D.C. District Court Vacates IRS Notice Limiting Test for Clean Energy Credit (6/18/26)

In Oregon Env. Council v. IRS, ___ F.Supp.3d ___ (D. D.C. 6/6/26), CL here and GS here, the Court rejected the IRS attempt to eliminate one of the tests the IRS had used to satisfy the “beginning of construction” dates for clean energy tax credits. For a long time, the IRS had Notices permitting “beginning of construction” to be tested under the “Physical Work Test” and the ”Five Percent Test” (or “Safe Harbor”). By Notice 2025-42, 2025-36, IRB 351 (2025), the IRS eliminated the Five Percent Test.

The Notice was based on the President’s Executive Order No. 14,315, titled  "Ending Market Distorting Subsidies for Unreliable, Foreign Controlled Energy Sources," directing the IRS to "take all action as the [Secretary] deems necessary and appropriate to strictly enforce the termination of the clean electricity production and investment tax credits under sections 45Y and 48E of the Internal Revenue Code for wind and solar facilities." Soon after the Executive Order but before Notice 2025-42, reacting to the Executive Order, “multiple interested parties,” filed comments. Some commenters urged the IRS to retain the existing tests, called the “Physical Work Test” and the ”Five Percent Test” (or “Safe Harbor”) or make any new test only prospective. Prominent Congressmen offered comments, some supporting the existing Tests. The IRS then issued Notice 2025-42, 2025-36, IRB 351 (2025) providing that the “beginning of construction” requirement will be based only on the Physical Work Test, thus eliminating the “Five Percent Test.”

The Plaintiffs (“a collection of governmental and private organizations”) sued alleging “that the Notice is harming them” in specific ways outlined in the opinion (but not relevant to this blog entry). Among the claims made was that the Notice violated the APA reasoned decisionmaking requirement for valid agency rules. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).

After extensive analysis, the Court held (Slip Op. 49):

Notice 2025-42 falls short of these standards. The Notice’s elimination of the Five Percent Safe Harbor is a significant change in the IRS’s position on what it means to “begin construction” for purposes of clean energy tax credits. This changed position implicates “serious reliance interests,” which the agency actively invited by repeatedly restating its prior approach. See Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221–22. Although the record shows that the Defendants received clear warnings about those reliance interests before adopting the Notice, the agency failed to justify its decision to change course. Because neither the Notice nor the administrative record provides an explanation from which “the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned” in light of all the facts and circumstances, the Notice is arbitrary and capricious. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.

On Legislative History—Supreme Court Faceoff Between Conservative and Liberal Justices with Comments (6/16/26)

In FS Credit Opportunities Corp.v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U. S. ____ (2026), decided June 22, 2026, SC here* and GS here**, the conservative and liberal Justices fussed about the proper role of legislative history in statutory interpretation. That fussing interested me because I had recently made substantial revisions to that fuss in my 2026 Working Draft of my Federal Tax Procedure book (Student and Practitioner Editions). I don’t think the fussing in FS Credit adds anything meaningful to the discussion, but it does offer a handy opportunity for those interested in the issue to be up to date on the Supreme Court’s views. So, I thought that, in addition to notifying readers and providing links to the Opinions, I would offer the current treatment of the issue from the Working Draft (due for publication on the SSRN platform in early August 2026). The Practitioner Working Draft (with text and footnotes) may be viewed or downloaded here. The Student edition is the Practitioner Edition text without the footnotes, so for readers generally I just copy and paste here the text only:

(5)    Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation.

           The pre-enactment history of enacted statutory text may be important in interpreting the enacted text (just as, for example, the history of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution may guide its interpretation). Relevant history is often discussed in two broad categories: Statutory History and Legislative History. (Actually, statutory history (defined below) is a subset of legislative history, but it is not uncommon to treat the two as separate categories.) Both types of history stop upon enactment of the statutory text being interpreted; at least conceptually, since the focus is on the meaning of the text upon enactment, there is no such concept as subsequent legislative history which at best would be comments on the meaning of the previously enacted text. (I return to subsequent legislative history below, beginning on p. 34.)

           Statutory history can include two broad categories: (i) enacted text only, including enacted text that has been revised by enacted text over time (call this category “enacted statutory history”); and (ii) the changes in the text of bills as they move through the legislative process to enactment (“drafting history”). Enacted statutory history considers only enacted text and any interpretive inferences that may be drawn from enacted text; drafting history also considers drafts of the text as it moved and changed through the legislative process. Textualists use enacted statutory history to draw inferences of enacted text meaning. Sometimes, textualists resort to drafting history treating it somewhat like enacted statutory history in drawing interpretive inferences.

           Legislative History includes all documents the legislature may have generated or considered in enacting the statutory text that might permit inferences as to the meaning of the enacted statutory text. Legislative history is the course of congressional consideration in identifying the need for legislation, drafting or revising the bills (the “drafting history” and statutory history for enacted statutory text), expressions by persons involved in the process as to how they understood the text of the bills, and the final statutory text. The principal sources of legislative history for statutes are the drafting history and the committee reports which I discuss below. (For tax legislation, the legislative history may also include proposals from Treasury (analogous to drafting history) and Treasury’s explanation of the proposals, most commonly along with Treasury’s annual budget request with tax proposals referred to as the Green Book.) Other sources include committee hearings, statements made on the floor of Congress in debating the legislation, and submissions to Congress by the executive branch. There is a long and substantial history of judicial use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, particularly in the tax area.

Tax Court Holds that IRS Must Prove Return Fraud After a Convicted Spouse is Convicted for Tax Evasion (5/30/26)

In Li v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-42 (T.C. Case 12133-23 at #35, here, at #35, and GS here [to come], the Court addressed proof issues for applying the unlimited statute of limitations for a joint return spouse (“unconvicted spouse”) after the other spouse was convicted of tax evasion (“the convicted spouse”). Of course, as to the convicted spouse, collateral estoppel will apply to establish fraud for the unlimited statute of limitations (§ 6501(c)(1)) and the civil fraud penalty (§ 6663). Li addresses the issue of the effect of the convicted spouse’s conviction on the unconvicted spouse’s statute of limitations (§ 6501(c)(1)),

The background is the Allen issue. In Allen v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (2007), the Court held that fraud on a return by a return preparer without the taxpayer’s personal fraud invoked the unlimited statute of limitations in § 6501(c)(1). The issues Allen raises are discussed in several blog entries over the years, but I think they are presented in my most recent blogs: Update on Murrin Petition for Cert re Unlimited Civil Statute of Limitations for Non-Taxpayer Fraud Reported on Tax Return (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 5/19/26), here; and Further on Murrin and Allen and the Unlimited Statute of Limitations for Fraud on the Return (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 4/30/26), here.

Stripped down to basics, the current status of the Allen issue is as follows:

• for courts applying the Allen holding (that the preparer’s fraud alone will suffice to the unlimited statute of limitations; the taxpayer’s fraud is not required). This includes all courts addressing the issue except the Federal Circuit.
• the Federal Circuit held that the taxpayer’s fraud is required, at least in a context where the fraud on the return was not the preparer’s fraud (although the Federal Circuit did not intimate that preparer fraud would suffice).

Li dealt with the unlimited statute of limitations for the unconvicted spouse after the convicted spouse’s tax evasion conviction. The holding was that, as to the unconvicted spouse, the IRS must prove fraud on the return by clear and convincing evidence of fraud on the return (which need not necessarily be the unconvicted spouse’s personal fraud). In the Li facts, that means that the unconvicted spouse is not subject to collateral estoppel for the convicted spouse's conviction. Li does not address the issue I discuss in the first blog above as to whether fraud on the return committed by others than the tax return preparer (e.g., tax shelter promoters) will suffice.

I have synthesized the Li Opinion in my working draft for the Federal Tax Procedure Editions for 2026 (to be published in early August). I offer that synthesis here in the paragraph after discussing the Allen issue (note that the footnotes are presented after the text; the numbering on the footnotes will not be the same in the working draft or the final 2026 Practitioner Edition):

Interesting Concurring Opinion on Canons (or Maxims) of Statutory Interpretation (5/29/26; 6/1/26)

In Flight Options LLC v. United States, ___ F.4th ___ (6th Cir. 2026), CA6 here and GS here, the Court reversed a district court holding that Flight Options, a fractional-share jet company, was liable for withholding tax in the amount of $39 million on fixed fees it charged to pay for the overhead and management of its clients' private jets. The tax involved was the

7.5% excise tax on the “amount paid for” domestic “transportation by air,” 26 U.S.C. §§4261(a), 4262(a)(1), what the statute called a “ticket tax” at all relevant times of this dispute, id. §4261(e)(1)(C), (e)(5) (2012).

Although I do not plan to deal with the substantive merits of the withholding tax in issue, basically a high-level overview is that the tax is easily calculated, collected, and paid over for the travel that most of us experience on commercial airlines where the price of the ticket is all in for cover all associated costs to the airline of providing the air transportation (included quite indirect costs of management and even paying lawyers). Private-jet companies operate differently, not including all costs in a single fare but separately calculating and charging for its costs and profit. So, Flight Options, calculated, collected, and paid over only that ticket tax related to “usage charges for each flight a client takes, not to fixed fees it charges its clients for overhead and management of its fractional jet business.” The latter charges are the types of charges that commercial airliners build into the ticket fare and thus are, for commercial travel, subject to the ticket tax. In effect, the IRS attempted to require private-jet providers to include some of those charges in the base to which the ticket tax, and thus withholding obligation, applied, thus making the ticket tax more comparable in impact between commercial providers and private-jet providers. (Added 4:50 pm: To put that another way, for a pro rata tax, private-jet flyers pay less than commercial-jet flyers. Think about that.)

The Court of Appeals (Judge Sutton for a unanimous panel) rejects the IRS position the district court sustained. Of course, the issue is to apply the ticket tax designed with the commercial-jet model where all-in costs are included in the ticket price subject to the tax. As noted above, the private-jet providers separately state their costs (with separately stated costs including profit). The effect of the Court’s holding is that private-jet providers get a competitive advantage relative to commercial-jet providers. The Court confers that competitive advantage by deploying the favorite interpretive tool of literalist textualists—Dictionaries. Using those vaunted tools, the Court’s parsing of the tax indicated to the Court that the text was uncertain as to the liability—ambiguous, if you will—and thus it is improper to hold a third-party withholder for a liability that is uncertain. In the process the Court deployed two canons, called “relevant taxpayer canons”: (i) the Pro-Taxpayer Canon, called a general canon, that interprets uncertainty in tax liability in favor of the taxpayer and against the IRS; and (ii) a related canon, called a "specific canon," that to hold a party charged with collecting the tax for the IRS must have “precise and not speculative” instructions in the statute (meaning in his telling that ambiguity is resolved in favor of the putative withholder).

Adding to my FTPB Discussion of Civil Suits for Disclosure of Return Information for the Trump "Settlement" (5/26/26; 5/29/26)

Added 5/27/26 7:00pm and 5/28/26 3:30pm: I have added new matters at the end of this blogging. Since the issue is developing, I may update on the developments by additions below or by separate blog.

I have just finished a first draft of the portion of the working draft of my Federal Tax Procedure book 2026 discussing the civil remedy for improper disclosures of tax return information under § 7431. In the 2025 version, I have a paragraph discussing the settlement with Ken Griffin regarding disclosures of prominent (meaning wealthy) taxpayers' return information. I have not changed that paragraph, but have added immediately after it a discussion of the Trump v. IRS § 7431 suit and the settlement of Trump’s suit that has been so much in the news recently. I suspect most, perhaps all, the readers will already know the basics of the settlement that I offer. I link here a pdf with redline of the new discussion with footnotes. I copy and paste below the discussion (text only) with the new material after the Griffin paragraph (which I do not redline here).

           A prominent example of this remedy is a suit brought by a Kenneth Griffin, reputedly a hedge fund billionaire. An employee of a third party contractor to the IRS, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., illegally accessed and disclosed the tax return information of Griffin and others to a news organization, ProPublica, which in turn published some of the tax return information. Griffin sued the IRS under (i) § 7431, alleging violation of § 6103, and (ii) the Privacy Act. The employee was prosecuted and pled guilty, receiving a five-year sentence. Griffin and the IRS settled the civil action resulting in a dismissal with prejudice. All of the terms of the settlement are not available, but the IRS agreed to and did issue a public apology. Another reputed billionaire brought related action against the employee’s employer, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.

           An even more prominent example arising from the same mass disclosures is a 2026 suit Donald J. Trump filed in his personal (rather than Presidential) capacity for $10 billion damages (asserting both the minimum $1,000 per disclosure with disclosures at $1,000 justifying $10 billion or actual damages of $10 billion) and for punitive damages in an amount not stated. The parties plaintiff also included Trump related persons and entities. The Judge in the case asked the parties to brief whether, given Trump’s control over the Government parties (IRS and DOJ) and personal interest as Plaintiff, the case met the required Article III case or controversy requirement. The Court also appointed distinguished amicus to provide here independent briefing on that issue. Before the parties presented their briefing but after the amicus provided its initial briefing, the Trump parties moved to dismiss requiring the Court to dismiss with prejudice under FRCP Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i); as required by that Rule, on 5/18/26, the Court dismissed with prejudice, the Court noted:

           Because the Notice does not reference any settlement or include a stipulation of settlement, there is no settlement of record. Additionally, Defendants—federal agencies represented by the Department of Justice, which has an independent obligation to uphold the “public’s strong interest in knowing about the conduct of its Government and expenditure of its resources” and the “fair administration of justice,” 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.9, 50.23—neither submitted any settlement documents nor filed any documents ensuring that settlement was appropriate where there was an outstanding question as to whether an actual case or controversy existed.

In short, the Court smelled a rat but under the Rule was required to dismiss with prejudice.

Re-Working the Chevron/Loper Bright Discussion in the FTP Books (Student and Practitioner Editions) (5/25/26)

I recently spent some time and mental energy on an article on Chevron and Loper Bright. Incident to rethinking the issues, I have decided to substantially reduce the space I devote to Chevron and Loper Bright in my Federal Tax Procedure Book working draft for the 2026 editions (due in early August on SSRN). I will first excerpt the current discussion offering more (particularly with footnotes) and print that discussion separately for publication on SSRN. I will then re-work the discussion to provide more compact summaries of the key points, hopefully keeping the discussion to 5 pages with footnotes in the Practitioner Edition of the book (the 2025 presented it as 9+ pages).

I thought I would use this effort to test some AI Tools on a short portion of the discussion that I am deleting from the FTP book. I took a portion of the introduction to the Chevron/Loper Bright issues (about 2+ pages in the Student Edition (pp.59-61) without footnotes. The 2026 working edition made some significant changes, so I used that for the AI tests. The draft that I asked the AI Tools for assistance may be viewed here. I tried it on several AI tools, but chose to work with the MS Copilot versions. I present Copilot’s reworking of that text here (various offerings). Probably the best choice is the following which Co-Pilot said was a “High-Impact” version (I have lightly edited the Co-Pilot version (my edits are marked in red):

For decades, Chevron stood at the center of administrative law—criticized, caricatured, and often misunderstood. In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court finally swept it aside. But the Court’s account of what Chevron was, how it functioned, and what the APA demands is not a restoration of interpretive purity. It is a reconstruction built on selective memory and an unwillingness to confront the APA text Congress actually wrote.

Chevron never required courts to embrace an agency’s inferior reading of a statute. Its reach was far narrower. Chevron operated only when a court, after exhausting the traditional tools of interpretation, reached a point of genuine ambiguity—a state of interpretive equipoise where the evidence did not permit a principled choice between competing readings. In that narrow space, Chevron supplied a tie‑breaker, not a theory of agency supremacy. The agency prevailed not because its interpretation was “better,” but because the court could not say that any interpretation was.

The APA itself contains the same tie‑breaking logic. Section 706(2)(A) authorizes courts to set aside agency action only when it is “not in accordance with law.” That language places the burden of persuasion on the challenger. If the interpretive evidence is evenly balanced, the challenger loses. The agency’s interpretation stands. This is not judicial invention; it is the statute’s own allocation of interpretive risk. Indeed, in Dobson (a unanimous 1943 Supreme Court opinion), interpreted “not in accordance with law” as a standard of review of statutory interpretation to require deference.

Loper Bright avoids this textual reality. It asserts that courts can always identify a single “best” interpretation, as though ambiguity were a judicial failure rather than an inherent feature of statutory language. Yet the Court simultaneously preserves Skidmore respect—a doctrine that presupposes ambiguity. The opinion cannot eliminate ambiguity and preserve Skidmore at the same time.

This chapter begins from a simple but unavoidable truth: ambiguity exists, and when it does, the APA—not Chevron—provides the tie‑breaker. Loper Bright may have the authority to overrule Chevron. What it lacks is the authority to rewrite the APA or to pretend that interpretive uncertainty can be willed away. The real work of statutory interpretation lies in confronting ambiguity honestly, not denying its existence.

Fourth Circuit Holds that § 6015(f)(1) Innocent Spouse Equitable Relief Can Apply to Erroneous Refund Interest (5/22/26)

I write what I call a notice blog today on a case involving the innocent spouse equitable relief provision, § 6015(f)(1), as applicable to erroneous refund interest. The case reverses and remands a Tax Court "T.C." decision on an issue that is, I think, not commonly encountered. So most practitioners should just know the bottom-line holding and then can pursue it further if they ever encounter it. I do think students should be concerned with the case.

In LaRosa v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. 2026), 4^th Cir. here and GS here, the Court provides this good summary at the beginning:

A provision of the tax code gives the Internal Revenue Service discretion to “relieve” a taxpayer of “liability” for “any unpaid tax or any deficiency.” 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f)(1). Sometimes, the IRS refunds money to a taxpayer but later concludes it erred in doing so. Our sole question in this appeal: When the IRS mistakenly refunds interest payments a taxpayer made on previously underpaid taxes, does the taxpayer have a “liability” for “unpaid tax” that is eligible for discretionary relief under Section 6015(f)(1)? Because we conclude the answer is yes, we vacate the tax court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I have summarized the holding of the case in a footnote in my working draft for the 2026 Federal Tax Procedure (Practitioner Edition) as follows:

In LaRosa v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. 2026), the Court held in an esoteric application of § 6015(f) that the IRS could grant equitable relief for interest (as opposed to tax) erroneously refunded to the taxpayer. I won’t discuss LaRosa further because I don’t see it as a situation that will be encountered often.

Update on Murrin Petition for Cert re Unlimited Civil Statute of Limitations for Non-Taxpayer Fraud Reported on Tax Return (5/19/26)

I provide an update on the Murrin petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court’s docket sheet is here. On May 15, 2026, the Government filed its brief in opposition here. I have recently addressed some points on the Murrin petition before the Government’s Brief in Opp. Further on Murrin and Allen and the Unlimited Statute of Limitations for Fraud on the Return (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 4/30/26), here.

The Government distinguishes (Brief in Opp. 13-15) the principal case indicating a possible conflict (a key factor in the Supreme Court accepting cert). That case is BASR Partnership v. United States, 795 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015), GS here. The Government asserts that Murrin involves fraud by the tax return preparer whereas BASR did not involve fraud by the tax return preparer (the fraud was by others in the bullshit shelter feeding chain, such as promoter and lawyers issuing bullshit opinions). That distinction strikes me as irrelevant to a textual reading of § 6501(c)(1).

The text is:

In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.

Once you say that fraud by someone other than the taxpayer that resulted in fraudulent reporting on a false return is sufficient, the text does not limit it to the taxpayer and the tax return preparer.

IRS Makes Generous Offer to Settle Many Bullshit Conservation Easement Cases (5/18/26)

In IR-2026-65 (5/12/26), here, the IRS announced a new time-limited settlement initiative for bullshit conservation easements with bullshit (maybe redundant) claims for charitable deductions. Given that the claimed deductions were always bullshit, those at risk should (in my opinion) take the offer if they are otherwise eligible to do so. I won’t go through the eligibility requirements; those interested in those requirements should consult with counsel who, if competent, should be capable of assessing the high risk of not accepting. I will say that, for the taxpayers targeted, this is an extremely generous offer.

That is to say that, if I had been a Government (IRS or DOJ) attorney litigating one of these cases, there is no way the taxpayers in those cases would have gotten such a settlement offer from me; my opposing counsel when I was a DOJ Tax litigator knew that I did not make settlement offers (I told opposing counsel early on just to be sure they were aware); I recommended acceptance of taxpayer settlement offers only rarely (including one that conceded everything, including a civil fraud penalty that I caused the IRS to assert, but wanted the concession styled as a settlement; I even balked at the description of a complete concession as a “settlement” but finally recommended acceptance of the full concession “settlement” offer). In some rare cases, I did dicker with opposing counsel regard their offers, but we just did not have the same view of the taxpayer winning the case. Even in those cases I lost after receiving a settlement offer I rejected (or DOJ Tax rejected based on my recommendation), I never thought that in retrospect I should have recommended acceptance of the offer. You win some; you lose some.

Federal Circuit Rejects Taxpayers' Arguments about Midco Transaction (5/17/26)

In Dillon Trust Co. LLC v. United States, ___ F.4th ___ (Fed. Cir. 2026), CAFC here and GS here, the Court in 50 pages rejects Dillon Trust’s bullshit claims in a bullshit “midco” transaction tax shelter. I wrote on one aspect of the case below. Court of Federal Claims Rejects Defective § 6603 Strategy for Multiple Transferee Liabilities (11/21/22), here (discussing one aspect of the Federal Circuit opinion).

The Federal Circuit offers a reasonable description of midco transactions (Slip Op. 10 n. 5):

5 A “midco transaction” or intermediary transaction is structured to allow a seller to engage in a stock sale and a buyer to engage in an asset purchase. Shareholders sell their C corporation stock to an intermediary (or midco) at a purchase price that does not discount for the built-in gain tax liability, as a stock sale to the ultimate purchaser would. The midco then sells the assets of the C corporation to the buyer, who gets a purchase price basis in the assets. The midco’s willingness to allow both buyer and seller to avoid the tax consequences inherent in holding appreciated assets in a C corporation is based on supposed tax attributes, like losses, that allow it to absorb the built-in gain tax liability. But, if these tax attributes of the midco prove to be artificial, then the tax liability created by the built-in gains on the sold assets still needs to be paid. In many instances, the midco is a newly formed entity created for the sole purpose of facilitating such a transaction, without other income or assets. It is thus likely to be judgment-proof, and the IRS will need to seek payment from the other parties involved in the transaction to satisfy any unpaid tax liability. 

That definition is antiseptic, eliminating details of the high- or low-drama presented in the rest of the opinion where the players on the taxpayer side unsuccessfully claimed a type of willful ignorance about the transaction to justify their participation and, they hoped, avoid the transferee tax liability involved. They failed.

The Court affirmed that the involved parties had at least constructive knowledge of the bullshit gambit and therefore could be liable under New York’s Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (see Slip Op. 21-26). Based on the players involved (see Slip Op. 3 nn. 1-3), some of whom testified, this was ““[a] deal done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid.” Michael Graetz statement, oft quoted, see e.g., Lynnley Browning, How to Know When a Tax Deal Isn’t a Good Deal (New York Times 10/10/08).

On what these taxpayers (including the company whose stock was purchased), their transferees, their advisors, and other players in the “deal” knew or should have known, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CFC holding of constructive fraud. (In my mind, the facts affirmed by the Federal Circuit might have even permitted a reasonable inference of actual fraud in the sense that the selling shareholders in the midco transaction knew enough to also know that the taxes were going to be avoided/evaded.) Readers might want to read through the opinion to appreciate the high- or low-drama.

Key bullet points of the holding are:

• Transferee liability under § 6901 applies and invokes the NY UFCA. (Slip Op. 20-39.)
• The amount of liability included the transferor corporation’s tax, penalties, and interest. On including the penalty, the Federal Circuit noted that there “appears to be a circuit split” on including penalties. (Slip Op. 42) The Court of Appeals adopted the majority of Circuits inclusion of penalties (Slip Op. 42-44.)
• The § 6603 deposit made by the Dillon Trust could not avoid interest on other taxpayers’ liabilities. Slip Op. 44-50.)

As I view it, the parties knew or should have known that, if the IRS spotted the transaction and spent the resources to "unpeal the onion," it would likely assert transferee liability. So, it seems that they rolled the dice on the audit lottery. These taxpayers lost that roll of the dice. But there are many others who have won that gamble.