CFC Adopts U.S. Interpretation of U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty Over Canadian Interpretation (8/27/26)

In The South Saskatchewan Comm. Fdn., Inc. v. United States, ___ Fed. Cl. ___  (8/25/26) (“South Saskatchewan”), CFC here, TN here, and GS here [to come], the Court rejected a Canadian charity’s attempt to apply an exemption in the United States-Canada Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (including a key Protocol). I found South Saskatchewan interesting because of the CFC’s application of interpretive techniques to resolve the treaty dispute between the parties in a situation where the Canadian tax authority and the U.S. did not agree on the interpretation as applied to the facts.

South Saskatchewan starts with the goal of treaty interpretation being to effectuate the shared understanding of the parties to the treaty. This is the contract model of interpretation. But, in this case, Canada’s understanding of the treaty is not the U.S.’s understanding. I infer that, assuming Canada’s current interpretation was taken in good faith, Canada did not have a shared understanding with the U.S. What does a court do when it cannot discern a shared understanding?

South Saskatchewan says (Slip Op. 6) after citing Loper Bright:

The meaning of both U.S. and Canadian laws, as well as that of the Tax Treaty, is susceptible to being construed, interpreted, and applied using traditional methods of statutory interpretation.

I am not sure how traditional methods of statutory interpretation flange with the goal of interpreting treaties to apply the shared understanding of the parties. Since, for U.S. purposes, the treaty is the law of the land and the treaty is text, I guess it is close enough to written law (statutes) that the interpretive model for statutes can apply. Maybe.

The Court adopts the U.S. interpretation based on a textualist reading of the Treaty Protocol. The Court finds helpful “extrinsic evidence” in the “legislative history” [caveat, legislative history is my term not the Court’s] of the Senate’s ratification of the Protocol. This legislative history is (i) the Treasury Technical Explanation accompanying the submission of the Protocol to the Senate for approval and (ii) the Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”) Report which “reflects the contemporaneous understanding of the Senate that ratified the Fifth Protocol.” (Slip Op. 9.) Both documents informed the Senate of the meaning of the Protocol.

Recommended Article on Constitutional Interpretation Applicable to Statutory Interpretation and Loper Bright (8/22/26)

Yesterday and today, I have been thinking about an article that implicates some of the interpretive issues I have been writing on post-Loper Bright. The article is: John O. McGinnis & Mike Rappaport, Originalism’s Better Meaning (Law & Liberty 8/13/26), here. Although developed in the context of constitutional interpretation and originalism, the article makes some points that seem to me applicable to statutory interpretation more broadly than the originalism spin.

First, the authors define the difference between interpretation and construction:

Interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of a constitutional provision. Construction begins only when that meaning is deemed indeterminate—that is, when it is thought to run out—and the decision must be made on grounds other than the provision’s original meaning.

I would restate that for statutory interpretation as follows (with changes in bold):

Statutory interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of a statutory provision. Statutory construction begins only when that meaning is deemed indeterminate—that is, when it is thought to run out—and the decision must be made on grounds other than the provision’s meaning as determined by statutory interpretation.

In these constructs, Chevron deference was construction rather than interpretation because it applied only when the meaning could not be determined and applied as a default rule to resolve cases before the courts without regard to the indeterminate meaning of the statute.

One interesting construct the authors deploy in the article is the “51-49 rule” which permits the “best” interpretation to be determined by the preponderance of the evidence standard (applying fact-finding concepts to a state of statutory interpretive ambiguity). In this construct, interpretation of a constitution (or statute) requires a confidence level for an interpretation to be at least 51%. The construction zone is between 50.9999% and 49.0001% where some default rule is required to resolve cases.

(Caveat: I don’t think that is a realistic range in statutory interpretation (or fact-finding for that matter); can anyone meaningfully distinguish between an interpretation that is 49.9% and one that is 50.1%?; but let’s just accept that construct for now; for my discussion of such ranges in valuation context, see John A. Townsend, Burden of Proof in Tax Cases: Valuation and Ranges—An Update, 73 Tax Lawyer 389 (2020).)

First Circuit Holds that the Time Period to File Petition in § 6213(a) is NonJurisdictional But Mandatory, Hence No Equitable Tolling (8/19/26; 8/20/26)

In Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (1st Cir. 2026), CA1 here and GS here [to come], the Court held that

1. The IRS properly sent the notice to the taxpayer’s last known address. This is the less exciting holding, but I will address it below in my Comment #2.

2. Section 6213(a)’s timely filing requirements are not jurisdictional. (Caution on this label “jurisdictional” though, as I note below.)

3. As a matter of statutory interpretation § 6213(a)’s timely filing requirements are “mandatory,” meaning that the periods to file the petition is not subject to equitable tolling. This latter holding has the same practical effect as would have applied if the Court had agreed with the consensus holdings in the Courts of Appeals that § 6213(a)’s time periods were jurisdictional.

The key holdings for purposes of this blog are ## 2 & 3, although they are not outcome-determinative in terms of the holdings of other Circuit Courts of Appeals. That is because regardless of whether a Court bases its outcome on jurisdiction or a mandatory analysis, the result is the same in denying the availability of equitable tolling.

For that reason, I worry whether courts futzing around with “jurisdiction” in this context is meaningful. Courts could just go to the heart of the disposition that the time periods are mandatory. In many cases, courts are just writing at length about jurisdiction which has some esoterica when mandatory should do.

Added 8/20/26 3:25pm: For a different outcome see Maniktala v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (8th Cir. 8/11/26), CA8 here and GS here, allowing equitable estoppel for time deadlines in § 6213(a) based on holdings that (i) § 6213(a) is nonjurisdictional (consistent with Kyick) but (ii) the § 6213(a) deadlines are not mandatory (inconsistent with Kyick). It appears that there is a clear conflict in the Circuits on the statutory interpretation issue which is often a substantial basis for granting a petition for writ of certorari. I should note that, in effect, Maniktala seems to be based on the Eighth Circuit's application of the default rule allowing equitable estoppel in a case where the court cannot determine the statutory meaning (in interpretive equipoise), whereas Kyick is based on an interpretation of the statute where it could it could determine the statutory meaning. Although an agency interpretation that might have qualified for Chevron deference (i.e., a Treasury interpretive regulation) is not in issue, this split does highlight one of the central fanciful notions of Loper Bright that courts can always interpret statutes to reach the best interpretation without the need for default rules for decision.

Other JAT Comments:

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Judge Halpern's Rejection of Bullshit Tax Shelter--the Conservation Easement Variety (8/15/26)

In Evans v. Commissioner (11^th Cir. Nos. 24-11882 & No. 24-11884 Unpublished Opinion dated 8/13/26), CA11 here, GS here [to come], and Tax Notes here, the Court affirmed the Tax Court’s decisions based on the opinions Carter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-133 (T.C. Dkt. 23647-15, here, at #112 and GS here), a fine Judge Halpern opinion.

The Eleventh Circuit majority gave the appellants’ bullshit arguments the treatment they deserve (even more than they deserve). (There ought to be an appellate disposition simply by rejecting an appellant’s arguments in two lines:

Appellant’s arguments are bullshit. [No exclamation mark needed; a simple statement of fact]

Affirmed.

For that reason, I hesitated to write anything on the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished opinions in this case that have already involved grossly disproportionate attention from all involved (including perhaps not-so-innocent readers such as me).

Fifth Circuit on Rehearing Makes the Same Mistake on the Limited Partner Gambit to Avoid Tax (8/13/26; 8/20/26)

On 8/20/26 at 12:25 am, I substantially revised this blog entry. My additions are indicated in red; but I do not show strikeouts.

In Alain, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (5th Cir. 8/12/26), CA5 here; GS here, the Court on panel rehearing (also denying en banc rehearing), again rejected the Tax Court and IRS interpretation of the limited partner exception to the “self-employment income” in § 1402(1)(13). Readers paying attention in the tax procedure universe are surely familiar with that issue. Basically, active service participants in a business enterprise who would have had self-employment income in straight-forward characterization of their earnings have tried to avoid that tax on self-employment income by the magic of labeling their income as a distributive share for share for limited partners.

Alain was originally decided in Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, 165 F.4th 374 (5th Cir. 2026), GS here, which the Court withdrew on the rehearing. The judges on the panel rendered opinions to the same effect as before. The Sirius majority opinion was nominally authored by Judge Oldham. The panel rehearing opinion is per curiam with neither of the majority judges stepping up as the author.

I critiqued the majority in Sirius Solutions in Fifth Circuit Knows a Limited Partner When Reads It (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 1/24/26; 1/20/26), here. In my original blog on Alain, I did not pay attention to the difference between the original opinion in Sirius and the revised opinion in Alain. The panel majority states its bottom-line interpretation in the opening (Slip Op. 1): 

Today, we hold its original public meaning is a partner who plays no significant role in managing or running a business.

As stated, the panel majority’s revised formulation narrows the limited partner exception it approved in its earlier opinion. The panel majority deploys the tools of interpretation that textualists so love (such as contemporary dictionaries) to determine (divine) the original public meaning to possibly include only a smaller subclass of nominal “limited partners”—specifically those limited partners who have no significant role in managing or running the business. That narrowing is at least an improvement on the earlier opinion. 

Judge Graves engages the majority on its determination of original public meaning. (Slip Op. 21-25.)

Questions for Tax Crimes and Tax Procedure Students on Trump's "Settlement" in Trump v. IRS (8/6/26)

I have posted my Federal Tax Procedure Book to SSRN, see here. Since it is timely, although a moving target that we sure have not heard the last of yet, I thought I would post the concluding paragraphs of my discussion of Trump v. IRS that Trump and his buddies at DOJ (most notably Blanch, but not only Blanche) tried to use as a pretext to raid the Treasury.

In my opinion, Trump and his buddies new they would draw flack on that package, so they must have realized that the Anti-Weaponization Fund was just a ploy, a stalking horse. The real goal was tax audit immunity which for now has not been taken off the table. I discuss that in the Federal Tax Procedure Book (Student Edition pp.  802-805; Practitioner Edition pp. 1118-1192). I conclude that discussion with some further discussion questions for students of tax crimes and tax procedure:

Exercise for Students: Readers of Chapter Six discussing tax and tax-related crimes should be able easily to spot several tax and tax-related crimes that this conduct might implicate, particularly the ubiquitous defraud conspiracy. One possibility is that anyone participating materially in the audit immunity could be an affirmative act of evasion with respect to the taxes covered or an overt act of conspiracy (offense or defraud). In theory, if that were viable, all of the key players in this drama stand exposed to criminal prosecution. Of course, the prosecutions, if any, will have to be brought by DOJ which Trump can prevent while he is President but can then be brought in the next Administration unless Trump gives sweeping pardons to all who were involved. (I suspect and have read that those actors are counting on such pardons.) One final question worth asking is whether Trump’s control of DOJ and IRS could implicate some conduct for which the Supreme Court has given full or qualified immunity in Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024).

Another Exercise for Students: Tax procedure students should think about the settlement authorities discussed earlier in this text. Thus, generally, only the IRS has settlement authority for cases that it has not yet referred to DOJ. DOJ has settlement authority only for cases that the IRS referred. Facially, it appeared in Trump v. IRS that the IRS had only transferred authority to DOJ over the § 7431 wrongful disclosure suit. There is no indication that the IRS referred all of the matters sweepingly released in the Release Order to DOJ, and there is no indication that the IRS “settled” those claims.

Concluding thoughts: If nothing else, Trump v. IRS and its resulting commotions will occupy tax procedure and tax crimes enthusiasts for a long time.

 This blog entry is cross-posted on the Federal Tax Crimes Blog here.

2026 Federal Tax Procedure Book Student and Practitioner Editions (8/4/26)

I have published to SSRN my Federal Tax Procedure Book Student and Practitioner Editions. For information on the SSRN links to download see the page to the right titled “Federal Tax Procedure Book (2026 Editions) (8/4/26)” here.

FTPB 2016 Editions Discussion of Trump v. IRS and Its Resulting Machinations (8/3/26)

I am trying to wrap up the 2026 Editions of my Federal Tax Procedure Book but the ongoing drama by DOJ’s $2.77 billion Anti-Weaponization Fund and Trump and related party tax immunity does not permit an easy stopping point. But I have to stop and have just concluded all that will be in the 2026 Editions that I hope to publish later this week. I thought I would post the discussion below (the Student Edition version without footnotes by copy and paste into the blog below) and the Practitioner Edition version with footnotes that can be downloaded here.

                   2.     Examples (Including Trump v. IRS).

          A prominent example of this remedy is a suit brought by a Kenneth Griffin, a hedge fund billionaire. An employee of a third party contractor to the IRS, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., illegally accessed and disclosed the tax return information of Griffin and others to a news organization, ProPublica, which in turn published some of the tax return information. Griffin sued the IRS under (i) § 7431, alleging violation of § 6103, and (ii) the Privacy Act. The employee was prosecuted and pled guilty, receiving a five-year sentence. Griffin and the IRS settled the civil action resulting in a dismissal with prejudice. All of the terms of the settlement are not available, but apparently there was no monetary consideration and the IRS agreed to and did issue a public apology. Another reputed billionaire brought related action against the employee’s employer, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.

          A more prominent example arising from the same mass disclosures is a 2026 suit Donald J. Trump filed in his nominal personal capacity for $10 billion damages (asserting both the minimum $1,000 per disclosure with disclosures at $1,000 justifying $10 billion or actual damages of $10 billion) and for punitive damages in an amount not stated. The Plaintiffs included Trump’s sons and The Trump Organization, LLC. (referred to collectively as the Trump Plaintiffs). Before the DOJ filed an answer, the Judge asked the parties to brief whether, given President Trump’s control over the Government parties (IRS and DOJ) and personal interest as Plaintiff, the case met the required Article III case or controversy requirement. The Court also appointed amici to provide independent briefing on that issue. Before the parties presented their briefing but after the amici provided its initial brief, the Trump Plaintiffs moved to dismiss with prejudice under FRCP Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) which requires dismissal with prejudice. On May 18, 2026, the Court dismissed with prejudice, noting:

Senator Kennedy Questions Trump Judicial Nominee on Original Public Meaning (7/28/26)

Recently, Senator John Kennedy (yeah, the folksy speaking one) and a Trump judicial nominee discussed conservative dogma in Constitutional interpretation (dogma that also plays out in statutory interpretation because the Constitution is just a super-statute). The discussion starts here. Many originalists now genuflect to the interpretive God of “original public meaning”—in other words, they look for the meaning of the words as the meaning some imagined public audience contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution would have interpreted the words. Senator Kennedy wants to know why the meaning that some imagined public audience might matter more than the meaning the actual framers of the Constitution contemporaneously attributed to the words. Senator Kennedy nails the bankruptcy of this notion of the originalist adventure that has captured the conservative imagination. One of my favorite articles on this theme is Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 575 (2011), here.

I write on a Federal Tax Procedure Blog which rarely deals with Constitutional interpretation. This Blog deals mostly with statutory interpretation, but the screwy conservative notions that affect original public meaning play out in statutory interpretation where conservative judges deploy dictionaries more or less contemporaneous with the statute text enactment to divine meaning rather than using the legislators’ own explanations (legislative history).

Side Note: Senator Kennedy (Wikipedia here) received his J.D. (basic law degree) from UVA Law School in 1977 (where he was executive editor of the Virginia Law Review) and thereafter a Bachelor of Civil Law (B.C.L.) from Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1979. He is plenty smart, sometimes masked by his folksy way of presenting himself. But that folksy way can often result in good discussions as above where he bests the judicial nominee spouting conservative dogma.

Eleventh Circuit Rejects Bullshit Conservation Easement Shelter (7/20/26; 7/27/26)

In Savannah Shoals, LLC v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (11th Cir. 2026), CA11 here and GS here, the Eleventh Circuit rejects the appeal of a bullshit conservation easement shelter. The result is foretold in the first paragraph of the opinion, noting that the shelter claimed a “$23 million” deduction for an easement found by the Tax Court to be worth $480,000. See Judge Goeke’s opinion Savannah Shoals LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-35, here.

I won’t discuss the opinion further because, although it is 34 pages long and is designated “FOR PUBLICATION,” I don’t think it adds anything material to previously developed law, factual conclusions, and appellate review. The bottom-line is for taxpayers and promoters to avoid bullshit claims, including bullshit claims on the Tax Court’s valuations. The Court does not say that or even, for most readers, fairly imply that. Still, that is my inference. And, of course, plenty of other opinions, including from this Court, can be read for that proposition.

One interesting point is that oral argument was 12/10/25 and the unanimous opinion was 7/16/26, for 218 days gestation period for a 34 page opinion of little precedential value. (See CL docket entries here).

However, I will make some comments which are even more picky.

JAT Comments:

 1. The Court discusses the shelter’s attack on the IRS expert. (See Slip Op. 10-16.) The Court spends some time discussing FRE 702 and the Daubert Standard. As it turns out, immediately before I read Savannah Shoals, I had just revised my Federal Tax Procedure Practitioner Edition to add a footnote on the text reference to FRE 702. I just copy and paste that footnote discussion because I don’t think the Court in Savannah Shoals picked up the nuance even though I don’t think the nuance would have changed the outcome.