Chevron, Loper Bright, and Statutory Ambiguity (1/8/26; 1/9/26)

Added 1/9/26 9:00pm: I would really appreciate readers notifying me of any case(s) they have read where the court said that it determined the best interpretation and nevertheless deferred under Chevron to a not best agency interpretation. Please respond either by comment or by email to me at jack@tjtaxlaw.com.

I start with two opposing statements:

“Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (Thomas, J. for the Court).

ChatGPT’s response to the following question: “Can you find me a United States case where the court determined the best interpretation of a statute but nevertheless applied Chevron to defer to a not best agency interpretation?”:

No United States case is identified in the provided search results where a court explicitly determined the best interpretation of a statute but nevertheless applied Chevron deference to a non-best agency interpretation. * * * * The results highlight Chevron's requirement for courts to defer to reasonable agency views of ambiguous statutes but provide no instance where a court labeled its own view "best" yet deferred anyway, likely because such language would contradict Step One's mandate to enforce unambiguous meanings.”

[JAT Note in support of ChatGPT’s response: I have read many Chevron cases and do not recall that a court ever said it had determined than interpretation other than the agency's was best but deferred to the agency interpretation. At an anecdotal level, I read cases identified by other scholars as Chevron cases and found that not one of the cases said the court determined the best interpretation was other than the agency interpretation and nevertheless deferred to the agency interpretation. See Is Chevron on Life Support; Does It Matter? (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 4/2/22; 4/3/22), here (focus on Category 5); and  Chevron Step Two Reasonableness and Agency Best Interpretations in Courts of Appeals (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 2/9/23), here (again focus on category 5). In not of those cases did a court state or fairly imply that it had determined a best interpretation and was deferring to the agency interpretation instead. Not one.]

I propose that (i) Chevron deference, properly applied, was a tie-breaker rule when a court found statutory text ambiguous as required to get past Step One (meaning that the court could not determine the best interpretation) and (ii) that Loper Bright’s rejection of Chevron deference leaves courts without guidance to resolve ambiguous statutory text. Of course, the phenomenon of statutory interpretive ambiguity is not unique to agency interpretations of statutes they administer, but at least Chevron offered a consistent and, in a sense, principled way to resolve ambiguity to reach a decision in the case at hand.

Fourth Circuit Applies Auer/Kisor Deference to Include in Guidelines "Loss" the Commentary Inclusion of "Intended Loss" (8/24/24)

In United States v. Boler, 115 F.4th 316 (4th Cir. 2024), CA4 here and GS here [to come], the Court held that the term loss included the pecuniary loss that Boler intended from filing false refund claims with the IRS. Boler filed six returns claiming false refunds; the IRS paid refunds on only four of the returns. Boler wanted the loss to be calculated using only the amounts actually refunded and thus to exclude the refund amounts claimed but not refunded. The district court held that Sentencing Guidelines inclusion of loss included intended loss. Since the pecuniary loss is a principal driver of the Sentencing Guidelines calculations, the inclusion of the intended loss increased the advisory Guidelines sentence and factored into the resulting sentence. On appeal, Boler argued that the Guidelines required inclusion of the loss, which facially does not include intended loss and that, the Guidelines Commentary interpretation of “loss” to include intended loss was an invalid interpretation of the Guidelines term “loss.” The Court of Appeals held that loss included the intended loss. (This is perhaps a moot issue in the future, because the definition of loss in the Guidelines was changed effective November 1 to include intended loss.)

The issue, as framed by the majority, turned on the application of Auer/Kisor deference. So, what is Auer/Kisor deference? As interpreted in Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019), GS here, the Court updated and constricted Auer deference, but, as constricted, held that in some cases courts should defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous agency legislative regulations. The majority in Loper Bright did not mention Auer/Kisor deference, although it cited Kisor several times; the dissent said (S.Ct. at 2306-2307) that Kisor approved Auer deference “which requires judicial deference to agencies' interpretations of their own regulations.” (Hereafter, whenever I use the term regulations, I mean agency notice and comment regulations required for legislative regulations and permitted for interpretive regulations.) The Loper Bright opinions make no statement that Auer/Kisor deference is affected.

I should note that, in my thinking, the Court analogized Auer/Kisor deference to Chevron deference which applied to agency regulations’ interpretations of ambiguous statutory text. The analogy is logical: Chevron deference applied to agency regulations interpretation of law (there statutory law); Auer deference applied to agency interpretations of law (legislative regulations that function like statutes to impose the law); so both forms of deference apply to agency interpretations of law.

Loper Bright’s Rejection of Deference Moots the Liberty Global Dispute About the Validity of the Temporary Regulation (7/12/24)

I have discussed various suits arising out of Liberty Global’s allegedly sham transactions to avoid tax based on an alleged loophole in the CFC regime as amended by the 2017 TCJA which taxed U.S. shareholders currently on all foreign earnings, except for certain limited categories of income. (For all blog entries mentioning Liberty Global, see here.) Liberty Global’s planning for the transactions was called “Project Soy.” The IRS sought to impose tax on Liberty Global for the Projects Soy transactions under the IRS’s application of the 2017 TCJA change. (The technical details of the statute and the Project Soy planning are complex and not needed for the point I make here.) The Project Soy initiative generated three separate lawsuits (making their contribution to full employment for lawyers, particularly with amici briefs on the inevitable appeal):

• Liberty Global brought a refund suit in the Colorado district court after reporting the liability and paying tax based on its claim that tax was not due,
• The United States brought a collection suit against Liberty Global to reduce the claimed tax to judgment before issuing a notice of deficiency, and
• Responding to a notice of deficiency, Liberty Global brought a Tax Court deficiency suit.

I won’t get into the procedural aspects of these various suits, except to note here that the refund suit requires Liberty Global to prove that it is entitled to a refund. (The other actions are still pending in the district court and Tax Court, respectively.) In the refund suit, the district court rejected Liberty Global’s refund claim, holding that the economic substance doctrine applied to defeat the claim. Liberty Global  appealed the refund suit. (10th Cir. No. 23-1410, see CourtListener Docket Entries, here.) On appeal, the parties fight over the application of the economic substance doctrine, either as a doctrine or its iteration in  §7701(o). None of the parties in their briefs cite Chevron or deference. (Determined by a search on those words in all of the briefs available in CourtListener as of today; my review of the district court order also indicates no reference to those words.) Accordingly, in the Loper Bright paradigm, the Government can prevail if its interpretation of the economic substance doctrine and § 7701(o) is the best interpretation.

Although Chevron deference does not appear to be directly at issue, I infer that the parties and amici for some reason think it may sub silentio because the parties commote at length about the validity Temporary Regulation  § 1.245A-5T. If the case is governed by the best interpretation of the statutory text as Loper Bright commands, what difference does it make whether the Temporary Regulation is valid? As I have explained in several blogs, the only interpretive benefit of a valid Regulation (whether Temporary or Final) was the potential for application of Chevron deference, a potential now denied by Loper Bright.

Does Corner Post Permit § 2401(a)’s 6-year Statute of Limitation to Apply from Date of Regulation for Procedural Challenges? (7/10/24; 8/17/24)

Added 7/11/24 4:00 pm: Caveat: My blog post below was an attempt to hammer Corner Post into the interpretive system as I understood it. Within that parameter, I think I got it right. But, since posting the blog below (after this update in red), I went back to basics to try to understand what this all means in the real world. So, here is another way to think about the interpretive regime we now have as a result of the confluence of Loper Bright (deference gone) and Corner Post. Here are the key bullet points:

• Loper Bright teaches that the best interpretation of the statute controls. The best interpretation gains or loses nothing (i) by being adopted in an agency regulation or (ii) whether the regulation is procedurally valid. 
•  The best interpretation issue is substantive and can be raised at any time (i.e., upon application or enforcement to the particular person).
• Ergo, Corner Post is the proverbial tempest in a teapot.

To extend the analysis:

• The best interpretation (whether or not in a regulation) is the interpretation applicable from the effective date of the interpreted statute. That means that the § 7805(b) constraints on retroactivity are meaningless if the IRS includes the best interpretation in a regulation.
• The adoption of the best interpretation in a regulation adds nothing of interpretive value to the regulation. However, perhaps at the theoretical margins, a procedurally regular notice and comment regulation interpretation might add some Skidmore oomph (whatever that is) to the persuasive value of the agency interpretation in the regulation.

If that makes sense and—dare I say—is persuasive to readers, there is no need to read the older portion of this blog below (but I think if one were to wallow around in the concepts presented below (as have I), one might get to the same point).

___________________________________

In Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS, 603 U. S. ____ (2024), SC here and GS here, the Court (Justice Barrett) held that cause of action “accrues” for purposes of the fallback 6-year statute of limitations in 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a), here, when the particular plaintiff first suffered injury from an agency action. The agency action was a regulation promulgated well before the 6-year period prescribed by § 2401(a). Corner Post, a new entity, suffered injury once it was created, thus its judicial challenge to the Regulation was timely under § 2401(a).

The gravamen of the Court’s holding is its focus on § 2401(a)’s text starting the statute of limitations when “the right of action first accrues.” That requires that the Court determine “the right of action” in the context.

The majority held that Corner Post’s claim was that the agency acted without statutory authority, an ultra vires claim. A party is injured and can challenge an invalid interpretation when the agency action applies to that party. This permitted the challenge by Corner Post, an entity created within the 6-year period before filing the challenge.

But, there is another type of APA challenge, a procedural challenge, that can be asserted to invalidate a regulation. The procedural challenges arise upon promulgation regardless of whether the regulation is otherwise substantively valid. Procedural challenges include the claim that notice and comment regulations have been promulgated without the agency having engaged in the APA procedural requirements of considering and responding to material comments. In such a procedural foot-fault case, the regulation can be within the authority conferred (e.g., offer the best interpretation of the statute) but might be invalid qua regulation solely for an alleged procedural defect. In such a case, of course, the interpretation (as opposed to the regulation) can still be valid and still be applied in a judicial proceeding despite the procedural invalidity of the regulation.

An aside: Prior to Chevron’s demise, the only effect of a procedurally invalid regulation was that the interpretation did not qualify for Chevron deference, so the court could still apply the best interpretation. See Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 28 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2022), CA6 here and GS here (rejecting Hewitt’s procedural invalidity holding but in any event holding that the agency interpretation was the best interpretation thus valid even without Chevron deference); see also Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Conflict with Eleventh Circuit on Conservation Easement Regulations (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 3/15/22), here.

Today’s Supreme Court Decision on Bump Stock Not Being Machineguns Ducks the Chevron Issues (6/14/24)

In Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. ____ (6/14/24), SC here, the Supreme Court rejected the ATF regulation treating bump stocks as within the meaning of the statutory term “machinegun, “which is  statutorily defined as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 26 U. S. C. §5845(b).

I won’t get into the fray of whether the majority correctly treats a bump stock as not a “machinegun.” The majority view is now the law of the land. Any change will have to come from Congress. (But we all know that, given the polarization over guns and other hot-button divisive political issues, the Supreme Court now determines the law of the land in the swath of decisions it alone can decide to pronounce; the Court makes the policy decisions that Congress should make.)

I do want to mention that in its opinions (majority and minority), the Court ducked any discussion or hint of the Chevron issues. Ultimately, the issue before the Court was whether the ATF regulations definition was within the reasonable scope of the statute’s text definition of “machinegun.” That sounds both within Chevron Step One (assuming that an unreasonable agency interpretation cannot get past Step One which conflates the Chevron Steps) or, at a minimum, Chevron Step Two (certainly Chevron Step Two rejects an unreasonable interpretation). The Court side-stepped any mention of Chevron by simply holding in a straight-forward manner (without mentioning Chevron), that the ATF interpretation was outside the permissible scope of a reasonable interpretation (as the majority saw it). In other words, for an unreasonable interpretation (i.e., outside the reasonable scope of any ambiguity in the statutory text), the agency interpretation cannot stand without mentioning Chevron.

The Courts below found some reason to at least mention or discuss Chevron. After all, notice and comment regulations interpreting statutory text has been the common ground for applying the Chevron two-step analysis (even before Chevron). (Most commentors don’t recognize or acknowledge that Chevron-type analysis has been a feature for testing the validity of agency rules since well before the APA in 1946. See John A. Townsend, The Tax Contribution to Deference and APA § 706 (SSRN December 14, 2023), pp. 5-23), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4665227

Excellent Article on Practical Effects the Administrative Law World Awaits Supreme Court Opinion(s) on Chevron (5/5/24)

The flood of Chevron comments seems to have slowed down while the Supreme Court is considering Chevron for what further havoc it will wreak in pursuit of its conservative agenda. Readers will certainly know that Chevron is a favorite bogeyman (real or feigned) in the conservative community.

I write to point readers to an article that I found very good about what might happen with the much-anticipated opinion. The article is James Downing, Energy Lawyers Debate the Impact of Losing the Chevron Deference (RTO Insider 4/29/24), here. The article reports on a discussion among “energy lawyers” which are perhaps not as nerdy as tax lawyers because of energy’s long-standing reputation of being major risk-takers. One of my favorite memories from moving to Houston in 1977 was an ad from a local entrepreneur, Eddie Chiles, proclaiming “If you don't have an oil well, get one,” see Wikipedia entry here. Tax lawyers are not identified with any particular risk-taking community and have long been thought as so nerdy as to be risk-averse (that reputation was challenged as tax lawyers forayed into bullshit tax shelters in relatively recent memory).

At any rate, the article reports interesting comments from the lawyers serving in energy regulator roles. I quote excerpts from the article:

          Chevron makes sense as a legal doctrine and provides judges with an easy way of affirming an agency’s decision-making when there is ambiguity in the law, FERC General Counsel Matthew Christiansen said at the EBA’s Annual Meeting. But underlying those decisions is some basic common sense being applied by the judges.

          “Because I think that Chevron is largely deployed as a way of providing a compelling path to affirm an agency action, I’m not convinced that the loss of Chevron in many cases, if that is indeed what happens, is going to lead to wildly different outcomes,” Christiansen said. “I’m sure it’s going to lead to different outcomes on the margins. But at the end of the day, I’m a big believer in agencies’ ability to still put forth compelling justifications.”

          Chevron has provided a lot of value over the decades, but the politics have reversed completely since it was first decided, DOE General Counsel Samuel Walsh noted. The late Justice Antonin Scalia, a textualist, was a big fan of the doctrine, and Justice Clarence Thomas authored the Brand X decision in 2005 that extended deference to the Federal Communications Commission and kept internet service providers from being regulated as common carriers.

          “Some of the most important Chevron cases were cases where agencies were using the flexibility afforded by deference to regulate in a more light-handed way, or maybe not at all,” Walsh said.

          The biggest area where DOE might be affected by the change in precedent would be on its ability to set efficiency standards for electric appliances, he said.

          “But to my knowledge, we’ve only been upheld at Chevron Step 2 once,” Walsh said; Step 1 is deciding whether the law’s intent is clear from the text. “We’ve done hundreds of rules over the last four decades, and I think we’ve only benefited from it in a clear and explicit way once.”

          DOE has benefited from the law more in its other functions such as litigation around nuclear waste storage in the 1990s and in litigation against the federal power marketing administrations it oversees. The law that governs sales from federal dams specifically calls “municipalities” preferred customers, so in the early 1990s, some “clever” city governments asked the Western Area Power Administration to sell them cheap electricity, Walsh said. WAPA argued that the term “municipalities” meant municipal utilities, and Chevron helped it carry the day in court.

*  * * *

Tax Court Holds Conservation Easement Proceeds Regulation Invalid Consistent with Eleventh Circuit Holding in Hewitt (3/28/24; 4/6/24)

In Valley Park Ranch, LLC v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. ___ No. 6 (3/28/24) (reviewed opinion), JAT Google Docs here and GS temp link here (GS permalink to follow when available)*, the Court declares the “proceeds” conservation easement regulation invalid by reversing its prior holding in Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 180 (2020), aff’d, 28 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2022) and adopting the holding of Hewitt v. Commissioner, 21 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2021). The Tax Court gets there with a thin one-judge majority because it drew only 7 agreements with the opinion of the Court (including the author, Judge Jones); there were two concurring opinions in result only and 4 dissenting opinions. (Note that the Tax Court has only 13 active judges, with six vacant positions per § 7443(a).)

I noted yesterday that the commotion about Chevron deference is just a battle in a “larger war to discredit what is perceived (or claimed for political purposes) to be an evil administrative state.” See Discussion with Reporter about Possible Demise of Deference, Now Often Called Chevron Deference (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 3/28/24), here (See Bryan Camp’s comment that, for APA issues, everything looks like a nail.) My initial reaction when I saw the positions of all the judges on this issue was to test whether some such bent may have been involved in Valley Park Ranch. Here is my breakdown (readers can click on the graphic of the spreadsheet for a cleaner view and download; NOTE THERE WAS A BUST IN THE CALCULATION IN THE ORIGINAL POSTING THAT UNDERSTATED THE OBAMA NOMINEES; I CORRECTED ON 3/29/24 @ 8:45AM):

The breakdown is interesting.

Discussion with Reporter about Possible Demise of Deference, Now Often Called Chevron Deference (3/28/24)

Yesterday, I spoke with a reporter about the effect of reversal or elimination of Chevron deference would have on tax administration. As readers of this blog will know, that issue is now before the Supreme Court in two cases. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (SEC) (Sup. Ct. Dkt. 22-451, here.; and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce (Sup. Ct. Dkt 22-1219, here). 

I thought some readers might like to engage with some of the points of the discussion. I will bullet point the key points starting with some predicate points to set up the issue of the effect of reversal or elimination of Chevron deference.

• The key predicate step is to define deference. Deference is a court applying an agency interpretation that the court does not believe is the best interpretation of the ambiguous statutory text. Based on my anecdotal research in significant datasets of courts of appeals opinions noising about Chevron, courts often are not concluding that there is a better nonagency interpretation. Best interpretations of otherwise ambiguous statutory text easily pass Chevron’s test that the interpretations be reasonable.
• I say that this is a predicate step, but it points to the final conclusion. If the Supreme Court says that deference is eliminated, that will only affect those cases where the court affirmatively determines that a nonagency interpretation is the best interpretation. Not affected are those cases where the court determines that, within the range of reasonable interpretations of the ambiguous statutory text, the agency interpretation is best reasonable interpretation or the court is in equipoise as to the best reasonable interpretation (unable to determine that any interpretation is best and agency interpretation is as good as nonagency interpretation).
• I did not discuss with the reporter how often a court might be in equipoise as to the best interpretation; some like the late Justice Scalia claimed that he was rarely if ever in equipoise in statutory interpretation; for present, I assume that legal realists know or intuit that a state of equipoise in statutory interpretation is at least a possibility.
• Chevron did not create deference. Deference existed long before Chevron, in Supreme Court cases describing deference as we now describe Chevron deference—(i) ambiguous statutory text; and (ii) reasonable agency interpretation within the scope of the ambiguity. See John A. Townsend, The Tax Contribution to Deference and APA § 706 (December 14, 2023 SSRN 4665227), here (showing these articulated features particularly in tax cases before the APA).
• Reversal or elimination of Chevron deference will affect only interpretations in Treasury regulations (both final and temporary) because (i) Treasury (IRS) and DOJ Tax do not claim Chevron deference (or any other deference) and (ii) courts do not “defer” to interpretations in IRS subregulatory guidance (Revenue Rulings, etc.). In this regard, Skidmore respect is often mislabeled as deference but is not deference. See Really, Skidmore "Deference?" (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 5/31/20; 2/14/21), here.
• If I am right in my conclusion based on anecdotal research and my intuition that courts now do not commonly really defer to agency interpretation (see definition above), then I suspect that eliminating deference (whether called Chevron or not) will not affect many outcomes, certainly not as many as the commotion about Chevron would suggest.
• Eliminating Chevron deference will exponentially increase tax litigation. It has been observed that the mix of administrative law and tax administration is like a lawyer with a hammer who imagines that there are a lot of nails out there that he or she can profitably hammer through litigation at high billing rates. See Bryan Camp, The APA Is Not A Hammer (Procedurally Taxing Blog 6/24/22), here (“Kristin Hickman loves the APA. To channel Jed Rakoff, it’s her Stradivarius, her Colt 45, her Louisville Slugger, her Cuisinart, and her True Love. It’s her Hammer, her righteous Mjölnir. And when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Including ALL Treasury regulations.).
• The question that should be asked is whether the burst of litigation attacking IRS interpretations in regulations will (or should) affect many final outcomes. I think not. But lawyers with this anti-Chevron hammer will certainly try and in the process charge their high fees. The IRS will underwrite those attempts by giving the taxpayers deductions for the high fees they pay their lawyers to go on what is often a quixotic adventure. (Part of the cost-benefit analysis for taxpayers is how many dollars are involved and the benefits of delay (including the audit lobby and the time benefit/cost of delay).)
• I pointed particularly to the commotion about the written supervisor approval requirement in § 6751(b) involving intersection of a poorly written statute (drafted in a highly partisan atmosphere surrounding RRA ’98 apparently without much thought about how it would actually work) and courts trying to make sense from nonsense. Sooner or later (much, much later), the courts will reach some consensus as to the various ambiguous (or nonsensical) terms in the statute or, more likely, either the courts will honor the IRS’s interpretations in final regulations (now in proposed form) or the Supreme Court will have to come in more than once to clean up the mess. See Musings on Proposed § 6751(b) Regulations and the Potential Demise of Chevron Deference (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 1/8/24; 1/15/24), here.
• Section 6751(b) is just one instance where deferring to agency regulations will avoid a lot of unnecessary commotion. Another instance I like to use (although not mentioned to the reporter) are interpretations such as those “deferred to” in United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967) where the agency interpreted the statute’s “away from home” requirement to include sleep or rest, hardly compelled by the statutory text but reasonable for administering the tax system. What happens to the thousands, if not millions, of interpretations buried in Treasury regulations that may now seem to be in play to those with a high-priced hammer?
• Finally, I vented to the reporter my concern that deference is just a battle in the larger war to discredit what is perceived (or claimed for political purposes) to be an evil administrative state. That is a political issue that plays out in many contexts; deference is just one context where politics is disguised with legal and even constitutional overtones (lipstick on the pig). My point is that given the community we have in the United States and where we want to be in the world, a robust administrative state is required. That means that we should honor those who work in that administrative state (military, IRS agents, etc.) and strive to make them better rather promoting a narrative that administrative agencies are enemies, a narrative that can seep through our fabric, even for such things as Chevron deference. 

Added 3/30/24 @ 2:30 pm:

Garland v. Cargill-Comments on Briefs and Oral Argument (2/29/24)

Yesterday, the Supreme Court held oral argument in Garland v. Cargill (No. 22-976 docket here, oral argument audio here, and transcript of oral argument here). The ultimate issue is whether “bump stock” devices are within the definition of “machinegun” in the National Firearms Act of 1934, as amended, and the Gun Control Act of 1968. Bump stocks were not devised when the statute was enacted and there is no definitive interpretation of the statutory term “machinegun” that includes or excludes bump stocks. Hence, the job of the regulator or the court in interpreting or applying the term is to determine whether, within the fair bounds of interpretation, the term includes or excludes bump stocks.

At first glance, this issue might call for the application of Chevron deference. Recall that Chevron deference requires two steps—

• Step One where the Court determines whether, on the text alone using proper tools of statutory interpretation, the text resolves the issue. If the text does, the interpreted text applies and there is no deference. If the text does not resolve the interpretive issue and the text is said to be ambiguous.
• Step Two, reached only if Step One does not resolve the interpretive issue, where the court determines whether the agency interpretation is reasonable (also called permissible). If so, the agency interpretation will prevail. Note that I said “prevail” rather than that the agency interpretation receives deference which is the standard Chevron Step Two formulation. Deference is only meaningful when the agency interpretation is not the best interpretation. If, within the zone of ambiguity in the statutory text, the agency interpretation is the better interpretation or even in equipoise as to the best interpretation, applying the agency interpretation is not deference.  See e.g., What is the Best Interpretation for Purposes of Determining a Not Best Interpretation for Chevron Deference? (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 10/21/22; 11/8/22), here.

In the facts of Cargill, the agency interpretation of “machinegun” to include bump stocks was made in the Trump administration in a notice and comment regulation adopting an “interpretive” rule. (I will address the interpretive characterization for the regulation below.) In adopting the regulation, the agency relied on Chevron. In the litigation culminating in Cargill in the Supreme Court, the agency did not rely on Chevron but rather asserted that the interpretation was the best interpretation. (Conceptually, the best interpretation can be determined at Step One or at Step Two (if the agency interpretation is the best in the zone of ambiguity); so it is unclear which Step the government’s reliance on the best interpretation applies.)

At oral argument, apparently because the government was not relying on deference or perhaps the uncertain future of Chevron deference, Chevron or deference was not mentioned. The argument simply addressed whether the text “machinegun” resolved the issue.

Oral Argument in Corner Post on Whether Procedural Challenges to Regulations Are Subject to § 2401(a)’s Six-Year Statute of Limitations (2/21/24; 4/6/24)

I previously included in another blog an introduction to Corner Post v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Sup. Ct. Case No. 22-1008), here, See Update on Supreme Court Deference Case (with Speculation) and New Supreme Court case on General 6-year Statute for Challenging Regulations Interpretations (Without Speculation) (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 10/1/23), here. The question presented in Corner Post is addressed to § 2401(a)’s general fallback statute of limitations of six years :

Does a plaintiffs APA claim "first accrue[]" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) when an agency issues a rule-regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date (as the Eighth Circuit and five other circuits have held)-or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to "suffer[] legal wrong" or be "adversely affected or aggrieved" (as the Sixth Circuit has held)? 

The Solicitor General (“SG”) worded the question presented slightly differently (appellate fans will understand the subtle difference):

Whether the court of appeals correctly held that petitioner’s freestanding challenge to a rule adopted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 2011 was untimely under the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) because petitioner had brought that challenge more than six years after the rule was adopted.

I noted that the resolution of Corner Post could affect many cases, including tax cases. E.g., Hewitt v. Commissioner, 21 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2021), GS here (where the Court invalidated an interpretive tax regulation promulgated in the 1980s for procedural irregularity (failing to consider and respond to meaningful comments during the notice and comment process).

Oral argument in Corner Post was held Tuesday, February 20, 2024. See the transcript here and the recording here. I won’t cover oral argument except as it might affect an issue I have discussed before—the difference between arbitrary and capricious procedural review and interpretation review through Chevron deference. The context for the following excerpts is whether procedural challenges (such as failure to consider and respond to comments in the notice and comment process) are subject to § 2401(a)’s six-year statute of limitations. Other nonprocedural challenges, referred to as substantive but, I think, meaning interpretive challenges of whether the regulation properly interprets the statute may be made on an as-applied basis during enforcement many years after the regulation was promulgated. [Added 4/6/24 1pm - see * at end of this blog entry] I quote the entire portions of the transcript (Tr. 33-24; & 73-74; note that Mr. Weir is counsel for Corner Post. and Mr. Snyder is Assistant Solicitor General, counsel for the Government):

Experts in Technical Area (FDA) Caution Supreme Court About Problems in Overruling Chevron Deference (1/12/24)

I recently wrote a blog on the bad effects of eliminating Chevron deference in a specific context—the § 6751(b) regulations bringing clarity to the legal mess created by the courts. Musings on Proposed § 6751(b) Regulations and the Potential Demise of Chevron Deference (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 1/8/24; 1/15/24), here. A team of multi-disciplinary authors has published a similar blog relating to the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”). Nikhil Chaudhry, Reshma Ramachandran, & Joseph Ross, Overruling Chevron and FDA Decision-Making (Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment 2/9/24), here. The authors credentials are:

Nikhil Chaudhry is a Postgraduate Associate at the Yale Collaboration for Regulatory Rigor, Integrity, and Transparency. Dr. Reshma Ramachandran is an Assistant Professor of Medicine at the Yale School of Medicine and Co-Director of the Yale Collaboration for Regulatory Rigor, Integrity, and Transparency. Dr. Joseph Ross is a Professor of Medicine at the Yale School of Medicine, Professor of Public Health at the Yale School of Public Health, and Co-Director of the Yale Collaboration for Regulatory Rigor, Integrity, and Transparency.

The authors make essentially the same point I made—abandoning Chevron in technical areas, like tax and the FDA, so that judges rather than experts make key interpretations will (quoting the Conclusion):

Overruling Chevron would drastically increase uncertainty and make public health agencies like the FDA less predictable and less effective. There is a high likelihood that decades of precedent would be undone by individual challenges to regulatory decisions, leading to great disorder—for Congress, for the agency, and for physicians and patients across the United States. The highest court should at the very least create a carve out for deference to scientific agencies, although it’s unclear how this would be operationalized. Regardless of how this court decides, with an array of complex public health and medical decisions arising in the 21st century, we need an effective government and more regulatory oversight, not less.

Among these authors’ arguments is the following:

Key Points in Oral Arguments on 1/17/24 in the Supreme Court Cases Considering the Future of Deference (1/18/24)

I have now had the time to read the transcripts of oral arguments in the cases challenging Chevron deference:

• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (SEC) (Sup. Ct. Dkt. 22-451, here.) (“Loper Bright”), transcript here,
• Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce (Sup. Ct. Dkt 22-1219, here ) (Relentlesss transcript here),

Relentless was argued before Loper Bright. I infer that was because Justice Jackson recused herself in Loper Bright.

I will discuss what I think are the key points of the oral arguments. There is a lot more in the transcripts, including both somewhat important points and some nit-picky points. I will consider later posting the transcripts with pdf highlights with discussion behind the highlights as comments for readers to review if they wish.

With apologies for readers that may not have some introduction into the jargon of administrative law, I will often just use that jargon without further citation. For example. I refer to (i) Chevron deference which refers to the deference approved in the case of that name and (ii) Brand X which is the deference approved in a Supreme Court opinion with that name. I do not give the cites for these common administrative law shorthand before having any understanding of the issues involved.

In my discussion, I do not attempt to predict whether the Court will pronounce the demise of deference (whether with the Chevron label or not) or the constriction of Chevron deference, or whatever. I note, that  the three Trump appointees (Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) almost certainly will vote for the demise or substantial restriction of deference (at least in its traditional formulation), because of their prior anti-Chevron musings and that anti-Chevron was a litmus test for their respective appointments as Justices.  See Jeremy W. Peters, Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: ‘Shrinking the Administrative State’ (NYT 3/26/18) (noting administrative state angst with anti-Chevron as a litmus test for Trump’s judicial, particularly Supreme Court Justice, nominees). And, Justices Thomas and Alito have expressed disdain for Chevron. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson seem pro-Chevron, although they might agree to some constriction (such as doubling down on Chevron Footnote 9). I think Chief Justice Roberts can go either way, but being an institutionalist may be inclined to lean toward stare decisis without terminating (but with constricting) Chevron in futuro.

What Are the Perceived Evils in Chevron? (Herein of The Deference Concept)

Oral Argument on 1/17/24 in Supreme Court Cases on the Future of Deference (1/16/24)

Oral argument in the cases (Loper Bright and Relentless, combined for oral argument) challenging Chevron deference is Wednesday, January 17. The relevant links are:

• Oral Argument Live, here (these are the only cases docketed for oral argument, so the oral argument should begin at 10am  EST).
• Recording of Oral Argument, here (listed under 22-451 Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo, Sec. of Comm. and 22-1219 Relentless, Inc. v. Dept. of Commerce.
• Transcripts of Oral Arguments (these are subject to change):
• Loper Bright, here.
• Relentless, here.

I thought I would use this blog to alert readers to some hyperbolic claims likely to appear in the oral argument (as they have proliferated in the press). (George Will, no fan of the administrative state or of Chevron, has said that “Hyperbole [is] the default setting in today’s discourse.” George F. Will, How the Supreme Court could end the ‘Chevron deference’ foolishness (WAPO 1/12/24), here (the claims he makes in his article prove the ubiquity of hyperbole).

Before addressing the hyperbole likely to appear in oral argument, I think it is helpful to establish what deference is:

Deference is commonly stated as a court applying an agency interpretation that reasonably interprets ambiguous statutory text within the scope of the ambiguity. Deference is more subtle than that. Deference is neither required nor applicable if the agency interpretation is the best interpretation (best interpretations are per se reasonable, after all). Rather deference only occurs when the agency’s reasonable interpretation is not the best; only then can a court defer to that not-best agency interpretation. (This does not address the phenomenon of the state of interpretive equipoise which I discuss in paragraph 4 below,)

 Now, to the hyperbole:

1. The hyperbole: Deference was the creation of the Chevron case decided in 1984. George Will says, “first propounded by the court in 1984.” That statement is not only hyperbole, it is false. Deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory text has been a feature of authoritative judicial decisions since at least the 1920s. All Chevron did was to (i) articulate an additional rationale for deference in the executive branch’s more direct accountability to the citizens than courts with lifetime appointments and no constituency and (ii) permit the famous 2-Step, which later courts found implicit in Chevron. (Since deference was the same as prior deference, the 2-Step formula was implicit in pre-Chevron deference.)

Article on The Tax Contribution to Deference and APA § 706 Posted on SSRN (12/14/23)

I have just posted this article to SSRN here.

The recommended SSRN cite is: Townsend, John A. and Townsend, John A., The Tax Contribution to Deference and APA § 706 (December 14, 2023). I don’t know why SSRN doubles up on my name, but have just not tracked it down. (If anyone knows how to fix that, please send me an email.)

 The abstract is at the link and then links to the pdf version. Here is my abstract of the SSRN abstract.

The tax authorities supporting APA to include deference are compelling. These tax authorities have been marginalized in the discussion. The law at the time of the APA in 1946 was settled to include deference when (i) the statute was ambiguous and (ii) the agency interpretation within the scope of the ambiguity was reasonable. That was Chevron deference before Chevron. That alone would support interpreting APA § 706 to include deference. But, there is more, § 706 states the standard of review for interpretations “not in accordance with law” which the Supreme Court interpreted in Dobson, a 1943 tax case, to mean review with deference rather than review de novo.

There is a lot of tax history in this rather short article. One key matter of interest is the roles in the tax system occupied by Justice Robert H. Jackson, Wikipedia here. He served successively in the following positions: Chief Counsel of the IRS, Assistant Attorney General Tax Division, Solicitor General, Attorney General, and Supreme Court Justice. He moved into all of those positions in a period of less than 10 years. Later, he also took a leave of absence from the Supreme Court to be the chief prosecutor at the Nuremburg war crimes trial. Jackson features prominently in the article as author of the Dobson decision, a unanimous decision, which authoritatively interpreted the Tax Court standard of review "not in accordance with law" to mean deference--hence Dobson deference--much like Chevron deference. The standard "not in accordance with law was incorporated in APA § 706.

I would appreciate any comments anyone would care to make to me.  My email address is jack@tjtaxlaw.com.

Fun Fact: The original draft of this article was over 140 pages long. I then bumped it down to 47 pages. It now is 32 (including appendix with the versions as it moved from the AG Final Report in 1941 to enactment in 1946).

Fun Chevron: AI Weighs in on Chevron’s Future (and Golsen) (12/12/23)

Chevron deference and its possible demise is much in the news recently with the Supreme Court’s acceptance of two parallel cases that address the following question: 

Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or, at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (SEC) (Sup. Ct. Dkt. 22-451), here; and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce (Sup. Ct. Dkt 22-1219), here.

I decided to ask various AI platforms what they could offer on whether the Supreme Court will overrule Chevron deference. Here are the answers from three AI platforms (alphabetical order by AI platform without only formatting (such as bold face) offered by the AI; Chevron is not formatted) [Note that I use the free-to-me versions of each platform]:

Bard (Google)

Whether the Supreme Court will overrule Chevron deference is uncertain. While there are indications suggesting both possibilities, ultimately the Court's decision will depend on the specific case and the justices' interpretations of the law.

Arguments in favor of overruling Chevron deference:

• Increased judicial activism: Some argue that Chevron deference grants excessive power to federal agencies, diminishing the role of the judiciary in interpreting the law.
• Lack of democratic accountability: Others argue that agencies are not accountable to the same democratic processes as elected officials, making Chevron deference potentially undemocratic.
• Concerns about agency expertise: Some believe that agencies may not always have the necessary expertise to interpret complex laws.

Arguments in favor of retaining Chevron deference:

• Promotes administrative efficiency: Chevron deference allows agencies to implement and enforce laws without lengthy court challenges, promoting efficiency.
• Recognizes agency expertise: Agencies often possess specialized knowledge and experience relevant to the laws they administer.
• Reduces judicial workload: Deference to agency interpretations can reduce the burden on the courts, allowing them to focus on other matters.

Recent developments:

• Supreme Court agrees to hear case challenging Chevron deference: In May 2023, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case related to the National Marine Fisheries Service's interpretation of a fishing law. The case could have significant implications for Chevron deference.
• Conservative justices express skepticism: Some conservative justices have expressed skepticism towards Chevron deference, suggesting a potential shift in the Court's stance.

Conclusion:

It is too early to predict whether the Supreme Court will overrule Chevron deference. The Court's decision will likely depend on the specific arguments presented in the case and the justices' individual interpretations of the law. However, recent developments suggest that the Court may be more receptive to challenges to Chevron deference than in the past.

Here are some resources that provide further information on this topic:

• Deference and its Discontents: Will the Supreme Court Overrule Chevron? (CRS Report): https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/4238063-what-happens-if-the-supreme-court-overturns-chevron/
• Supreme Court to Consider Major Case on Power of Federal Regulatory Agencies (SCOTUSblog): https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/11/chevron-deference-at-stake-in-fight-over-payments-for-hospital-drugs/
• Supreme Court to Consider Overruling Chevron Deference (Baird Holm LLP): https://www.theregreview.org/2022/07/14/pierce-chevron-deference/  [JAT Note: the link is to an article by Richard Pierce, a noted expert in administrative law]

Tax Deference Cases–the Rest of the Story in the Interpretation of APA § 706 (11/6/23; 11/8/23)

I susbstantially revised this blog entry because it was not my best writing; I have made it better (I hope), but do not change the trajectory of my original analysis.

As readers of this blog know, the Supreme Court accepted cert in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (SEC) (Sup. Ct. Dkt. 22-451, here.) (“Loper Bright”) to consider the following question in the October 2023 term:

 Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or, at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

Chevron is common shorthand for Chevron deference, named after Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron deference as interpreted (it's all about interpretation) deploys a two step framework before deference may be invoked at Chevron Step Two. Chevron is a hot-button issue for those who fear and/or hate (admitting some possibility to deploy fear and hate at the same time) of the administrative state and libertarians and a broad ragtag group of fellow travelers which, when lumped together, I call deference deniers.

Since the grant of certiorari in Loper Bright, the Court has accepted certiorari in Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce (Sup. Ct. Dkt 22-1219, here ) where the question presented is the same as in Loper Bright. The Court took unusual steps in accelerating cert action on Relentless and even in accepting cert in a carbon copy case to Loper Bright. The speculation is that, given a recusal of one Justice (Jackson) in Loper Bright, accepting cert in Relentless for consideration of the same legal issue on the same relevant facts at the same time would permit the Supreme Court to have a full nine Justice opinion or opinions on the issue for cert. On October 27, 2023, the Court ordered that Amicus Briefs in Loper Bright will be considered in Relentless. (There may be some opportunity for persons who were not amicus in Loper Bright or their attorneys with prudence to file amicus briefs in Relentless, and with the change in Supreme Court rules to permit amicus brief without parties' consents or motion; As with the Amicus Briefs in Loper Bright, the real targets of the Amicus Briefs may not be Supreme Court Justices but rather some amorphous (at least hidden from view0 group with deep pockets to whom they can market themselves for the old-fashioned reason to ultimately, they hope, make money.)

I don’t speculate about what certiorari means other than the Court will consider the question presented unless the court finds a way not to consider the merits issue or narrowly focus on some unimportant issue within the scope of Chevron (a not uncommon dodge for the Supreme Court when a more direct solution would be to DIG the case when it does not want to or can't offer any wisdom that is wise (t least when it can discern that is all it has to offer). I cannot predict any outcome, except that, if the merits, if any, are reached, the pinion(s) may speak to the continuing existence of Chevron deference (perhaps a refinement or limitation as in Kisor.) 

I have just finished drafting an article currently titled Tax Deference Cases–the Rest of the Story in the Interpretation of APA § 706. I sent the draft article to a friend who graciously agreed to read it and offer suggestions.

My article explores the claims made by UVA Law Professor Aditya Bamzai in his article titled: The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L.J. 908 (2017), here. As relevant to my article, Professor Bamzai’s claims, highly summarized, are that given the milieu of the Supreme Court cases prior to enactment of the APA in 1946, the state of deference at enactment of the APA was that the APA the in relevant part verbatim text of  706 cannot be read as authorizing a broad form of deference such as in its current iteration is called Chevron deference. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). (I do not suggest that deference to agency statutory interpretations ever had material features other than those in Chevron—ambiguity in the statute and a reasonable agency interpretation within the scope of the ambiguity.)

A Conceptual Analysis of Chevron Footnote 9’s Approach to (Possibly) Mitigating Chevron Deference (10/15/23; 2/6/24)

I am working on a paper addressing the issue of whether APA § 10(e) of the original Administrative Procedure Act in 1946 (now codified at 5 USC § 706, here). My principal contribution is to bring the tax authorities into the discussion. Tax authorities are important to the discussion but have been overlooked or misunderstood by those writing on the subject.

Today’s blog addresses the commotion about whether rigorous statutory interpretation is a cure, in whole or in part, to so-called "reflexive deference." This topic was originally in the drafts of the paper, but I took it out to slim the paper down and now offer the discussion here.

The cure championed by some (e.g., Justice Kavanaugh) is to deploy rigorous statutory interpretation at Chevron Step One to determine the best interpretation without ambiguity. (Remember that only at Chevron Step Two after determining ambiguity does Chevron deference apply.) This approach is the so-called Chevron Footnote 9 approach based on Chevron’s footnote 9 (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n9  (1984) (case citations omitted)):

   n9  The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.

The notion is that more rigorous interpretation will shrink the scope of the ambiguity and will shrink (or tame) the scope of deference. Deference deniers view this as a positive good to at least partially emasculate Chevron deference.

This blog is inspired by a tax phenomenon at the heart of abusive tax shelters sold with “opinions” written by prominent lawyers and accountants that the key legal edifice (and components) supporting a bullshit tax shelter opinion would “more likely than not” prevail. That type of legal opinion was inspired by the fact-finding concept that preponderance of the evidence meant a finding that, on the evidence, the fact was more likely than not. The fact-finding concept was sometimes conceptualized as a finding that the fact was more than 50% likely based on the evidence. A 50% or lesser likelihood meant the party bearing the burden of persuasion lost on that fact issue. So, in theory, if the fact-finder found that the fact was 51% likely the party bearing the burden of persuasion on that issue wins. I hope at this point you have spotted the problem—what exactly is the difference between 50% and 51% likelihood? Can a fact-finder really perceive that fine a difference in a way meaningful to make a rational fact-finding? Isn’t this a context where there is a range rather than a finite percentage. See in a similar context in fact-finding, John A. Townsend, Burden of Proof in Tax Cases: Valuation and Ranges—An Update, 73 Tax Lawyer 389 (2020), here.

Applying that theoretical concept to “law-finding,” what is the difference between a 51% and a 50% likelihood for a legal opinion. Can any rational or responsible law-finder—whether a judge in a case or a lawyer rendering a legal opinion--make that fine an analysis? Specifically, in the current context, is a judge’s or a lawyer’s belief that the likelihood of being the correct interpretation is 51% (proponent wins) or 50% (proponent loses) meaningful? Is that sliver of difference of 1% (or with finer tuning, .000001%) meaningful to anyone? See e.g., Daniel J. Hemel and Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 757, 781-782 (2017) (using a similar spectrum analysis)

Republicans Press Again on SOPRA Legislation that, They Claim, Eliminates Deference (8/30/23)

I am presently drafting an article, the principal point of which is to bring deference in tax cases to the discussion of the original meaning of APA § 10(e) of the original APA in 1946 (now codified at 5 USC § 706, here), which requires court review of agency action, in this case, agency regulations interpretations of ambiguous statutory text. The question is whether de novo review includes or does not include deference. For an example where prominent scholars have agreed upon de novo review including deference, see Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) and the American Bar Association Section of Administrative Practice and Regulatory Practice (“ACUS/ABA Site”), here:

Agency conclusions on questions of law are reviewed de novo. When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute it administers, the court is required to uphold Congress’s intent where Congress has directly spoken to the precise statutory question at issue. If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, however, the agency’s interpretation of the statute must be upheld if the agency’s construction of the statute is “permissible.” See Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984).

The review of tax cases applying deference before enactment of the APA in 1946 (thus setting the background for the meaning of the words in the APA), ignored or discussed only at the margins by most pundits pontificating. In my article, I will show that the mainstream discussion at the time of enactment of the APA in 1946 treated deference to agency interpretations as a process for interpreting de novo with deference, like tools of interpretation applied during the de novo review of the agency interpretation just as the quote above says it is. I discuss some tax deference cases and articles before 1940 (I peg that date to a claim by UVA Law Professor Bamzai in his acclaimed article, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L.J. 908 (2017), here, that there are 2 key periods to understand the state of deference prior to enactment of the APA in 1946 -- (i) pre 1940 and (1940 (app) to the date of enactment. I read the case authority and scholarly discussion differently than does Professor Bamzai particularly because of the tax case authority and scholarly discussion which he basically ignores.

I pause from attention to that future (if ever article) to write this blog to bring attention to readers a recent Republican legislative initiative to statutorily repeal deference by amending § 706 to require de novo review without deference. (The current brouhaha and misinformation about Chevron and how and when it works is mostly political and ideological emerging from hatred and fear, at least imagined, of the administrative state.)  Actually, this Republican legislative initiative goes back several years to other Congresses, all pursued with smoke and mirrors but, thankfully, no legislation.

On June 15, 2023, the House passed an act with the “Short Title” of “This Act may be cited as the ‘Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2023” or “SOPRA”. (See Congress.gov, here,  on the bill and its movement through Congress.) The net effect intended by the Republicans introducing SOPRA in the House and voting to pass it over Democrat opposition is, so Republicans believe, is to eliminate deference. The act thus would amend APA 5 USC 706(a) to read as follows (new language is redlined):

(a)         To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action and decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, rules made by agencies, and interpretative rules, general statements of policy, and all other agency guidance documents. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this subsection shall apply in any action for judicial review of agency action authorized under any provision of law. No law may exempt any such civil action from the application of this section except by specific reference to this section.

For the House Committee Report showing the amended entire § 706 with the changes in italics, see here.

This quixotic Republican adventure with no reasonable prospect of being enacted any time soon is a play to their base who Republicans have convinced should hate the administrative state as much as Republican politicians claim they (the Republican politicians) do. They claim that deference  is an administrative agency takeover from the courts of a large swath of the interpretive process. See Daniel Goldbeck & Shantanu Kamat, The Administrative State After Chevron (American Action Forum: Insight 8/8/23), here (caveat, this is a screed by an organization, the American Action Forum which as the name implies is a Republican Group not surprisingly anti-deference; why do Republicans consistently wrap their political agendas in things like America First or, in this case, the American Action Forum to imply that those who oppose are unamerican? That’s a rhetorical question.) Why is it when Republicans raise such whipping boys (the IRS is one, but the deference whipping boy goes to all agencies) as this can we assume that there is much hyperbole exceeding the bounds of critical analysis?

I have the following questions:

Supreme Court Grants Cert to Consider Overruling or Clarifying Chevron (5/1/23)

In today’s Order List, here, the Supreme Court granted the petition writ of certiorari in  Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (SEC) (Dkt 22-451). The Court limited cert to the following issue (from the petition):

  2. Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or, at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

I have written before on the Loper petition’s trajectory where I also link the docket entries on the Supreme Court website and on SCOTUSblog. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari in NonTax Case Raising Issue of Continued Viability of Chevron (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 3/19/23; 4/30/23)), here, and see no need to repeat or extend that discussion at this time.

Added 11:20 am:

Overlap Between Chevron Deference and Skidmore Respect; Chevron Deference Masking Skidmore Respect (3/25/23)

 I have argued in various postings on this blog that:

1. Chevron means that, for ambiguous statutory text, the court may apply reasonable agency regulations interpretations. (Please note that in this opening statement I do not call Chevron a deference regime.) Further, reasonable agency interpretations include (i) interpretations that are the better interpretation of the statute (by definition a reasonable interpretation) and (ii) interpretations that are not the better interpretation of the statute but still reasonable (whatever that means). Finally, based on my anecdotal but I think representative review of the cases where courts of appeals invoke Chevron to apply the reasonable agency interpretation but do not declare which of the subcategories the agency reasonable interpretation falls into, most of the time the court is at category (i) which is not deference. If that is right (I think it is), courts are not deferring to the agency interpretation in subcategory (i). Chevron deference applies only in subcategory (ii).

a. Chevron deference generally applies only to regulations promulgated with notice and comment. For this discussion, I assume that the Chevron-qualified notice and comment regulations were properly promulgated (i.e., no foot-faults in the procedures to promulgate notice and comment regulations).

2. Skidmore is not deference, because it does not permit a court to adopt an agency interpretation that is not the better of the possible reasonable interpretations. Rather, Skidmore only requires consideration of the agency interpretation in determining the better interpretation of the statute. Skidmore does not require or even permit the court to defer to an agency interpretation that is not persuasive as the better reading of the statute. Skidmore is not even weak deference, as often claimed. Hence careful judges and scholars avoid referring to Skidmore as a deference authority. Even Justices when discussing Skidmore recently have noted that Skidmore is not deference. See Really, Skidmore "Deference?" (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 5/31/20; 2/14/21), here, where I quote the Justices’ discussion in oral argument in Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (2019), with a link to the transcript of and local page citations to the oral argument.

a. Skidmore respect generally applies only to subregulatory agency interpretations not entitled to Chevron deference. (I use the term subregulatory guidance as agency guidance other than in a procedurally properly promulgated notice and comment regulation.) However, logically, Skidmore respect can apply at Chevron Step One if the agency interpretation is determined the better interpretation, thus pre-empting Chevron Step Two which is the only step in the Chevron Framework where a court can defer to an agency interpretation. (Caveat: my anecdotal reading of the cases and inferences therefrom is that courts rarely invoke Skidmore at Chevron Step One but probably do some type of Skidmore-type analysis without naming it at Step Two where they determine the agency regulation interpretation is reasonable and thus seem to defer (of course, the better interpretation is reasonable and needs no deference; I’ll come back to this later.)

b. I noted that Skidmore can apply at Chevron Step One. It may also apply before the Chevron Framework is invoked--i.e. before Step One. If the agency interpretation is the better interpretation of the statute, it might even resolve ambiguity which is the predicate to the Chevron Framework. 

I now extend those arguments.