In Cargill v. Garland, 57 F.4th 447 (5th Cir. 2023)
(en banc), CA5 here and GS here, the Fifth Circuit reversed the prior panel opinion and held
that the ATF bump stock regulation interpreting the term "machinegun"
to include a so-called bump stock. The holding, one of statutory construction,
may be stated as follows:
- "A plain reading of the statutory language, paired with
close consideration of the mechanics of a semi-automatic firearm, reveals that
a bump stock is excluded from the technical definition of "machinegun"
set forth in the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act." (Slip Op. 3)
- But, even if the statutory term machinegun were not
unambiguous, the statutory term "machinegun" is not ambiguous enough
to include bump stocks as a permissible interpretation because of the rule of
lenity when criminal consequences might attend, requiring ambiguities to be
resolved in favor of the citizen potentially subject to those criminal
consequences.
In the course of these core holdings, the en banc majority, concurring and dissenting opinions delve into many topics that I have discussed in
connection with the bump stock cases related to Chevron and Chevron-related
issues (in a broad sense). I collect at the end of this blog in paragraph 16 some
of my earlier Federal Tax Procedure blogs on these issues arising in prior
cases involving the bump stock regulations.
I address several key points in the various opinions (the en
banc majority, the concurring, and the dissenting opinions).
1. I state at the outset that I believe this commotion about bump
stocks is inherently political. Those judges fearing the administrative state
(at least in their rhetoric landing them a place on a court) are more likely to
reach the decision the en banc majority reached. Those judges whose rhetoric
does not include fear of the administrative state and believe that
administrative agencies can enrich our society and make it work better are less
likely to reach the decision the en banc majority did. Both sides can pull up soundbites
masquerading as reasoned decisionmaking to justify the result they prefer. At
the end of the day, I think the real issue is whether there can be a symbiotic
relationship between Congress, the Executive, and the Courts which together act
reasonably to make our system work.
2. The en banc majority main holding is that the meaning of
the statutory term "machinegun" is plain and unambiguous. In the Chevron
framework, that would be a Step One determination that stops the Chevron
analysis. There have been many words spent in addressing precisely what is
meant by plain meaning and unambiguous to avoid the Chevron framework
(or, equivalently, stopping the Chevron analysis at Step One), but I
think the en banc majority's claim is that the other courts finding ambiguity
means that those other just missed the meaning of the term that is so plain to
this en banc majority. Everyone can agree that, when enacted in the 1930s, the
statutory term machinegun did not include a bump stock which did not then even
exist. But once they began to exist around 2000, I don't think it is so plain
that the statutory term machinegun should not include bump stocks. This seems
to be an eye of the beholder thingy, with political implications (which is what
originalism is about).
3. At least in less political analysis, determining whether
the statute is plain requires the use of the normal tools of statutory
construction. Rhetoric aside, the normal tools of statutory construction
include Skidmore respect for an agency interpretation. Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). None of the en banc opinions cite Skidmore.
(Note in this regard that Skidmore is not deference as many so-called
smart judges and scholars mislabel it.
See Really, Skidmore "Deference?" (Federal Tax Crimes
Blog 5/31/20; 2/14/21), here.