long settled and established practice.”
The minority urged that, at best, the Quorum Clause was silent on the issue, and the Founders surely did not intend this branch of Government to be nonfunctional in times of emergencies. The minority wove into its analysis some of the traditional techniques of interpretation (e.g., reference to the provision authorizing Houses to determine their procedures), but bottom line, I view the minority as arguing for a pragmatic interpretation rather than the rigid at conception interpretation of the majority.
I asked ChatGPT Plus (“ChatGPT”) to summarize the competing interpretive methods used by majority and dissenting judges in Texas, including some discussion of pragmatism as an interpretive method. ChatGPT’s detailed response may be viewed here. The ChatGPT response is pretty good, although me being me, I could quibble but won't.