6th Circuit Remands Case for Consideration of Certain Constitutional Claims Against § 6050I(d)(3) Addition to Include Digital Assets in CTR Reportable Cash (8/21/24; 8/22/24)

In Carman v. Yellen, ___ F.4th ___, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20033 (6th Cir.), CA6 here and GS here, the plaintiffs made a number of constitutional claims against the 2021 addition to the definition of cash reportable on currency transaction reports under § 6050I. The addition is in § 6050I(d)(3) to include digital assets in the definition of reportable “cash.” The plaintiffs were particularly concerned about cryptocurrency. The constitutional claims as set forth by the Court are (Slip Op. 9-11, cleaned up for readability principally by omitting citations to the record): 

          Plaintiffs launch five distinct constitutional attacks on the amended § 6050I, including a Fourth Amendment claim, a First Amendment Claim, a Fifth Amendment vagueness claim, an enumerated-powers claim, and a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim. For each of these, plaintiffs bring facial challenges, meaning they contend all (or almost all) applications of the law are unconstitutional. That creates some confusion, however, because their legal theories, as we note in our analysis, sound in as-applied challenges by contending that specific applications of § 6050I or hypothetical future events tied to the statute would create constitutional infirmities. Yet, for all claims, plaintiffs’ requested relief is the same: a declaration that § 6050I is facially unconstitutional and that enforcement of the law be enjoined.

           Plaintiffs’ first claim is that the amended § 6050I violates the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the amended law compels senders and receivers of cryptocurrency in reported transactions to “share their personal identifying information in conjunction with the details of their covered transactions, and thereby reveal sensitive details about their personal affairs.” Because of the private nature of cryptocurrency transactions, plaintiffs contend that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the amended law will invade that expectation of privacy, all without the need for a warrant. Plaintiffs additionally claim that the government will conduct searches by violating their property rights.