First Circuit Holds that the Time Period to File Petition in § 6213(a) is NonJurisdictional But Mandatory, Hence No Equitable Tolling (8/19/26; 8/20/26)

In Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (1st Cir. 2026), CA1 here and GS here [to come], the Court held that

1. The IRS properly sent the notice to the taxpayer’s last known address. This is the less exciting holding, but I will address it below in my Comment #2.

2. Section 6213(a)’s timely filing requirements are not jurisdictional. (Caution on this label “jurisdictional” though, as I note below.)

3. As a matter of statutory interpretation § 6213(a)’s timely filing requirements are “mandatory,” meaning that the periods to file the petition is not subject to equitable tolling. This latter holding has the same practical effect as would have applied if the Court had agreed with the consensus holdings in the Courts of Appeals that § 6213(a)’s time periods were jurisdictional.

The key holdings for purposes of this blog are ## 2 & 3, although they are not outcome-determinative in terms of the holdings of other Circuit Courts of Appeals. That is because regardless of whether a Court bases its outcome on jurisdiction or a mandatory analysis, the result is the same in denying the availability of equitable tolling.

For that reason, I worry whether courts futzing around with “jurisdiction” in this context is meaningful. Courts could just go to the heart of the disposition that the time periods are mandatory. In many cases, courts are just writing at length about jurisdiction which has some esoterica when mandatory should do.

Added 8/20/26 3:25pm: For a different outcome see Maniktala v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (8th Cir. 8/11/26), CA8 here and GS here, allowing equitable estoppel for time deadlines in § 6213(a) based on holdings that (i) § 6213(a) is nonjurisdictional (consistent with Kyick) but (ii) the § 6213(a) deadlines are not mandatory (inconsistent with Kyick). It appears that there is a clear conflict in the Circuits on the statutory interpretation issue which is often a substantial basis for granting a petition for writ of certorari. I should note that, in effect, Maniktala seems to be based on the Eighth Circuit's application of the default rule allowing equitable estoppel in a case where the court cannot determine the statutory meaning (in interpretive equipoise), whereas Kyick is based on an interpretation of the statute where it could it could determine the statutory meaning. Although an agency interpretation that might have qualified for Chevron deference (i.e., a Treasury interpretive regulation) is not in issue, this split does highlight one of the central fanciful notions of Loper Bright that courts can always interpret statutes to reach the best interpretation without the need for default rules for decision.

Other JAT Comments:

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Judge Halpern's Rejection of Bullshit Tax Shelter--the Conservation Easement Variety (8/15/26)

In Evans v. Commissioner (11^th Cir. Nos. 24-11882 & No. 24-11884 Unpublished Opinion dated 8/13/26), CA11 here, GS here [to come], and Tax Notes here, the Court affirmed the Tax Court’s decisions based on the opinions Carter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-133 (T.C. Dkt. 23647-15, here, at #112 and GS here), a fine Judge Halpern opinion.

The Eleventh Circuit majority gave the appellants’ bullshit arguments the treatment they deserve (even more than they deserve). (There ought to be an appellate disposition simply by rejecting an appellant’s arguments in two lines:

Appellant’s arguments are bullshit. [No exclamation mark needed; a simple statement of fact]

Affirmed.

For that reason, I hesitated to write anything on the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished opinions in this case that have already involved grossly disproportionate attention from all involved (including perhaps not-so-innocent readers such as me).

Fifth Circuit on Rehearing Makes the Same Mistake on the Limited Partner Gambit to Avoid Tax (8/13/26; 8/20/26)

On 8/20/26 at 12:25 am, I substantially revised this blog entry. My additions are indicated in red; but I do not show strikeouts.

In Alain, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (5th Cir. 8/12/26), CA5 here; GS here, the Court on panel rehearing (also denying en banc rehearing), again rejected the Tax Court and IRS interpretation of the limited partner exception to the “self-employment income” in § 1402(1)(13). Readers paying attention in the tax procedure universe are surely familiar with that issue. Basically, active service participants in a business enterprise who would have had self-employment income in straight-forward characterization of their earnings have tried to avoid that tax on self-employment income by the magic of labeling their income as a distributive share for share for limited partners.

Alain was originally decided in Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, 165 F.4th 374 (5th Cir. 2026), GS here, which the Court withdrew on the rehearing. The judges on the panel rendered opinions to the same effect as before. The Sirius majority opinion was nominally authored by Judge Oldham. The panel rehearing opinion is per curiam with neither of the majority judges stepping up as the author.

I critiqued the majority in Sirius Solutions in Fifth Circuit Knows a Limited Partner When Reads It (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 1/24/26; 1/20/26), here. In my original blog on Alain, I did not pay attention to the difference between the original opinion in Sirius and the revised opinion in Alain. The panel majority states its bottom-line interpretation in the opening (Slip Op. 1): 

Today, we hold its original public meaning is a partner who plays no significant role in managing or running a business.

As stated, the panel majority’s revised formulation narrows the limited partner exception it approved in its earlier opinion. The panel majority deploys the tools of interpretation that textualists so love (such as contemporary dictionaries) to determine (divine) the original public meaning to possibly include only a smaller subclass of nominal “limited partners”—specifically those limited partners who have no significant role in managing or running the business. That narrowing is at least an improvement on the earlier opinion. 

Judge Graves engages the majority on its determination of original public meaning. (Slip Op. 21-25.)

Questions for Tax Crimes and Tax Procedure Students on Trump's "Settlement" in Trump v. IRS (8/6/26)

I have posted my Federal Tax Procedure Book to SSRN, see here. Since it is timely, although a moving target that we sure have not heard the last of yet, I thought I would post the concluding paragraphs of my discussion of Trump v. IRS that Trump and his buddies at DOJ (most notably Blanch, but not only Blanche) tried to use as a pretext to raid the Treasury.

In my opinion, Trump and his buddies new they would draw flack on that package, so they must have realized that the Anti-Weaponization Fund was just a ploy, a stalking horse. The real goal was tax audit immunity which for now has not been taken off the table. I discuss that in the Federal Tax Procedure Book (Student Edition pp.  802-805; Practitioner Edition pp. 1118-1192). I conclude that discussion with some further discussion questions for students of tax crimes and tax procedure:

Exercise for Students: Readers of Chapter Six discussing tax and tax-related crimes should be able easily to spot several tax and tax-related crimes that this conduct might implicate, particularly the ubiquitous defraud conspiracy. One possibility is that anyone participating materially in the audit immunity could be an affirmative act of evasion with respect to the taxes covered or an overt act of conspiracy (offense or defraud). In theory, if that were viable, all of the key players in this drama stand exposed to criminal prosecution. Of course, the prosecutions, if any, will have to be brought by DOJ which Trump can prevent while he is President but can then be brought in the next Administration unless Trump gives sweeping pardons to all who were involved. (I suspect and have read that those actors are counting on such pardons.) One final question worth asking is whether Trump’s control of DOJ and IRS could implicate some conduct for which the Supreme Court has given full or qualified immunity in Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024).

Another Exercise for Students: Tax procedure students should think about the settlement authorities discussed earlier in this text. Thus, generally, only the IRS has settlement authority for cases that it has not yet referred to DOJ. DOJ has settlement authority only for cases that the IRS referred. Facially, it appeared in Trump v. IRS that the IRS had only transferred authority to DOJ over the § 7431 wrongful disclosure suit. There is no indication that the IRS referred all of the matters sweepingly released in the Release Order to DOJ, and there is no indication that the IRS “settled” those claims.

Concluding thoughts: If nothing else, Trump v. IRS and its resulting commotions will occupy tax procedure and tax crimes enthusiasts for a long time.

 This blog entry is cross-posted on the Federal Tax Crimes Blog here.

2026 Federal Tax Procedure Book Student and Practitioner Editions (8/4/26)

I have published to SSRN my Federal Tax Procedure Book Student and Practitioner Editions. For information on the SSRN links to download see the page to the right titled “Federal Tax Procedure Book (2026 Editions) (8/4/26)” here.

FTPB 2016 Editions Discussion of Trump v. IRS and Its Resulting Machinations (8/3/26)

I am trying to wrap up the 2026 Editions of my Federal Tax Procedure Book but the ongoing drama by DOJ’s $2.77 billion Anti-Weaponization Fund and Trump and related party tax immunity does not permit an easy stopping point. But I have to stop and have just concluded all that will be in the 2026 Editions that I hope to publish later this week. I thought I would post the discussion below (the Student Edition version without footnotes by copy and paste into the blog below) and the Practitioner Edition version with footnotes that can be downloaded here.

                   2.     Examples (Including Trump v. IRS).

          A prominent example of this remedy is a suit brought by a Kenneth Griffin, a hedge fund billionaire. An employee of a third party contractor to the IRS, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., illegally accessed and disclosed the tax return information of Griffin and others to a news organization, ProPublica, which in turn published some of the tax return information. Griffin sued the IRS under (i) § 7431, alleging violation of § 6103, and (ii) the Privacy Act. The employee was prosecuted and pled guilty, receiving a five-year sentence. Griffin and the IRS settled the civil action resulting in a dismissal with prejudice. All of the terms of the settlement are not available, but apparently there was no monetary consideration and the IRS agreed to and did issue a public apology. Another reputed billionaire brought related action against the employee’s employer, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.

          A more prominent example arising from the same mass disclosures is a 2026 suit Donald J. Trump filed in his nominal personal capacity for $10 billion damages (asserting both the minimum $1,000 per disclosure with disclosures at $1,000 justifying $10 billion or actual damages of $10 billion) and for punitive damages in an amount not stated. The Plaintiffs included Trump’s sons and The Trump Organization, LLC. (referred to collectively as the Trump Plaintiffs). Before the DOJ filed an answer, the Judge asked the parties to brief whether, given President Trump’s control over the Government parties (IRS and DOJ) and personal interest as Plaintiff, the case met the required Article III case or controversy requirement. The Court also appointed amici to provide independent briefing on that issue. Before the parties presented their briefing but after the amici provided its initial brief, the Trump Plaintiffs moved to dismiss with prejudice under FRCP Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) which requires dismissal with prejudice. On May 18, 2026, the Court dismissed with prejudice, noting:

Senator Kennedy Questions Trump Judicial Nominee on Original Public Meaning (7/28/26)

Recently, Senator John Kennedy (yeah, the folksy speaking one) and a Trump judicial nominee discussed conservative dogma in Constitutional interpretation (dogma that also plays out in statutory interpretation because the Constitution is just a super-statute). The discussion starts here. Many originalists now genuflect to the interpretive God of “original public meaning”—in other words, they look for the meaning of the words as the meaning some imagined public audience contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution would have interpreted the words. Senator Kennedy wants to know why the meaning that some imagined public audience might matter more than the meaning the actual framers of the Constitution contemporaneously attributed to the words. Senator Kennedy nails the bankruptcy of this notion of the originalist adventure that has captured the conservative imagination. One of my favorite articles on this theme is Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 575 (2011), here.

I write on a Federal Tax Procedure Blog which rarely deals with Constitutional interpretation. This Blog deals mostly with statutory interpretation, but the screwy conservative notions that affect original public meaning play out in statutory interpretation where conservative judges deploy dictionaries more or less contemporaneous with the statute text enactment to divine meaning rather than using the legislators’ own explanations (legislative history).

Side Note: Senator Kennedy (Wikipedia here) received his J.D. (basic law degree) from UVA Law School in 1977 (where he was executive editor of the Virginia Law Review) and thereafter a Bachelor of Civil Law (B.C.L.) from Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1979. He is plenty smart, sometimes masked by his folksy way of presenting himself. But that folksy way can often result in good discussions as above where he bests the judicial nominee spouting conservative dogma.

Eleventh Circuit Rejects Bullshit Conservation Easement Shelter (7/20/26; 7/27/26)

In Savannah Shoals, LLC v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (11th Cir. 2026), CA11 here and GS here, the Eleventh Circuit rejects the appeal of a bullshit conservation easement shelter. The result is foretold in the first paragraph of the opinion, noting that the shelter claimed a “$23 million” deduction for an easement found by the Tax Court to be worth $480,000. See Judge Goeke’s opinion Savannah Shoals LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-35, here.

I won’t discuss the opinion further because, although it is 34 pages long and is designated “FOR PUBLICATION,” I don’t think it adds anything material to previously developed law, factual conclusions, and appellate review. The bottom-line is for taxpayers and promoters to avoid bullshit claims, including bullshit claims on the Tax Court’s valuations. The Court does not say that or even, for most readers, fairly imply that. Still, that is my inference. And, of course, plenty of other opinions, including from this Court, can be read for that proposition.

One interesting point is that oral argument was 12/10/25 and the unanimous opinion was 7/16/26, for 218 days gestation period for a 34 page opinion of little precedential value. (See CL docket entries here).

However, I will make some comments which are even more picky.

JAT Comments:

 1. The Court discusses the shelter’s attack on the IRS expert. (See Slip Op. 10-16.) The Court spends some time discussing FRE 702 and the Daubert Standard. As it turns out, immediately before I read Savannah Shoals, I had just revised my Federal Tax Procedure Practitioner Edition to add a footnote on the text reference to FRE 702. I just copy and paste that footnote discussion because I don’t think the Court in Savannah Shoals picked up the nuance even though I don’t think the nuance would have changed the outcome.

Federal Circuit Holds that Timely Filed Claim Can be Rectified by Untimely Filed Formal Refund Claim Before the IRS Acts (7/17/26)

In Dougherty Electric, Inc. v. United States, ___ F.4th ___ (Fed. Cir. 2026), FC here and GS here [to come], the taxpayer timely filed a letter to the IRS titled “PROTECTIVE CLAIM FOR REFUND.” the letter was processed as a claim for refund for the issue identified in the letter. The taxpayer later filed another letter outside the refund claim period called a “MODIFIED PROTECTIVE CLAIM FOR REFUND,” which stated a new issue not asserted in the original letter. The IRS requested more information and that the taxpayer file Forms 843 for each claim. The taxpayer filed Forms 843 for the two claims. The IRS denied both claims. The taxpayer sued for refund in the Court of Federal Claims. Applying § 7422(a) prohibition of a refund suit where a formal claim for refund has not been filed, the Court (i) sustained the first timely filed protective claim as an informal claim that had been “rectified” by filing the Form 843 before the IRS denied the claim; and (ii) rejected the second untimely filed protective claim, since it was a different claim that was untimely.

In the course of the decision, the Court clarified (Slip Op. 14-17) it’s precedent in Computervision Corp. v. United States, 445 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) that the timely filed claim may be an informal claim that is not formal claim for refund on the required form, such as Form 843; rather it can be a timely filed informal written claim (e.g., by letter) that can then be “rectified” by filing the formal claim before the IRS denies the claim.

Another Bullshit SCE Case Fails for the Usual Reasons, but Court also Rejects the Jarkesy Claim (7/16/26)

In Piton Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 167 T.C. ___, No. 4 (2026), TC Dkt 637-23, here, at # 237 and GS here [to come], the Court (Judge Kerrigan) gave the IRS the victory in yet another syndicated conservation easement (“SCE”) case. The Court

• rejected the usual bullshit about the before contribution valuation from which the after valuation is deducted. The before contribution value claimed was $42,200,000; the Court found the before contribution value was $1,440,000. Since the parties stipulated that the after contribution value of the property subject to the easement was $640,000, the contribution value was reduced from $41,635,000 to $800,000. Hence, the value of the “contribution” was greatly, should I say grossly, reduced based on a gross overvaluation of the value of the easement. I address this in my comments below.
• found that the partnership improperly allocated the resulting deductions among the partners. This holding applies in the “varying interests” rule in partnership tax law. The allocation made by the partnership failed the requirements of that rule. It is a bit esoteric, so I do not discuss it further. (See Slip Op. 36-44.)
• found, applying simple math (and as usual with SCE bullshit valuation claims that are litigated), the gross valuation misstatement penalty in § 6662(h) applies (Slip Op. 44-45.)
• rejected the claim that § 6662 penalties are not assessable as a matter of law because of the application of U.S. Const. amend. VII, raising the Jarkesy case. (Slip Op. 45-I briefly discuss this in my comments below.

JAT Comments:

1. At the outset, I am amazed that the Tax Court has not found some way to better manage these SCE cases where, it seems on the anecdotal cases I have read, the partnership proffers grossly excessive valuations and requires enormous judicial and other resources to call the partnerships out on the bullshit valuation claims. I thought Judge Buch was trying to do that in a case about which I blogged earlier. Tax Court Rejects a Bullshit Tax Shelter False Valuation Claim with Warning of Sanctions for Taxpayers, their Counsel, and Expert Witness Proffering the Bullshit (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 7/16/25; 9/10/25), here. Perhaps Judge Buch’s warnings have been effective in some cases which have settled. But Piton Holdings illustrates that the message has not been respected by some. So, for example, why did Judge Kerrigan not consider the penalties Judge Buch indicated were possible?

2. The Court’s findings of fact and conclusions regarding the valuation issue are standard for SCE cases. The key valuation always in dispute is the “before contribution” value of the property for which an easement was contributed. Remember that the valuation of the easement because there is no market for such easements, is derived by the “before contribution” value less the after contribution value of the property subject to the easement contributed. (That simple subtraction produces the contribution value, but I suggest (without further explanation) that even that method may overvalue the easement for contribution purposes.