Sunday, December 8, 2024

Guest Blog: Professors McGovern and Brewer on Developments in Hewitt Holding Regulation Procedurally Invalid (12/8/24)

This morning I offer a guest blog from Professors Bruce McGovern, teaching tax law at the South Texas College of Law Houston (school resume here) and Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer teaching tax law at the Georgia State University College of Law (school resume here). Professor McGovern authors many articles, including an annual article co-authored with Professor Brewer titled Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation: The Year 2023, 77 Tax Law. 805 (2024). Professor McGovern makes monthly presentations of material included in that annual offering to the Wednesday Tax Forum (“WTF”) in Houston. In the most recent offering on December 13, 2024, Professors McGovern and Brewer had significant items on tax procedure that I thought readers of this blog might find interesting and enlightening. With their permission, I am offering a copy and paste of the two items in two separate blogs (because they are two separate subjects). I offer some comments after that copy and paste.

The first involves the saga of cases starting with Hewitt v. Commissioner, 21 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2021) here, which held IRS proceeds regulation for conservation easements adopted in 1986 invalid under the APA for failure to respond to significant comment in adopting the final regulation. There have been significant developments since Hewitt that Professors McGovern and Brewer cover quite nicely.

IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING Exempt Organizations Charitable Giving

          With more than 750 conservation easement cases on the docket, the Tax Court’s flip-flop on the validity of the extinguishment proceeds regulation is not going to help matters. Valley Park Ranch, LLC v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. No. 6 (3/28/24). In a reviewed opinion (7-2-4) by Judge Jones, the Tax Court refused to follow its prior decision in a conservation easement case decided just four years earlier Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 180 (2020), aff’d, 28 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2022). Instead, rejecting Oakbrook, a majority of the Tax Court in this case appealable to the Tenth Circuit determined that Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), one of the chief weapons the IRS has used to combat conservation easements, is procedurally invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). It is fair to say that the Tax Court’s decision in Valley Park Ranch will have a significant impact on current and future conservation easement litigation between the taxpayers and the IRS.

          Background. Other than challenging valuations, the IRS’s most successful strategy in combating syndicated conservation easements generally has centered around the “protected in perpetuity” requirement of § 170(h)(2)(C) and (h)(5)(A). The IRS has argued in the Tax Court that the “protected in perpetuity” requirement is not met where the taxpayer’s easement deed fails to meet the strict requirements of the “extinguishment regulation.” See Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). The extinguishment regulation ensures that conservation easement property is protected in perpetuity because, upon destruction or condemnation of the property and collection of any proceeds therefrom, the charitable donee must proportionately benefit. According to the IRS’s reading of the extinguishment regulation, the charitable donee’s proportionate benefit must be determined by a fraction determined at the time of the gift as follows: the value of the conservation easement as compared to the total value of the property subject to the conservation easement (hereinafter the “proportionate benefit fraction”). See Coal Property Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 126 (10/28/19). Thus, upon extinguishment of a conservation easement due to an unforeseen event such as condemnation, the charitable donee must be entitled to receive an amount equal to the product of the proportionate benefit fraction multiplied by the proceeds realized from the disposition of the property.

          Facts. The taxpayer partnership in this case claimed a $14.8 million charitable contribution deduction for its 2016 tax year after granting to a charity a conservation easement over 45.76 acres of Oklahoma land it acquired in 1998 for $91,610. The easement deed recited in part that the contributed property was to be held “forever predominantly in its natural, scenic, and open space condition” and that “the duration of the Easement shall be in perpetuity.” 162 T.C. at ___. The easement deed further provided in relevant part that if the land was taken by eminent domain, the taxpayer and the charity would, “after the satisfaction of prior claims,” share in the condemnation proceeds “as determined by a Qualified Appraisal meeting standards established by the United States Department of Treasury.” 162 T.C. at _____. Upon audit, the IRS took the position, as it has in many prior cases, that the taxpayer’s deduction should be disallowed for failing to meet the proportionate benefit fraction requirement of the extinguishment proceeds regulation, Reg. [*9] § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). The IRS’s litigating position is that the proportionate benefit fraction must be fixed and unalterable as of the date of the donation according to the following ratio: the value of the conservation easement as compared to the total value of the property subject to the conservation easement. Thus, according to the IRS, leaving the proportionate benefit upon condemnation to be determined later by a qualified appraisal meeting certain standards is insufficient. (Note: Section 4.01 of Notice 2023-30, 2023-17 I.R.B. 766 (4/10/23), sets forth what the IRS considers acceptable language regarding the proportionate benefit fraction as it relates to extinguishment clauses in conservation easement deeds.) After petitioning the Tax Court, the taxpayer argued alternatively that either (i) the easement deed met the requirements of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) by “explicit incorporation,” or (ii) the regulation is procedurally invalid under the APA, in which case the easement deed need not strictly comply with the regulation as long as it meets the more general requirements of the applicable subsections of the statute, § 170(h) (qualified conservation contribution). The case was heard by the Tax Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

          The Tax Court’s Majority Opinion. In a reviewed opinion (7-2-4) by Judge Jones (joined by Judges Foley, Urda, Toro, Greaves, Marshall, and Weiler), the court began its analysis by reviewing the conflicting decisions of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits concerning the procedural validity of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) under the APA. See Hewitt v. Commissioner, 21 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2021) (concluding that the regulation is invalid under the APA); Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 28 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2022) (concluding that the regulation satisfies the APA). The majority emphasized that a divided (2-1) Sixth Circuit panel decided Oakbrook, whereas a unanimous (3-0) Eleventh Circuit panel decided Hewitt. Thus, in a footnote, Judge Jones pointed out that of the six appellate court judges who have considered the issue, four decided that Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) is invalid under the APA while only two upheld the regulation. Noting that the case is appealable to the Tenth Circuit, which has not taken a position on the validity of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), Judge Jones concluded for the majority that “after careful consideration of the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Hewitt, we find it appropriate to change our position.” 162 T.C. at ____. The majority gave a nod to the principle of stare decisis—following established precedent—but reasoned that its holding in Oakbrook, even though affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, is not “entrenched precedent,” thereby allowing the Tax Court to strike down Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) as procedurally invalid under the APA in line with Hewitt. 162 T.C. at ____.

Thursday, December 5, 2024

Texas District Court Enjoins the Corporate Transparency Act Nationwide (12/5/24)

In Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v. Garland, ___ F.Supp.4th ___, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218294 (ED TX 12/3/24), GS here [to come] and CL here, the Court ordered a preliminary nationwide (or universal) injunction enjoining enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act, codified at 31 U.S. C. § 5336. (The relief is sometimes called vacatur under the APA which has the same effect of a nationwide injunction, see Slip Op. p. 77.)

Four courts have spoken on the issue, with two granting preliminary injunctions (with different scopes as noted) and two denying preliminary injunction.

Granting preliminary injunction:

  • Nat'l Small Business United v. Yellen, ___ F. Supp.4th ___, 2024 WL 899372 , 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36205  (N. D. Ala. 2024), GS here and CL here; and
  • Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v. Garland, ___ F.Supp.4th ___, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218294  (W.D. TX 12/3/24), GS here [to come] and CL here.

Denying preliminary injunction

  • Community Assocs. Inst. v. Janet Yellen, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193958 (E.D. Va. 10/25/24), GS here and CL here; and
  • Firestone v. Yellen, 2024 WL 4250192, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170085 (D. Or. Sep. 20, 2024), GS here and CL here

 All of the cases are on appeal, with the Alabama case being fully briefed.

The difference between the two sets of cases is the courts’ respective assessments of the likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Those cases granting the preliminary injunctive relief held that the CTA was unconstitutional, thus satisfying the preliminary injunction requirement that the plaintiffs be likely to prevail. Those cases denying the preliminary injunctive relief held that the CTA was likely constitutional, thus plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirement that they would likely prevail,

In any event, the Texas Top Cop Shop injunction until changed means that the CTA cannot be enforced. Of course, I am sure that there has been significant filings by now. The injunction should prevent FinCEN from using the data or making it available to persons who, under the CTA, could have access.

Finally, I said before in blogging on the Alabama case: “This opinion is dumb, stupid.” The Texas case is wrapped in a greater fog of words, but alas in my view, is also dumb, stupid. For context in assessing my assessment, I am not a constitutional law scholar. But, I don’t think the Constitution should be interpreted so rigidly that reasonable accommodations to the world we live in now (rather than over 200 years ago) cannot be made in governing doctrines. Constitutional text cannot be ignored but it can be interpreted reasonably. I think the Courts in the Virginia and Oregon cases made those accommodations.

Other JAT Comments: