- The deduction for the contributed easement is disallowed in full.
- All partners must agree to settle, and the partnership must pay the full amount of tax, penalties and interest before settlement.
- "Investor" partners can deduct their cost of acquiring their partnership interests and pay a reduced penalty of 10 to 20% depending on the ratio of the deduction claimed to partnership investment.
- Partners who provided services in connection with ANY Syndicated Conservation Easement transaction must pay the maximum penalty asserted by IRS (typically 40%) with NO deduction for costs.
One of the key points regarding the offer, it will be made only in those cases pending before the Tax Court. Cases in the IRS administrative pipeline are not within the scope of the offer as stated. (Query, will Appeals make the same offer because, once a case gets to Appeals, the same incentive to clear the cases will be presented, because the next step will be litigation in the Tax Court?)
Peter Reilly has a good early discussion of the offer: IRS Victory In Easement Case Prompts An Offer Not To Be Refused (Forbes 6/25/20), here. Highly recommended. And, from knowing Peter and his special interested in the abusive Syndicated Conservation Easement Shelters, he is likely to have more posts as the settlement offer plays out.
In email correspondence with Peter, I offered the following off-the-cuff (meaning not fully considered) comments. I offer those off-the-cuff comments (modified and expanded but again without detail thought) just for early consideration, but if I have time to try to refine them, I will do so here.
1. The key excerpt, I think, is this:
The IRS realizes that some promoters may tell their clients that their transaction is “better” than or “different” from the transactions previously rejected by the Tax Court and that it may be better for the client to litigate than accept this resolution. When deciding whether to accept the offer, the IRS encourages taxpayers to consult with independent counsel, meaning a qualified advisor who was not involved in promoting the transaction or handpicked by a promoter to defend it.2. The penultimate paragraph says that taxpayers not excepting should not expect better terms. But, as suggested by the above quote, what about those taxpayers who really do have better cases than the very bad cases (i.e., their documents meet the technical requirements of the regulation and their valuation is not grossly inflated as much as the more abusive ones)? They will have better litigating hazards and the IRS should be willing to settle on a litigating hazards of their cases rather than insisting that one size fits all.