Update on FTPB Discussion of Legislative History (3/18/26)

I have substantially revised the legislative history discussion in my Federal Tax Procedure Working Draft for the 2026 editions (Student and Practitioner) to be published on SSRN in early August 2026. As currently revised, the text (without footnotes as it will appear in the Student Edition, although those wanting the draft with footnotes in the Practitioner Edition may view it here):

                                      (5)    On Legislative History.

          I noted above the controversy between textualists and purposivists over the role that legislative history should play in statutory interpretation. Legislative history is the course of congressional consideration in identifying the need for legislation, drafting or revising the bills (the “drafting history” for enacted statutory text), expressions by persons involved in the process as to how they understood the text of the bills, and the final statutory text. The principal sources of legislative history for statutes are the drafting history and the committee reports which I discuss below. (For tax legislation, the legislative history may also include proposals from Treasury (analogous to drafting history) and Treasury’s explanation of the proposals, most commonly along with Treasury’s annual budget request with tax proposals referred to as the Green Book.) Other sources include committee hearings, statements made on the floor of Congress in debating the legislation, and submissions to Congress by the executive branch. There is a long and substantial history of judicial use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, particularly in the tax area.

          Legislative history is a broad term, with some legislative history more persuasive than others (at least for those willing to consider legislative history). In terms of the legislative process and reliable indicators of the meaning of statutory text, the committee reports accompanying legislation are generally viewed as a reliable form of legislative history (eclipsed only by conference committee reports discussed below). In both houses, proposed legislation is generally first considered substantively in committees which generally give the most detailed consideration of proposed statutory text; those committees often hold hearings to discuss legislative proposals and then prepare reports explaining the proposed statutory text that they send to the floors of their respective Houses. The meaning of particular statutory text that is then enacted may be discussed in those hearings or in the committee reports.

          For tax legislation, because of the historic influence of the tax writing committees and their staffs and the assistance of the Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”), the committee reports of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee have been the most frequently used legislative history guide to interpreting the statutory text. Often said to rank even higher than committee reports in authoritativeness is the particular form of legislative history accompanying and explaining statutory text produced in a Conference Committee to work out differences in legislation between the two Houses of Congress. In considering legislative history in a particular case, it is important to understand the legislative processes that produced the legislative history and whether those processes make the legislative history a reliable indicator of the actual or deemed meaning of the statutory text.

Comments on Highly Recommended Article Extending Skidmore "Deference" Approved in Loper Bright (3/7/26; 3/8/26)

I have just read a great article: Mitchell Zaic, Note: The Skidmore Compromise: Interpreting Skidmore as a Tiebreaker to Preserve Judicial Wisdom in the Era of Loper Bright, 110 Minn. L. Rev. 1535 (2026), here, and post some thoughts on the article and on Skidmore (Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134 (1944), here).

First, I acknowledge Mr. Zaic has published an exceptional work with substantial research and creative thought after Loper Bright Ent. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), SC here (Preliminary Print), which overruled so-called Chevron deference. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), GS here. Mr. Zaic says in the asterisk for his name: “Writing this piece has been one of the great privileges of my life.” He has also privileged readers of the article.

Mr. Zaic states his thesis in these two excerpts (pp. 1356 and 1569):

This interpretation of Skidmore would only be used by interpreters when judges are faced with interpretive ties that have no other method of resolution. Only then can judges resort to applying the agency's interpretation. This method of interpreting Skidmore ensures that agency interpretations never overrule the best meaning of the statute, instead facilitating the judge in his or her interpretive quest. In addition, the tiebreaker continues the long tradition of respect for agency interpretations beyond that of the typical litigant.

* * * *

Where competing interpretations are at equipoise to an interpreter, courts should resolve conflicts in the agency's favor so long as the agency's reasoning is valid, thorough and its interpretation arises from experience and informed judgment.

Bottom line, Mr. Zaic argues that, in a state of statutory interpretive equipoise, a court needs—indeed, must—apply a default rule to decide the case. The default rule in a case where a regulated party opposes an agency interpretation is that the court should default to the agency interpretation. Mr. Zaic gets to his conclusion through a process of reasoning.

My previous Chevron research indicates that Chevron worked in equipoise (without necessarily the qualifiers at the end of Mr. Zic's last sentence). Chevron was supposed to apply only where, after vigorous statutory interpretation (Chevron fn. 9), the statutory text was still ambiguous—in equipoise—where the court could not determine which of two or more interpretations within the zone of ambiguity was the best interpretation.

Second Circuit Rejects Tax Court's Fahry Holding That IRS Can't Assess and Collect the § 6038(b) Penalty (2/27/26)

I have written on the issue of whether the § 6038(b) penalty can be assessed (with the assessment collection tools available) or must be collected by a collection suit in the district court. See posts here. The Tax Court held in  Farhy v. Commissioner, 160 T.C. 399 (2023), GS here, that the IRS could not assess and collect but rather must sue and collect. The D.C. Circuit reversed. Farhy v. Commissioner, 100 F.4th 223 (D.C. Cir. 2024), CADC here**, and GS here. The Tax Court stuck to its Farhy holding in cases appealable to Circuits other than the D.C. Circuit under its Golsen rule, feeling that its original Farhy holding was correct.

Today, the Second Circuit has now aligned with the D.C. Circuit, saying that the IRS can assess and collect the § 6038(b) penalty.  Safdieh v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (2d Cir. 2/27/26), CA 2 here, TN here, and GS here [to come]. Other than to say that I think the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit are correct, I can’t add any discussion not evident from my earlier posts linked above. Thus, this is a notice-only blog.

This post is cross-posted in my Federal Tax Crimes Blog, here.

Tax Court Calls Out Yet Another Bullshit Tax Shelter But Relieves Taxpayer of 6662 Penalties (2/24/26 as corrected; 2/27/26)

Major Correction: I made an error in the original blog post, by misreading the court's application of the 40% Substantial Valuation Misstatement and Gross Valuation Misstatement Penalties in § 6662(e)(1)(A) and I.R.C. § 6662(h) but not picking up that the reasonable cause defense it sustained effectively wiped out all 6662 penalties.

Yesterday, the Tax Court (Judge Weiler) decided Otay Project LP v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-21, TC Dkt here at # 349, TN here, and GS here, tanking another bullshit tax shelter. There is no indication that this is a syndicated shelter creating basis and thus deductions out of thin air in complex structures taxed as partnership; as presented it seems like “one-off” imagined by creative minds and blessed by firms that have played prominently in tax sheltering—E&Y and McKee Nelson LLP; moreover, I suspect (suspicion only) that variations on the shelter were promoted on and opined upon on other occasions.

I find it a bit odd that, although Judge Weiler says he read the those firms’ opinions (Slip Op. 45), but he does not identify the persons signing the opinions. Oh well, let’s move on to the main points for tax procedure enthusiasts.

On the Merits of the Complex Machinations:

The actual bottom-line tax costs of the shelter failing must await the Rule 155 computation, but the Court concludes on the merits (other than penalties) (Slip Op. 31):

In sum, we determine petitioner has not met its burden here and has failed to correctly establish the Basis Deduction under section 743(b), as claimed on OPLP’s 2012 Form 1065. Accordingly, we will sustain respondent’s disallowance of $713,759,615 of a more than $743 million claimed Basis Deduction reported on OPLP’s 2012 Form 1065 for the 2012 tax period. 

I believe it would not be helpful to most tax procedure enthusiasts to wade into the complex facts and partnership tax law discussed in the opinion. Although this appeared not to be one of the abusive shelters of the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., BLIPS or variants used by different accounting and law firms), I suspect that some of the fanciful notions asserted in those earlier versions were deployed here in a more complex and “engineered” (Slip Op. 30-32) journey through esoteric partnership tax provisions.

Suffice it to say that the Court rejected that “engineered” journey on the merits of the partnership tax law and also based on economic substance doctrine. In this regard, because it preceded the effective date, the transaction was not subject to the codified economic substance doctrine in § 7771(o) or the penalty in § 6662(b)(6). (See Slip Op 2 n. 2.)

 The Penalties:

On Supreme Court U.S. (or is it U. S.) Citations and the Supreme Court's Tariff Opinions (2/22/26; 2/23/26)

This blog entry is a bit of a detour from the domain of federal tax procedure. Specifically, this blog presents two more or less fringe disparate subjects. I divide the blog into two sections. The first is mundane: whether to space or not to space between U. and S. in Supreme Court citations? The second is a disjointed foray into the Supreme Court’s tariff opinions handed down Friday:  Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. ___ (2026), here (Slip Op.).

To Space or Not  to Space in U.S. (or it is U. S.) Citations, that is the Question

For those who review Supreme Court opinions in all official formats (Slip Opinion, Preliminary Print, and Final), the opinions format the citation to the official reports with a blank between U. and S.—e.g., Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo,  603 U. S. 369 (2024), here (Preliminary Print). I had not learned to cite without the space and had not paid attention to the Supreme Court's format (with space) until today as I was reading the slip opinion in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. ___ (2026), here (Slip Op.). So, I asked ChatGPT and received the following answer (with my prompt, with citations omitted):

Prompt: Please cite me authorities (judicial and otherwise) that discuss the difference between the Supreme Court's citation of its decisions as "U. S." (with a blank between U. and S. and other authorities (mostly commentary but also Courts of Appeals and case reporters) foregoing the blank between U. and S.

Chat GPT Response: 

The U.S. Supreme Court officially cites its own decisions using "U. S." with a space between "U." and "S." in the United States Reports (e.g., 5 U. S. 137), while The Bluebook, Courts of Appeals, most legal commentary, and case reporters standardize "U.S." without the space. This distinction arises from the Court's unique style conventions versus modern citation guides like The Bluebook, which enforce no space between adjacent single capital letters per Rule 6.1(a).

Supreme Court Practice ("U. S." with space)

The Supreme Court itself uses spaced citations in its bound volumes of the United States Reports, reflecting historical typography from early volumes like Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).8 This format appears consistently in official reporter headings and the Court's published opinions.

Other Authorities ("U.S." without space)

The Bluebook: Prohibits "U.S." with a space, mandating "U.S." for United States Reports (e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); spaces are reserved for abbreviations like "S. Ct." (Rule 6.1(a) and Table T1).

Courts of Appeals and State Appellate Guidance: U.S. Courts of Appeals briefs require "U.S." without parallels or spaces (e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). California Courts of Appeal cite as "450 U.S. 544." Washington Supreme Court style sheet specifies "__ U.S. __" without space in examples.

Tax Court (Lauber) Rejects Bullshit Syndicated Conservation Easement (BSSCE) Valuation Claim (2/19/26; 2/20/26)

Today, Judge Lauber called out yet another bullshit syndicated conservation easement (“BSSCE”). North Donald LA Property, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-19 T.C. No. 24703-21, here, at # 476; TN here; and GS here.The BSSCE claimed a charitable contribution of $115,391,000. The flaw that swung the case against BSSCE was, as Judge Lauber held in the opening (Slip Op. p. 3):

We conclude here, as we did in J L Minerals, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-93, at *3, that the valuation of the conservation easement “was an outrageous overstatement,” wholly untethered from reality. Employing the comparable sales method, as backstopped by the price actually paid to acquire the property in March 2016, we find that its “before value” was $2,975 per acre and that its “after value” was $2,300 per acre. The delta between these figures—the reduction in value attributable to the easement—is $675 per acre. The value of the easement—and hence the allowable charitable contribution deduction—is thus $175,824 ($675 × 260.48 = $175,824).

For those who are valuation enthusiasts, I suppose there is a lot to chew on. 

There are some interesting snippets in the opinion. I will list them in my numbered further comments below. The main things I want to write on are (i) the bottom-line valuation and (ii) the rejection of the civil fraud penalty for bullshit valuations. At trial, despite claiming a $115,391,000 value on the return, North Donald’s simultaneous opening brief (pp. 6, 124 & 202) described the valuation as:

5. Whether the value of the Easement Donation, as determined by Petitioner’s expert (Mr. Catlett), is $61,235,000?

* * * * 

824. The value of the Easement Donation is as determined by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Catlett, $61,235,000. Entire Record.

* * * * 

Because the Catlett Appraisal is the only appraisal before the Court that considered the relevant, available data regarding the quantity and quality of the clay reserves on the NDLA Property, the Court should adopt Mr. Catlett’s determination that the value of the Conservation Easement is at least $61,235,000.

So, after trial, North Donald conceded $54,156,000 of the amount it claimed on the return. More importantly, after trial, North Donald still claimed a value of $61,235,000. Judge Lauber found that the actual value was $175,824, which is 0.29% of the value North Donald claimed at trial. North Donald presented a gross overvaluation at trial by presenting, I guess with a straight trial face on, a valuation methology—described by Judge Lauber as the “Income Approach”—that has repeatedly been rejected by the Tax Court, as Judge Lauder notes (Slip Op. 54-59.)  Some interesting points of Judge Lauber’s analysis of petitioner’s claimed valuation:

Tax Court Memo Decision Warns Practitioners About Misuse of Artificial Intelligence Hallucinations (2/10/26)

 I have written before on Tax Court Orders addressing AI use and hallucinations. Use of AI, Including Large Language Models (LLMs), in Tax Court Brief Writing (And Really Other Legal Analysis) (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 1/22/25; 4/29/25), here. In Clinco v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-16 (2/9/26 T.C. No. 8077-23, here, at # 37 and GS here [to come]), Judge Holmes finally puts the issue in a decision (as opposed to an order). The relevant discussion is here (Slip Op. 5 & 6-8, yellow-highlighting supplied by JAT):

I. Notice of Deficiency

          Clinco’s challenge to the validity of the notice of deficiency serves up one apparently serious question: Must one of the Commissioner’s employees manually sign a notice of deficiency? But it is accompanied by a garnish we’ve reviewed in orders but not in an opinion: What should we do when lawyers cite hallucinated authorities likely generated through artificial intelligence (AI)?

* * * *

B. Fabricated Case Citations

          The persuasiveness of Clinco’s argument collapses like an overmixed soufflé when one looks at the citations used to prop it up. Mr. Wagner, Clinco’s attorney, cites four cases in support. Three appear to be hallucinations generated by a large language model AI. He cites “Cacchillo v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 132 (2008),” as a case where a taxpayer challenged the validity of the notice of deficiency because it lacked an official signature. He claims we held that the IRS’s failure to issue a valid signed notice of deficiency ousted us of jurisdiction. “Cacchillo v. Commissioner” does not, however, exist. Page 132 in volume 130 of the Tax Court Reports is within Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115 (2008), and that page discusses the standard of review for section 6015(f) claims for relief—completely unrelated to the case before us.

          Mr. Wagner claims “Cacchillo v. Commissioner” overturned “Miller v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 440 (1971),” and “Tefel v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 324 (2002).” He elaborated:

In Tefel the Tax Court did note that the case clarified that while substantial compliance may be sufficient, the IRS [*7] must still meet the signature and other formal requirements in issuing the [statutory notice of deficiency]. While some cases allowed for minor errors in the issuance process, critical requirements like a signature must be followed for a Notice of Deficiency to be valid.

Neither of these cases exist as cited. Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-448 (not the citation provided by Mr. Wagner) mentions a notice of deficiency in passing in the findings of fact, but only to state that one was sent. There is no discussion of the formal requirements of such a notice. Page 440 in volume 57 of the Tax Court Reports is within Winfield Manufacturing Co. v. Renegotiation Board, 57 T.C. 439 (1971)—a case in which there is no mention of a notice of deficiency whatsoever.

NTA Annual Report to Congress, with Purple Book Recommendations for Legislation (1/8/26)

This post is a little late in coming, but the National Taxpayer Advocate issued the Annual Report to Congress-2025, here. The key portion of the report for tax procedure enthusiasts is the “Purple Book,” here, described as:

a concise summary of 71 legislative re1commendations that the National Taxpayer Advocate believes will strengthen taxpayer rights and improve tax administration. Most of the recommendations have been made in detail in prior reports, but others are presented in this book for the first time. The National Taxpayer Advocate believes that most of the recommendations presented in this volume are non-controversial, common-sense reforms that the tax-writing committees, other committees, and other members of Congress may find useful.

 There are many proposals in the Purple Book that could affect tax procedure. The discussions of current law and problems, with the proposed legislative solutions are quite good. Given that Congress has not acted on the proposals yet, I thought this would be just a “notice” blog offering the descriptions in the listing (like a table of contents): 

STRENGTHEN TAXPAYER RIGHTS
1. Elevate the Importance of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights by Redesignating It as Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code
2. Require the IRS to Timely Process Claims for Credit or Refund
3. Require Notices of Claim Disallowance to Clearly State the Reasons for Disallowance, Explain Administrative and Judicial Appeal Options, and  Specify Applicable Timeframes

IMPROVE THE FILING PROCESS
4. Treat Electronically Submitted Tax Payments and Documents as Timely If Submitted on or Before the Applicable Deadline
5. Authorize the IRS to Establish Minimum Standards for Federal Tax Return Preparers and to Revoke the Identification Numbers of Sanctioned Preparers
6. Extend the Time for Small Businesses to Make Subchapter S Elections
7. Adjust Individual Estimated Tax Payment Deadlines to Occur Quarterly
8. Eliminate Duplicative Reporting Requirements Imposed by the Bank Secrecy Act and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
9. Authorize the Use of Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Grant Funding to Assist Taxpayers With Applications for Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers

Could the District Court Invite or Appoint an Amicus to Present the U.S. Position in Trump v. IRS? (2/7/26; 2/12/26)

Yesterday, I posted a blog on the Amici Brief filed in Trump v. IRS, (S.D. Fla. No. 26-cv-20609), CL Docket sheet here. On Amici Brief in Trump and Related Parties Suit for Damages from Unauthorized Inspections and Disclosures of Return Information by Employee of IRS Contractor (2/6/26), here. Basically,  a principal theme of the Amici Brief is that the Trump plaintiffs are suing the Government where Trump is also the Government “decider” (to echo George Bush’s claim). That presents some major issues, some of which are discussed in the Amici Brief and I address in the prior blog.

Today, I wanted to expand on an issue that I began considering after posting yesterday’s blog: 

Can the district court sua sponte or at the urging of some Amici invite or appoint an Amicus to represent the United States if the United States at Trump’s direction aligns itself with the Trump plaintiffs?

There is precedent that might permit the district court to invite or appoint an Amicus to participate in the proceeding to represent the United States’ interest where the parties are aligned (thus perhaps not creating a case or controversy). The precedent is Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), GS here. In that case, the IRS denied tax-exempt status to two education organizations—Bob Jones and Goldsboro Christian Schools--which allegedly had a "sincerely held" religious belief that their God required them to racially discriminate. The Fourth Circuit sustained the IRS position. In the Supreme Court, the White House directed the SG’s office to disavow the IRS position that had prevailed in the Fourth Circuit. There is intrigue and high drama about the White House doing that, but I offer more on that below in order to stay on track for the main body of this posting.  Perceiving that, at that point, the parties were aligned and no one was arguing in support of the Fourth Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court invited William T. Coleman, a prominent D.C. lawyer, to brief and argue the case as Amicus Curiae;  the opinion in the case describes Coleman as follows: “William T. Coleman, Jr., pro se, by invitation of the Court, 456 U. S. 922, argued the cause as amicus curiae urging affirmance.” (As in many Supreme Court cases, there were other Amici briefs filed, but Coleman’s was likely the one that the Justices paid most attention to; I have sometimes expressed doubt as to the efficacy of Amici Briefs that often flood the Supreme Court in hot button issue cases where the Amici often just give the same or slight variations of the arguments made by the parties or Amici, often with slightly different wording; Coleman’s was different because the Supreme Court respected him andinvited it.) In the merits decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, thus rejecting the White House’s forced position that put the parties in alignment.

The bottom-line, where in Trump v.  IRS the Trump-related parties and the Government (at the direction of Trump) have interests that are or may be aligned, the district court might invite or appoint an Amicus to assist the court in doing justice in the case. The court could do that sua sponte as the Supreme Court did in Bob Jones or it could do it on motion from Amici.

On Amici Brief in Trump and Related Parties Suit for Damages from Unauthorized Inspections and Disclosures of Return Information by Employee of IRS Contractor (2/6/26)

On 2/20/26 at 12:30am, an update has been added to the bottom of this blog entry to note another Amici Curiae Brief filing by public interest organizations.

I assume that most readers of this blog will already have seen news about Trump’s suit against the IRS for “damages” arising from the disclosure of his tax return information by an employee of an IRS contractor who was subsequently criminally convicted by plea agreement and sentenced to five years’ incarceration. E.g., Trump sues IRS and Treasury for $10 billion over leaked tax information  (NPR 1/30/26), here. The suit is titled Trump v. IRS (S.D. Fla. No. 26-cv-20609), CL Docket sheet here. (Reminder: Access to the Court Listener docket sheet is free and will have links to the documents provided that some CL member has downloaded them from PACER.)

The key documents to date are

• the complaint (CL here) and
• a new Amici Curiae Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae by Former Government Officials and Public Interest Organizations, here. The interests of the Amici are (Br 1-2, footnote omitted):

          Amici are four former government officials with combined decades of experience in federal tax law, each of whom joins this brief only in their personal capacity, and two public-interest organizations. They have sought leave to submit this brief to aid the Court in its management of this important case.

          John Koskinen served as the 48th Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. He was confirmed to the position by the Senate in 2013, and he served in the position until 2017. Prior to his service as IRS Commissioner, he served in a number of positions in the public and private sector, including as the non-executive chairman of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) from 2008 to 2012.

          Kathryn Keneally served as the Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. Department of Justice’s Tax Division. She was confirmed to the position by the Senate in 2012, and she served in the position until 2014. Prior to her service in the Department of Justice, she practiced tax law in private practice for thirty years and served as chair of the American Bar Association’s Section of Taxation’s Committees on Civil and Criminal Tax Penalties and Standards of Tax Practice.

          Nina Olson served as the National Taxpayer Advocate from 2001 to 2019. In that role, she led the Taxpayer Advocate Service, an independent organization within the Internal Revenue Service. Prior to serving in that role, she had over two decades of experience representing individual taxpayers at all levels of income.

          Gilbert Rothenberg served as the Chief of the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Appellate Section. He joined the Department as a line attorney in the Appellate Section in 1975 and served in the Section until his retirement in 2019.

          Common Cause is a nonpartisan, grassroots organization dedicated to upholding the core values of American democracy by working to create open, honest, and accountable government that serves the public interest. Common Cause has over 1.5 million members nationwide and local organizations in 23 states.

          Project On Government Oversight (POGO) is a nonpartisan, independent watchdog that investigates, exposes, and champions reforms on systemic corruption, abuse of power, and waste. [*2] POGO envisions a federal government that is effective and accountable—governed by just laws, operating with integrity, and committed to serving the public. Government ethics and public trust in the federal government are at the heart of POGO’s mission.

I will not write on the merits of the Complaint. I will editorially comment that, in my opinion, this is just another Trump attempt to monetize Trump’s presidency which has already unlocked mega-millions for Trump and his family (not to mention his “friends,” such as pardon attorneys close to him). Rather, I address in this blog the Amici Brief.

The judge on the case is Kathleen M. Williams, an Obama appointee. See Wikipedia here. Pretrial responsibilities have been assigned to Magistrate Judge Enjolique A. Lett. I could find no current information on her in a quick Google search; I did find, for example, that Judge Roy K. Altman assigned her to handle pretrial non-dispositive matters in The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust v. Capital One, N.A. (S.D. Fla. 1:25-cv-21596), here. (This suit against Capital One asserts a “de-banking” claim that appears to  be another classic Trump case to monetize his presidency; although Trump does not directly control both sides, he can control the levers of power by directing Government action, directly or indirectly, against the defendant; tongue-in-cheek, maybe Trump and the related parties will give up the suit if Capital One names its corporate headquarters the Trump Building or even the name of the organization as Trump Bank.)

Points about the Amici Brief: