Yet another. Riddle Aggregates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-117 (11/10/26), T.C. No. 31104-21 at # 315, TN here, and GS here [to come].
The Court goes with the IRS valuation expert, mimicking baseball arbitration. Since the shelter’s lawyers abandoned the reasonable valuation field, leaving the IRS with the only reasonable valuations, naturally the Court went with the IRS. (This differs from baseball arbitration where the arbitrator accepts the most reasonable valuation; here the shelter offered only bullshit valuations.)
I don’t think readers will benefit from my digging into and regurgitating the opinion; nor do I think they will be enlightened on tax procedure by reading the opinion on their own. It is the same old bullshit, although Judge Kerrigan skillfully shows she can dig into the bullshit to see if there is a pony underneath (there is not). And she does it in 34 pages which, from my nonempirical memory, is less than most judges spend on this genre of bullshit case.
I think the two last footnotes—11 and 12—in the opinion are worth copying and pasting (my experience is that in otherwise unexceptional (or even exceptional) cases there are some jewels in the footnotes, including here addressing some of the shelter's "hail Mary" ruses:
n11 Petitioner also raised the argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Slaughter, 146 S. Ct. 2283 (2026), undermines this Court’s earlier decision in Riddle Aggregates, LLC v. Commissioner (Riddle I), No. 31104-21, 165 T.C. (Dec. 15, 2025), denying petitioner’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a jury trial before respondent can assess penalties. Petitioner argues that after Slaughter failure to adjudicate penalties in accordance with the president’s political goals could be valid grounds for the removal of a Tax Court judge. The Supreme Court did not address the removal of a Tax Court Judge. Slaughter, 146 S. Ct. at 2306 (“Nor do we determine the fate of officials not before us. . . . [T]he permissibility of tenure protections for the judges of non-Article III courts, such as the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims, is not presented or briefed in this case and poses a different set of questions.” (citation modified)). Accordingly, Slaughter does not affect our analysis in Riddle I.
n12 Petitioner raised the argument that Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-5(a) is invalid. While the provision addresses the issue in dispute, respondent relies upon the statute to support his position. We reached our conclusion by relying upon the statutory text.