FTP Book Clean Up - Restitution-Based Assessments (RBAs) (7/8/26; 7/9/26)

In working on my 2026 editions of my Federal Tax Procedure Book for publication on SSRN in early August, I am trying to eliminate bloat accreted over the years from the text and the footnotes (particularly the footnotes). I conceive the text (as opposed to footnotes) to be directed to students of tax procedure for whom I provide the Student Edition without footnotes. I hope to shorten the text, but the major changes will be in footnotes. I feel that some of the eliminations I make in the footnotes have good discussions, so I will be posting on the Federal Tax Procedure Blog some of the eliminations (doing some clean-up).

I start today with a footnote on “restitution-based assessments” (“RBAs) under §§ 6201(a)(4) & 6213(b)(5). The discussion of RBAs is in the text discussing exceptions to the prohibitions on assessment arising from the general requirement in income and estate and gift tax cases that the IRS first issue a notice of deficiency. One of the exceptions is “restitution for tax in a criminal tax case which may be assessed despite the  prohibition (“restitution-based assessment, or “RBA”).” I eliminate from the footnote the discussion after citing the statute sections for the RBA, §§ 6201(a)(4) & 6213(b)(5). The eliminations are (as I have cleaned them):

Certain points about RBAs:

1. First, normally, tax restitution is not available for Title 26 offenses. However, courts may impose tax restitution for Title 18 convictions, such as the ubiquitous Klein / defraud conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §  371(a). See Daugerdas v. Commissioner, 171 F. 4th 924 (7th Cir. 2026) (holding that §  6201(a)(4)(A) authorizes the IRS to assess and collect tax restitution ordered in Title 18 convictions and the IRS collection measures do not have to be consistent with the restitution order for deferred payment of restitution).

2. In tax cases, in pleading guilty to a Title 26 offense, a defendant often agrees to “contractual” restitution in the plea agreement that the sentencing court then incorporates as a restitution order in the criminal judgment. Or, in imposing sentence for Title 26 offenses, a court may impose restitution as a condition for some benefit (such as supervised release for some period rather than incarceration).

3. The net effect of these statutory changes to the Code is that (i) the IRS can immediately assess the tax restitution as if it were a tax (the assessment acronymed RBA) and (ii) deploy the IRS collection tools for tax assessments. Carpenter v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 202 (2020), aff’d 788 F. App’x 187 (4th Cir. 2019); and Reynolds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-10 (also holding that the IRS can collect on the RBA even if the person has an agreement with DOJ for installment payment of the restitution). However, if the sentencing judge sets the terms of installment payment of the restitution, the Tax Court can consider those terms in a CDP proceeding contesting an IRS levy and the IRS should consider that as well. White v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-56 (remanding to IRS Appeals to consider).

CFC Invalidates GILTI Gap-Filling Regulation That Avoided Textual Statute Inconsistency (7/7/26)

In Keysight Technologies, Inc. v. United States, ___ Fed.Cl. ___ (7/2/26), the Court held invalid a Treasury Regulation designed to plug a gap in the statutory text. The opinion may be found: CFC here, TN here, GS here [to come].

The Court opens with this sentence projecting the outcome (Slip Op. 1):

When Chevron fell, so too did the presumption that statutory ambiguity favors the agency. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

If that were not clear enough as to where it is going, the Court opens the next paragraph (bold face supplied by JAT):

This controversy relates to the Treasury’s self-inflicted fix of a mismatch between foreign subsidiaries with fiscal- or calendar-year tax filing requirements that Congress quietly built into the global intangible low-taxed income ("GILTI") statutory scheme.

And the next paragraph (bold face supplied by JAT):

The Treasury’s antipathy for this inconsistency resulted in the Secretary promulgating Regulation 1.951A-2(c)(5) ("the Regulation").

I won’t parse the quoted text any further (although my bold face may imply something).

The technical issue was whether Treasury could, by interpretive regulation, fix what appears textually to be a timing glitch producing materially different tax result based on differences in tax years between calendar year taxpayers and fiscal year taxpayers. As the Court says (Slip Op. 2): “Enactment of the TCJA created an inconsistency between treatment of certain taxpayers depending on whether they were fiscal-year or calendar-year filers.”

Basically, the taxpayer argued that it, as a fiscal year taxpayer, was entitled to a benefit that a calendar year taxpayer could not achieve. Without wallowing around in the details, it appears to me that an intuitive view of how Congress enacts tax legislation, one can fairly infer that Congress did not intend the result that the regulation sought to forbid and the Court blesses. Congress appears to have had no specifically articulated intent on the precise issue, but Congress generally does not make such distinctions to permit disparities between otherwise similarly situated taxpayers.

Second Circuit Says § 6751(b) Means What It Says-Appeals Officer in CDP Appeal Must Verify the Supervisor Approval Requirement (6/30/29)

In Besicorp Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (2d Cir. 2026), 2Cir here and GS here, the Court held that, in a CDP Appeals Office Conference, the Appeals Officer must verify the IRS’s compliance with § 6751(b)’s written supervisor approval requirement for penalties. The Court says that in 29 pages cogently, if not succinctly, traversing the applicable statute and other authority. Those 29 pages are not all fluff without lessons for students and practitioners, so I address certain key points.

1. I open with a comment I make in a soon to be published article. Section 6751(b) is nonsensical and a textual mess. That comment was focused on the courts’ flailing around to make sense of the mess and was an argument for courts to approve the regulations adopted in December 2024 to make sense of key components of § 6751(b). However, as to the text in § 6751(b) that Besicorp interprets and applies, the text is clear, so Besicorp is correct that CDP Appeals Office proceedings require verification of the written supervisor approval requirement. (I except from that the possible application of res judicata discussed below in ¶ 5.) That is a textualist reading of the text; I don’t see any reasonable mode of interpretation that would reach a different conclusion.

2. Of course, in making that verification, the Appeals Officer must wade into the mess of the other components of § 6751(b) which are a mess with differing interpretations by the courts. I suppose, the Appeals Officer might rely upon the § 6751(b) regulations, either proposed or permanent, although the Besicorp Appeals Office hearing likely occurred before the regulations were proposed or adopted. (In this regard, the Second Circuit argument in Besicorp was 2/5/24; and Besicorp (and consolidated cases) were filed in the Tax Court in 2017. See T.C. dkt. Entries here, before the 2024 regulations were even a twinkle in the Commissioner’s eye.

3. The income tax liabilities in Besicorp and consolidated cases arose from bullshit tax shelters. The Court says the tax and interest (Slip Op. 3) reporting and tax savings from “tax shelter transactions designed to avoid the payment of taxes,” as determined by the IRS. The tax shelter transactions were of the “intermediary tax shelter” aka Midco ilk. (Slip Op. 10.) Besicorp’s deficiency was $50 million. (Slip Op. 5.) And, being a category of bullshit tax shelters, the IRS also asserted the 40% penalty which for Besicorp was “roughly $20 million penalty on a $50 million deficiency for its accuracy-related gross valuation misstatements,” citing § 6662(h). (Slip Op. 5.)

4. The taxpayers involved in Besicorp and consolidated cases may have been affiliated with the promoters who promoted the bullshit tax shelters. Indeed, from my work in this area, I found it was not uncommon for the promoters who “earned” very large amounts from promoting the fake tax savings (a price taxpayers were willing to pay for fraud insurance) to themselves then “shelter” their income with their own bullshit tax shelters (always permitting some variance in the smoke and mirrors game). I note in this regard that one of the attorneys for the taxpayers was also an attorney for at least one promoter and related corporation.

Wherefore Art Thou Tax Court? (6/29/26; 7/1/26)

In two cases today, the Court held that

• The general rule is that (i) the President can fire executive agency personnel at will even if the statute says that they can only be removed for cause or for some other similarly worded reason  Trump v. Slaughter, 609 U. S. ___ (2026) (stating the general rule); but
• An exception to the general rule in the case  of members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve where the statute requires “for cause” removal. Trump v. Cook, 609 U. S. ____ (2026) (stating the exception).

The opinions may be viewed and downloaded here: Trump v. Slaughter, SC Slip Op. here and GS here; and Trump v. Cook, SC Slip Op. here and GS here. 

Of course, the general rule (concocted under the “unitary executive” theory) and the exception require a definition of an executive agency subject to the respective rule and exception. In other words, it is not clear that Cook states a single exception applicable to the Federal Reserve. 

In the tax world, the Tax Court is potentially implicated in this brouhaha. Consider the following statutory text:

26 U.S. Code § 7441 – Status
There is hereby established, under article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court. The members of the Tax Court shall be the chief judge and the judges of the Tax Court. The Tax Court is not an agency of, and shall be independent of, the executive branch of the Government.

26 U.S. Code § 7443 - Membership
* * * *
(f)Removal from office
Judges of the Tax Court may be removed by the President, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.

A strict textual reading of § 7441 specifically states that the Tax Court is not an executive body (agency in administrative law lingo). The President has the power to appoint Tax Court Judges, “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, solely on the grounds of fitness to perform the duties of the office.”  § 7443(b). (That may suggest that politics should not be involved, but babies come in baskets (although politics is involved some of the Tax Court Judges are exceptional on the metric of “fitness to perform”).) Then, once the Senate has advised and consented, the President alone has the power to remove Tax Court Judges but only, to repeat, “after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.”

Supreme Court Denies Cert in Murrin on Issue of Whether Taxpayer's Fraud is Required for § 6501(c)(1) Unlimited Statute of Limitations (6/22/26)

Today, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in Murrin v. Commissioner (Sup. Ct. No. 25-988), docket here. See Order List dated 6/22/26, here at p.3, The Third Circuit opinion from which Murrin sought cert was Murrin v. Commissioner, 158 F.4th 527 (3rd Cir. 2025), here.

The question presented in the petition here was:

Whether, under 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(1), the IRS may assess tax beyond the Code’s three-year limitations period based solely on the fraudulent intent of a third-party, even when the taxpayer herself neither intended to evade tax nor knew of any wrongdoing.

The question as framed by the SG in the Commissioner’s Brief in Opposition here was:

Whether the indefinite limitations period in 26 U.S.C. 6501(c)(1) applies to a false or fraudulent return prepared by a tax return preparer who acted with the intent to evade tax.

Tax Court Sustains IRS Interpretation for the Research Credit as Best Interpretation or, Possibly, with Loper Bright Deference from § 7805(a) (6/19/26)

In Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-50, TC No, 13382-17 here at #286 dated 6/16/26 and GS here, the Court sustained a regulations interpretation of the research credit over the taxpayers’ Loper Bright objections. Readers will recall that Loper Bright rejected Chevron deference for agency interpretations, exhorting courts to determine and apply the “best” interpretation. “Best interpretation” was not an inflexible command; Loper Bright permitted deference to agency interpretations when delegation was expressly or impliedly granted by Congress and courts might still find the agency interpretation persuasive under Skidmore.

A number of pre-Loper Bright cases sustained the applicable agency regulation by applying Chevron deference. In Smith, the taxpayers argued that (*30) “under the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Loper Bright, Treasury Regulation § 1.41-4A(d) is no longer the single best reading of section 41(d)(4)(H).”

One problem with the taxpayers’ argument was that prior cases had sustained the interpretation under Chevron. The Smith opinion mentions (*31) “statutory stare decisis” which Loper Bright expressly approved for pre-Loper Bright cases applying (or appearing to apply) Chevron deference. Smith concludes that discussion (*33):

           Thus, we find that the holdings in our prior cases and the aforementioned decisions of the Federal Circuit and Federal Claims continue to remain in effect. See Diversified Grp. Inc. v. Commissioner, Nos. 17038-18L, et al., 166 T.C., slip op. at 21–22 (2026); see also, e.g., Garcia Pinach v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 117, 121, 131–33 (2d Cir. 2025) (analyzing Loper Bright and the doctrine of statutory stare decisis and leaving undisturbed the holding of a prior panel opinion).

More importantly, Smith reasons (*33-*34, emphasis supplied by JAT):

          Moreover, we find respondent’s power to persuade argument compelling. In reaching a conclusion on the validity of a regulation we may give “[c]areful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch.” Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2273. For the views of Treasury in this context “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Id. at 2262 [*34] (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). “The weight of such a judgment in a particular case,” of course, “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id. at 2259 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140); see also Varian Med. Sys., 163 T.C. at 106. Congress has delegated authority to Treasury under section 7805(a) to define criteria for Congress’s funded research exclusion found in section 41(d)(4)(H). Here, Treasury has exercised that authority and issued longstanding and favorable administrative guidance that offers both clarity and certainty for taxpayers.

Considering the foregoing, we conclude the regulatory requirements found in Treasury Regulation § 1.41-4A(d) used to determine whether research is funded are reasonably related to and otherwise consistent with the intent of section 41(d)(4)(H). Accordingly, we reject petitioners’ contention that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright undermines the prior decisions that relied on Treasury Regulation § 1.41-4A(d) and their effects as precedent in these cases. Further, we reject petitioners’ reading of the phrase “to the extent funded by any grant, contract, or otherwise” found in section 41(d)(4)(H) to mean only “a sum of money set apart for a specific objective” and likewise determine our reading of this phrase would not be as beneficial as the Treasury regulation requirements. In other words, we find no benefit to petitioners’ argument, should we be inclined to reject respondent’s reading of the Code for our own.

          On the basis of the foregoing, we decline to invalidate Treasury Regulation § 1.41-4A(d) and the requirements for determining funded research under section 41(d)(4)(H) incorporating both “contingent on success” and “substantial rights” elements.

As I read this, Smith is saying that, although the prior cases may have noised about Chevron deference and in some cases even appeared to apply Chevron deference, in truth and might pass muster under statutory stare decisis, the IRS interpretation was the “best” interpretation, passing muster under Loper Bright’s de novo interpretation imperative.

Smith muddles on the point of best interpretation by citing § 7805(a) as a Congressional delegation of interpretive authority for the substantive Code provision. Is Smith suggesting in citing § 7805(a) that the interpretive regulation was a delegation qualifying for Loper Bright deference? If so, since Smith seems to have determined the agency interpretation was the best, was the citation of § 7805(a) necessary or even appropriate?

One side note on § 7805(a): Throughout its history, § 7805(a) has been authority for interpretive regulations. That authority was muddled by those claiming that interpretive regulations when applied by courts using Chevron deference meant that the interpretive regulation was transformed into a legislative regulation. That claim was always nonsense (even when made by Justice Scalia); with the demise of Chevron deference, courts are free to get past the nonsense. 

D.C. District Court Vacates IRS Notice Limiting Test for Clean Energy Credit (6/18/26)

In Oregon Env. Council v. IRS, ___ F.Supp.3d ___ (D. D.C. 6/6/26), CL here and GS here, the Court rejected the IRS attempt to eliminate one of the tests the IRS had used to satisfy the “beginning of construction” dates for clean energy tax credits. For a long time, the IRS had Notices permitting “beginning of construction” to be tested under the “Physical Work Test” and the ”Five Percent Test” (or “Safe Harbor”). By Notice 2025-42, 2025-36, IRB 351 (2025), the IRS eliminated the Five Percent Test.

The Notice was based on the President’s Executive Order No. 14,315, titled  "Ending Market Distorting Subsidies for Unreliable, Foreign Controlled Energy Sources," directing the IRS to "take all action as the [Secretary] deems necessary and appropriate to strictly enforce the termination of the clean electricity production and investment tax credits under sections 45Y and 48E of the Internal Revenue Code for wind and solar facilities." Soon after the Executive Order but before Notice 2025-42, reacting to the Executive Order, “multiple interested parties,” filed comments. Some commenters urged the IRS to retain the existing tests, called the “Physical Work Test” and the ”Five Percent Test” (or “Safe Harbor”) or make any new test only prospective. Prominent Congressmen offered comments, some supporting the existing Tests. The IRS then issued Notice 2025-42, 2025-36, IRB 351 (2025) providing that the “beginning of construction” requirement will be based only on the Physical Work Test, thus eliminating the “Five Percent Test.”

The Plaintiffs (“a collection of governmental and private organizations”) sued alleging “that the Notice is harming them” in specific ways outlined in the opinion (but not relevant to this blog entry). Among the claims made was that the Notice violated the APA reasoned decisionmaking requirement for valid agency rules. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).

After extensive analysis, the Court held (Slip Op. 49):

Notice 2025-42 falls short of these standards. The Notice’s elimination of the Five Percent Safe Harbor is a significant change in the IRS’s position on what it means to “begin construction” for purposes of clean energy tax credits. This changed position implicates “serious reliance interests,” which the agency actively invited by repeatedly restating its prior approach. See Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221–22. Although the record shows that the Defendants received clear warnings about those reliance interests before adopting the Notice, the agency failed to justify its decision to change course. Because neither the Notice nor the administrative record provides an explanation from which “the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned” in light of all the facts and circumstances, the Notice is arbitrary and capricious. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.

On Legislative History—Supreme Court Faceoff Between Conservative and Liberal Justices with Comments (6/16/26)

In FS Credit Opportunities Corp.v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U. S. ____ (2026), decided June 22, 2026, SC here* and GS here**, the conservative and liberal Justices fussed about the proper role of legislative history in statutory interpretation. That fussing interested me because I had recently made substantial revisions to that fuss in my 2026 Working Draft of my Federal Tax Procedure book (Student and Practitioner Editions). I don’t think the fussing in FS Credit adds anything meaningful to the discussion, but it does offer a handy opportunity for those interested in the issue to be up to date on the Supreme Court’s views. So, I thought that, in addition to notifying readers and providing links to the Opinions, I would offer the current treatment of the issue from the Working Draft (due for publication on the SSRN platform in early August 2026). The Practitioner Working Draft (with text and footnotes) may be viewed or downloaded here. The Student edition is the Practitioner Edition text without the footnotes, so for readers generally I just copy and paste here the text only:

(5)    Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation.

           The pre-enactment history of enacted statutory text may be important in interpreting the enacted text (just as, for example, the history of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution may guide its interpretation). Relevant history is often discussed in two broad categories: Statutory History and Legislative History. (Actually, statutory history (defined below) is a subset of legislative history, but it is not uncommon to treat the two as separate categories.) Both types of history stop upon enactment of the statutory text being interpreted; at least conceptually, since the focus is on the meaning of the text upon enactment, there is no such concept as subsequent legislative history which at best would be comments on the meaning of the previously enacted text. (I return to subsequent legislative history below, beginning on p. 34.)

           Statutory history can include two broad categories: (i) enacted text only, including enacted text that has been revised by enacted text over time (call this category “enacted statutory history”); and (ii) the changes in the text of bills as they move through the legislative process to enactment (“drafting history”). Enacted statutory history considers only enacted text and any interpretive inferences that may be drawn from enacted text; drafting history also considers drafts of the text as it moved and changed through the legislative process. Textualists use enacted statutory history to draw inferences of enacted text meaning. Sometimes, textualists resort to drafting history treating it somewhat like enacted statutory history in drawing interpretive inferences.

           Legislative History includes all documents the legislature may have generated or considered in enacting the statutory text that might permit inferences as to the meaning of the enacted statutory text. Legislative history is the course of congressional consideration in identifying the need for legislation, drafting or revising the bills (the “drafting history” and statutory history for enacted statutory text), expressions by persons involved in the process as to how they understood the text of the bills, and the final statutory text. The principal sources of legislative history for statutes are the drafting history and the committee reports which I discuss below. (For tax legislation, the legislative history may also include proposals from Treasury (analogous to drafting history) and Treasury’s explanation of the proposals, most commonly along with Treasury’s annual budget request with tax proposals referred to as the Green Book.) Other sources include committee hearings, statements made on the floor of Congress in debating the legislation, and submissions to Congress by the executive branch. There is a long and substantial history of judicial use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, particularly in the tax area.

Tax Court Holds that IRS Must Prove Return Fraud After a Convicted Spouse is Convicted for Tax Evasion (5/30/26)

In Li v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-42 (T.C. Case 12133-23 at #35, here, at #35, and GS here [to come], the Court addressed proof issues for applying the unlimited statute of limitations for a joint return spouse (“unconvicted spouse”) after the other spouse was convicted of tax evasion (“the convicted spouse”). Of course, as to the convicted spouse, collateral estoppel will apply to establish fraud for the unlimited statute of limitations (§ 6501(c)(1)) and the civil fraud penalty (§ 6663). Li addresses the issue of the effect of the convicted spouse’s conviction on the unconvicted spouse’s statute of limitations (§ 6501(c)(1)),

The background is the Allen issue. In Allen v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (2007), the Court held that fraud on a return by a return preparer without the taxpayer’s personal fraud invoked the unlimited statute of limitations in § 6501(c)(1). The issues Allen raises are discussed in several blog entries over the years, but I think they are presented in my most recent blogs: Update on Murrin Petition for Cert re Unlimited Civil Statute of Limitations for Non-Taxpayer Fraud Reported on Tax Return (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 5/19/26), here; and Further on Murrin and Allen and the Unlimited Statute of Limitations for Fraud on the Return (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 4/30/26), here.

Stripped down to basics, the current status of the Allen issue is as follows:

• for courts applying the Allen holding (that the preparer’s fraud alone will suffice to the unlimited statute of limitations; the taxpayer’s fraud is not required). This includes all courts addressing the issue except the Federal Circuit.
• the Federal Circuit held that the taxpayer’s fraud is required, at least in a context where the fraud on the return was not the preparer’s fraud (although the Federal Circuit did not intimate that preparer fraud would suffice).

Li dealt with the unlimited statute of limitations for the unconvicted spouse after the convicted spouse’s tax evasion conviction. The holding was that, as to the unconvicted spouse, the IRS must prove fraud on the return by clear and convincing evidence of fraud on the return (which need not necessarily be the unconvicted spouse’s personal fraud). In the Li facts, that means that the unconvicted spouse is not subject to collateral estoppel for the convicted spouse's conviction. Li does not address the issue I discuss in the first blog above as to whether fraud on the return committed by others than the tax return preparer (e.g., tax shelter promoters) will suffice.

I have synthesized the Li Opinion in my working draft for the Federal Tax Procedure Editions for 2026 (to be published in early August). I offer that synthesis here in the paragraph after discussing the Allen issue (note that the footnotes are presented after the text; the numbering on the footnotes will not be the same in the working draft or the final 2026 Practitioner Edition):

Interesting Concurring Opinion on Canons (or Maxims) of Statutory Interpretation (5/29/26; 6/1/26)

In Flight Options LLC v. United States, ___ F.4th ___ (6th Cir. 2026), CA6 here and GS here, the Court reversed a district court holding that Flight Options, a fractional-share jet company, was liable for withholding tax in the amount of $39 million on fixed fees it charged to pay for the overhead and management of its clients' private jets. The tax involved was the

7.5% excise tax on the “amount paid for” domestic “transportation by air,” 26 U.S.C. §§4261(a), 4262(a)(1), what the statute called a “ticket tax” at all relevant times of this dispute, id. §4261(e)(1)(C), (e)(5) (2012).

Although I do not plan to deal with the substantive merits of the withholding tax in issue, basically a high-level overview is that the tax is easily calculated, collected, and paid over for the travel that most of us experience on commercial airlines where the price of the ticket is all in for cover all associated costs to the airline of providing the air transportation (included quite indirect costs of management and even paying lawyers). Private-jet companies operate differently, not including all costs in a single fare but separately calculating and charging for its costs and profit. So, Flight Options, calculated, collected, and paid over only that ticket tax related to “usage charges for each flight a client takes, not to fixed fees it charges its clients for overhead and management of its fractional jet business.” The latter charges are the types of charges that commercial airliners build into the ticket fare and thus are, for commercial travel, subject to the ticket tax. In effect, the IRS attempted to require private-jet providers to include some of those charges in the base to which the ticket tax, and thus withholding obligation, applied, thus making the ticket tax more comparable in impact between commercial providers and private-jet providers. (Added 4:50 pm: To put that another way, for a pro rata tax, private-jet flyers pay less than commercial-jet flyers. Think about that.)

The Court of Appeals (Judge Sutton for a unanimous panel) rejects the IRS position the district court sustained. Of course, the issue is to apply the ticket tax designed with the commercial-jet model where all-in costs are included in the ticket price subject to the tax. As noted above, the private-jet providers separately state their costs (with separately stated costs including profit). The effect of the Court’s holding is that private-jet providers get a competitive advantage relative to commercial-jet providers. The Court confers that competitive advantage by deploying the favorite interpretive tool of literalist textualists—Dictionaries. Using those vaunted tools, the Court’s parsing of the tax indicated to the Court that the text was uncertain as to the liability—ambiguous, if you will—and thus it is improper to hold a third-party withholder for a liability that is uncertain. In the process the Court deployed two canons, called “relevant taxpayer canons”: (i) the Pro-Taxpayer Canon, called a general canon, that interprets uncertainty in tax liability in favor of the taxpayer and against the IRS; and (ii) a related canon, called a "specific canon," that to hold a party charged with collecting the tax for the IRS must have “precise and not speculative” instructions in the statute (meaning in his telling that ambiguity is resolved in favor of the putative withholder).

Adding to my FTPB Discussion of Civil Suits for Disclosure of Return Information for the Trump "Settlement" (5/26/26; 5/29/26)

Added 5/27/26 7:00pm and 5/28/26 3:30pm: I have added new matters at the end of this blogging. Since the issue is developing, I may update on the developments by additions below or by separate blog.

I have just finished a first draft of the portion of the working draft of my Federal Tax Procedure book 2026 discussing the civil remedy for improper disclosures of tax return information under § 7431. In the 2025 version, I have a paragraph discussing the settlement with Ken Griffin regarding disclosures of prominent (meaning wealthy) taxpayers' return information. I have not changed that paragraph, but have added immediately after it a discussion of the Trump v. IRS § 7431 suit and the settlement of Trump’s suit that has been so much in the news recently. I suspect most, perhaps all, the readers will already know the basics of the settlement that I offer. I link here a pdf with redline of the new discussion with footnotes. I copy and paste below the discussion (text only) with the new material after the Griffin paragraph (which I do not redline here).

           A prominent example of this remedy is a suit brought by a Kenneth Griffin, reputedly a hedge fund billionaire. An employee of a third party contractor to the IRS, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., illegally accessed and disclosed the tax return information of Griffin and others to a news organization, ProPublica, which in turn published some of the tax return information. Griffin sued the IRS under (i) § 7431, alleging violation of § 6103, and (ii) the Privacy Act. The employee was prosecuted and pled guilty, receiving a five-year sentence. Griffin and the IRS settled the civil action resulting in a dismissal with prejudice. All of the terms of the settlement are not available, but the IRS agreed to and did issue a public apology. Another reputed billionaire brought related action against the employee’s employer, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.

           An even more prominent example arising from the same mass disclosures is a 2026 suit Donald J. Trump filed in his personal (rather than Presidential) capacity for $10 billion damages (asserting both the minimum $1,000 per disclosure with disclosures at $1,000 justifying $10 billion or actual damages of $10 billion) and for punitive damages in an amount not stated. The parties plaintiff also included Trump related persons and entities. The Judge in the case asked the parties to brief whether, given Trump’s control over the Government parties (IRS and DOJ) and personal interest as Plaintiff, the case met the required Article III case or controversy requirement. The Court also appointed distinguished amicus to provide here independent briefing on that issue. Before the parties presented their briefing but after the amicus provided its initial briefing, the Trump parties moved to dismiss requiring the Court to dismiss with prejudice under FRCP Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i); as required by that Rule, on 5/18/26, the Court dismissed with prejudice, the Court noted:

           Because the Notice does not reference any settlement or include a stipulation of settlement, there is no settlement of record. Additionally, Defendants—federal agencies represented by the Department of Justice, which has an independent obligation to uphold the “public’s strong interest in knowing about the conduct of its Government and expenditure of its resources” and the “fair administration of justice,” 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.9, 50.23—neither submitted any settlement documents nor filed any documents ensuring that settlement was appropriate where there was an outstanding question as to whether an actual case or controversy existed.

In short, the Court smelled a rat but under the Rule was required to dismiss with prejudice.

Re-Working the Chevron/Loper Bright Discussion in the FTP Books (Student and Practitioner Editions) (5/25/26)

I recently spent some time and mental energy on an article on Chevron and Loper Bright. Incident to rethinking the issues, I have decided to substantially reduce the space I devote to Chevron and Loper Bright in my Federal Tax Procedure Book working draft for the 2026 editions (due in early August on SSRN). I will first excerpt the current discussion offering more (particularly with footnotes) and print that discussion separately for publication on SSRN. I will then re-work the discussion to provide more compact summaries of the key points, hopefully keeping the discussion to 5 pages with footnotes in the Practitioner Edition of the book (the 2025 presented it as 9+ pages).

I thought I would use this effort to test some AI Tools on a short portion of the discussion that I am deleting from the FTP book. I took a portion of the introduction to the Chevron/Loper Bright issues (about 2+ pages in the Student Edition (pp.59-61) without footnotes. The 2026 working edition made some significant changes, so I used that for the AI tests. The draft that I asked the AI Tools for assistance may be viewed here. I tried it on several AI tools, but chose to work with the MS Copilot versions. I present Copilot’s reworking of that text here (various offerings). Probably the best choice is the following which Co-Pilot said was a “High-Impact” version (I have lightly edited the Co-Pilot version (my edits are marked in red):

For decades, Chevron stood at the center of administrative law—criticized, caricatured, and often misunderstood. In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court finally swept it aside. But the Court’s account of what Chevron was, how it functioned, and what the APA demands is not a restoration of interpretive purity. It is a reconstruction built on selective memory and an unwillingness to confront the APA text Congress actually wrote.

Chevron never required courts to embrace an agency’s inferior reading of a statute. Its reach was far narrower. Chevron operated only when a court, after exhausting the traditional tools of interpretation, reached a point of genuine ambiguity—a state of interpretive equipoise where the evidence did not permit a principled choice between competing readings. In that narrow space, Chevron supplied a tie‑breaker, not a theory of agency supremacy. The agency prevailed not because its interpretation was “better,” but because the court could not say that any interpretation was.

The APA itself contains the same tie‑breaking logic. Section 706(2)(A) authorizes courts to set aside agency action only when it is “not in accordance with law.” That language places the burden of persuasion on the challenger. If the interpretive evidence is evenly balanced, the challenger loses. The agency’s interpretation stands. This is not judicial invention; it is the statute’s own allocation of interpretive risk. Indeed, in Dobson (a unanimous 1943 Supreme Court opinion), interpreted “not in accordance with law” as a standard of review of statutory interpretation to require deference.

Loper Bright avoids this textual reality. It asserts that courts can always identify a single “best” interpretation, as though ambiguity were a judicial failure rather than an inherent feature of statutory language. Yet the Court simultaneously preserves Skidmore respect—a doctrine that presupposes ambiguity. The opinion cannot eliminate ambiguity and preserve Skidmore at the same time.

This chapter begins from a simple but unavoidable truth: ambiguity exists, and when it does, the APA—not Chevron—provides the tie‑breaker. Loper Bright may have the authority to overrule Chevron. What it lacks is the authority to rewrite the APA or to pretend that interpretive uncertainty can be willed away. The real work of statutory interpretation lies in confronting ambiguity honestly, not denying its existence.

Fourth Circuit Holds that § 6015(f)(1) Innocent Spouse Equitable Relief Can Apply to Erroneous Refund Interest (5/22/26)

I write what I call a notice blog today on a case involving the innocent spouse equitable relief provision, § 6015(f)(1), as applicable to erroneous refund interest. The case reverses and remands a Tax Court "T.C." decision on an issue that is, I think, not commonly encountered. So most practitioners should just know the bottom-line holding and then can pursue it further if they ever encounter it. I do think students should be concerned with the case.

In LaRosa v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. 2026), 4^th Cir. here and GS here, the Court provides this good summary at the beginning:

A provision of the tax code gives the Internal Revenue Service discretion to “relieve” a taxpayer of “liability” for “any unpaid tax or any deficiency.” 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f)(1). Sometimes, the IRS refunds money to a taxpayer but later concludes it erred in doing so. Our sole question in this appeal: When the IRS mistakenly refunds interest payments a taxpayer made on previously underpaid taxes, does the taxpayer have a “liability” for “unpaid tax” that is eligible for discretionary relief under Section 6015(f)(1)? Because we conclude the answer is yes, we vacate the tax court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I have summarized the holding of the case in a footnote in my working draft for the 2026 Federal Tax Procedure (Practitioner Edition) as follows:

In LaRosa v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. 2026), the Court held in an esoteric application of § 6015(f) that the IRS could grant equitable relief for interest (as opposed to tax) erroneously refunded to the taxpayer. I won’t discuss LaRosa further because I don’t see it as a situation that will be encountered often.

Update on Murrin Petition for Cert re Unlimited Civil Statute of Limitations for Non-Taxpayer Fraud Reported on Tax Return (5/19/26)

I provide an update on the Murrin petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court’s docket sheet is here. On May 15, 2026, the Government filed its brief in opposition here. I have recently addressed some points on the Murrin petition before the Government’s Brief in Opp. Further on Murrin and Allen and the Unlimited Statute of Limitations for Fraud on the Return (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 4/30/26), here.

The Government distinguishes (Brief in Opp. 13-15) the principal case indicating a possible conflict (a key factor in the Supreme Court accepting cert). That case is BASR Partnership v. United States, 795 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015), GS here. The Government asserts that Murrin involves fraud by the tax return preparer whereas BASR did not involve fraud by the tax return preparer (the fraud was by others in the bullshit shelter feeding chain, such as promoter and lawyers issuing bullshit opinions). That distinction strikes me as irrelevant to a textual reading of § 6501(c)(1).

The text is:

In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.

Once you say that fraud by someone other than the taxpayer that resulted in fraudulent reporting on a false return is sufficient, the text does not limit it to the taxpayer and the tax return preparer.

IRS Makes Generous Offer to Settle Many Bullshit Conservation Easement Cases (5/18/26)

In IR-2026-65 (5/12/26), here, the IRS announced a new time-limited settlement initiative for bullshit conservation easements with bullshit (maybe redundant) claims for charitable deductions. Given that the claimed deductions were always bullshit, those at risk should (in my opinion) take the offer if they are otherwise eligible to do so. I won’t go through the eligibility requirements; those interested in those requirements should consult with counsel who, if competent, should be capable of assessing the high risk of not accepting. I will say that, for the taxpayers targeted, this is an extremely generous offer.

That is to say that, if I had been a Government (IRS or DOJ) attorney litigating one of these cases, there is no way the taxpayers in those cases would have gotten such a settlement offer from me; my opposing counsel when I was a DOJ Tax litigator knew that I did not make settlement offers (I told opposing counsel early on just to be sure they were aware); I recommended acceptance of taxpayer settlement offers only rarely (including one that conceded everything, including a civil fraud penalty that I caused the IRS to assert, but wanted the concession styled as a settlement; I even balked at the description of a complete concession as a “settlement” but finally recommended acceptance of the full concession “settlement” offer). In some rare cases, I did dicker with opposing counsel regard their offers, but we just did not have the same view of the taxpayer winning the case. Even in those cases I lost after receiving a settlement offer I rejected (or DOJ Tax rejected based on my recommendation), I never thought that in retrospect I should have recommended acceptance of the offer. You win some; you lose some.

Federal Circuit Rejects Taxpayers' Arguments about Midco Transaction (5/17/26)

In Dillon Trust Co. LLC v. United States, ___ F.4th ___ (Fed. Cir. 2026), CAFC here and GS here, the Court in 50 pages rejects Dillon Trust’s bullshit claims in a bullshit “midco” transaction tax shelter. I wrote on one aspect of the case below. Court of Federal Claims Rejects Defective § 6603 Strategy for Multiple Transferee Liabilities (11/21/22), here (discussing one aspect of the Federal Circuit opinion).

The Federal Circuit offers a reasonable description of midco transactions (Slip Op. 10 n. 5):

5 A “midco transaction” or intermediary transaction is structured to allow a seller to engage in a stock sale and a buyer to engage in an asset purchase. Shareholders sell their C corporation stock to an intermediary (or midco) at a purchase price that does not discount for the built-in gain tax liability, as a stock sale to the ultimate purchaser would. The midco then sells the assets of the C corporation to the buyer, who gets a purchase price basis in the assets. The midco’s willingness to allow both buyer and seller to avoid the tax consequences inherent in holding appreciated assets in a C corporation is based on supposed tax attributes, like losses, that allow it to absorb the built-in gain tax liability. But, if these tax attributes of the midco prove to be artificial, then the tax liability created by the built-in gains on the sold assets still needs to be paid. In many instances, the midco is a newly formed entity created for the sole purpose of facilitating such a transaction, without other income or assets. It is thus likely to be judgment-proof, and the IRS will need to seek payment from the other parties involved in the transaction to satisfy any unpaid tax liability. 

That definition is antiseptic, eliminating details of the high- or low-drama presented in the rest of the opinion where the players on the taxpayer side unsuccessfully claimed a type of willful ignorance about the transaction to justify their participation and, they hoped, avoid the transferee tax liability involved. They failed.

The Court affirmed that the involved parties had at least constructive knowledge of the bullshit gambit and therefore could be liable under New York’s Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (see Slip Op. 21-26). Based on the players involved (see Slip Op. 3 nn. 1-3), some of whom testified, this was ““[a] deal done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid.” Michael Graetz statement, oft quoted, see e.g., Lynnley Browning, How to Know When a Tax Deal Isn’t a Good Deal (New York Times 10/10/08).

On what these taxpayers (including the company whose stock was purchased), their transferees, their advisors, and other players in the “deal” knew or should have known, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CFC holding of constructive fraud. (In my mind, the facts affirmed by the Federal Circuit might have even permitted a reasonable inference of actual fraud in the sense that the selling shareholders in the midco transaction knew enough to also know that the taxes were going to be avoided/evaded.) Readers might want to read through the opinion to appreciate the high- or low-drama.

Key bullet points of the holding are:

• Transferee liability under § 6901 applies and invokes the NY UFCA. (Slip Op. 20-39.)
• The amount of liability included the transferor corporation’s tax, penalties, and interest. On including the penalty, the Federal Circuit noted that there “appears to be a circuit split” on including penalties. (Slip Op. 42) The Court of Appeals adopted the majority of Circuits inclusion of penalties (Slip Op. 42-44.)
• The § 6603 deposit made by the Dillon Trust could not avoid interest on other taxpayers’ liabilities. Slip Op. 44-50.)

As I view it, the parties knew or should have known that, if the IRS spotted the transaction and spent the resources to "unpeal the onion," it would likely assert transferee liability. So, it seems that they rolled the dice on the audit lottery. These taxpayers lost that roll of the dice. But there are many others who have won that gamble.

District Court Sustains IRS Assessment Authority for § 6039F penalty on D.C. Circuit Analysis in Farhy II (5/12/26)

In Zhang v. IRS, (N.D. Cal. No.3:24-cv-08210 Order Granting Partial Motion to Dismiss dtd.5/4/26), CL here and GS here, the Court held that the IRS had authority to assess the § 6039F penalty for failing to file Form 3520 reporting foreign gifts. The Court’s analysis is similar to the D.C. Circuit holding in Farhy v. Commissioner (Farhy II), 100 F.4th 223 (D.C. Cir. 2024) that the IRS had authority to assess the § 6038(b) penalty. In doing so, the Court rejected the Tax Court’s contrary holdings in Farhy v. Commissioner (Farhy I), 160 T.C. 399 (2023) and Mukhi v. Commissioner, 163 T.C. ___, No. 8 (11/18/24) (reviewed opinion confirming Farhy I).

Interestingly, the Court does not mention Safdieh v. Commissioner, 169 F. 4th 102 (2d Cir. 2/27/26), which agreed with the D.C. Circuit holding in Farhy II. I discuss Safdieh in Second Circuit Rejects Tax Court's Farhy Holding That IRS Can't Assess and Collect the § 6038(b) Penalty (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 2/27/26), here.

The Court also rejected Zhang’s APA and Eighth Amendment arguments.

I have written on the issue before in discussing Farhy and other cases. The prior postings sorted by date are here. I see no need to write further in this blog on that issue.

Another Gross Overvaluation Conservation Easement Claim Fails (5/6/26)

In Kimberly Road Fulton 25, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-36 (5/4/26), Case # 2026-36 here at #178 and GS here, the Court (Judge Holmes) shot down another bullshit syndicated conservation easement (“SCE”). As is common, the bullshit was in the gross overvaluation. So, not only do the partnerships (and their partners) in the consolidated cases lose, but they suffer the 40% 6662(h) gross valuation misstatement penalties. On the penalties, the Court’s analysis driven by its holding of a gross overvaluation is short (p.39, footnote omitted):

VI. Penalties

          The FPAAs determined the applicability of section 6662(h) gross-valuation misstatement penalties. This penalty applies if the value of property claimed on a return is 200% or more of the amount determined to be the correct value. It’s a 40% penalty, and there’s no reasonable cause defense. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(3). This is a math question, and it is a math question that we must find the Commissioner got right. The parties stipulated that the Commissioner complied with the supervisory-approval requirement of section 6751(b)(1) in asserting these penalties, and we therefore uphold them. 

Because its material facts are many and duplicative of patterns in earlier bullshit SCE cases, the only thing that makes this opinion worth reading is its opening (Slip Op. 1-2) which anticipates the conclusions I summarized above:

Jeffrey Grant’s grandfather taught him a saying that has stuck with him all his life: “Sometimes, a fast nickel is worth more than a slow dime.” A self-identified “land man,” Grant has [*2] made a career of buying vacant land in Georgia and quickly turning it into enough “fast nickels” to make a good living.

More on the Economic Substance Doctrine (ESD) and Relevancy in § 7701(o) (5/5/26)

In Kadau v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-37 (5/5/26), referred to as Kadau II, TC Case # 286-21 here at #216; GS here, the Court held that the taxpayer’s microcaptive insurance arrangement failed under the Economic Substance Doctrine (“ESD”) in § 7701(o) and was subject to the 40% penalty in § 6662(b)(6) and (i). Given the facts in Kadau II and its earlier opinion in Kadau v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-81 (referred to as Kadau I), at # 198 and GS here, the result is not surprising. The arrangement was smoke and mirrors to appear as a transaction with magic tax benefits.

Kadau II drew my attention because of its discussion of § 7701(o)’s requirement that the common law ESD be “relevant.” § 7701(o)(1) & (o)(5)(C). I have written on this issue before. See Liberty Global's Tax Scam Fails in Tenth Circuit (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 4/30/26), here; The Economic Substance Doctrine ("ESD")--the Common Law and § 7701(o) (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 3/31/26; 4/8/26), here; and Tax Court in Unanimous Reviewed Opinion Interprets and Applies the Accuracy-Related Economic Substance Penalty (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 11/12/25), here. I thought this might be a good point to offer further thoughts on § 7701(o) and the requirement that the common law ESD be “relevant.” (Actually, anticipating a theme below, my thoughts today may be a clarification of my earlier thoughts.)

Section § 7701(o), titled “Clarification,” states the general prongs of the common law ESD requirement—meaningful economic position effect and substantial nontax purpose. § 7701(o)(1). Then, in the balance of § 7701(o), some specific rules for applying the ESD are provided, such as that the nontax profit potential “be substantial in relation to the expected value of the net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were respected.” § 7701(o)(2)(A). Those in the tax world for some time know precisely why that “clarification” was there—to foreclose taxpayer arguments that remote, unlikely profit potentials could still meet that prong of the common law ESD.

Kadau II addresses the term “relevant” in § 7701(o). Kadau II accepted the holding in Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. ___, No. 10 (11/12/25) (reviewed unanimous) that § 7701(o) requires that the common law ESD must be “relevant” before § 7701(o) can apply. The Court in Kadau II did not need to address that predicate requirement because petitioners in briefing said (p. 4, emphasis supplied):

As the Court held in Patel III, a threshold determination must be made as to whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant. Because Petitioners formed a small captive insurance company, Petitioners acknowledge that section 7701(o) is applicable. The dispositive question is whether Petitioners’ transactions satisfy its requirements. Accordingly, we refrain from addressing any threshold determination issues and proceed directly to examination of the transaction by applying the foregoing elements outlined in section 7701(o)(1).

Judge in Trump Return Disclosure Damages Mega-Suit Appoints Amicus to Assist the Court on Jurisdictional Issue as to Party Adversity (4/30/26;5/1/26)

I recently wrote on Trump’s suit against the IRS for damages for tax return disclosures. See Could the District Court Invite or Appoint an Amicus to Present the U.S. Position in Trump v. IRS? (2/7/26; 2/12/26), here. The district court (Judge Williams) has appointed amicus curiae to “assist the Court in identifying the applicable law governing an analysis” of the issue she identifies—subject matter jurisdiction where because the parties may not be opposed there may be no case or controversy required for jurisdiction. See order of 4/29/26, CL here (document 43 on the docket sheet, CL here).

In an earlier order on the same day, Judge Williams said “it is unclear to this Court whether the Parties are sufficiently adverse to each other so as to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy  requirement.” Order dated 4/29/26, here (document 41 on the docket sheet), at p. 3. Based on that concern, the Order asks the “the Parties to address the question of subject matter jurisdiction before addressing the relief requested in the Motion.” Order at p.. 4. The Order appointing amicus curiae is apparently based on that concern as to which the response the nominal parties may give could be suspect.

The Order for Amicus assistance is more limited than I suggested in my original blog posting. However, the same concerns could prompt Judge Williams to appoint amicus (either sua sponte or on motion) for other aspects of the case where party adversity may be questionable.

Added 5/1/26 11:30am: The New York Times has this article on these events: Andrew Duehren, Judge Asks Justice Department: Will You Oppose Trump? (NYT 4/29/26), here.

Liberty Global's Tax Scam Fails in Tenth Circuit (4/30/26)

In Liberty Global, Inc. v. United States, ___ F.4th ___ (10th Cir. 2026), CA10 here, GS here, and CL here, using tax lingo and analysis, rejected Liberty Global’s tax scam. The panel majority correctly holds that Liberty Global’s farcical multiple steps did not pass economic substance doctrine (“ESD”) scrutiny.

The key issue upon which the majority of the panel and the dissenting judge differ is over what role, if any, § 7701(o)’s requirement that whether the ESD is “relevant.” § 7701(o)(1) & (o)(5)(C). So that readers can understand the statute’s textual context, I offer it here (with key word in red):

(o) Clarification of economic substance doctrine
    (1) Application of doctrine. In the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if—
        (A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and
        (B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.
* * * *
    (5) Definitions and special rules
    For purposes of this subsection—
    * * * *
        (C) Determination of application of doctrine not affected. The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.

I have written previously on the issue of the term “relevant” in § 7701(o). The Economic Substance Doctrine ("ESD")--the Common Law and § 7701(o) (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 3/31/26; 4/8/26), here. I believe that ESD as the term is used both in the common law and in § 7701(o) means the same thing, except that § 7701(o) adds some specific rules that apply in applying certain features of the ESD. These specific rules address some taxpayer claims about how those features of the common law ESD work. For example, § 7701(o)(2) & (4) provide rules for applying the ESD requirement that a taxpayer have a non-tax profit potential. Section § 7701(o) rejects certain claims that taxpayers made in prior cases to avoid the ESD. Thus, I think that the threshold inquiry is whether the common law ESD applies (not that it is just relevant, but certainly, if ESD applies, it is relevant for purposes of § 7701(o) because the special rules of § 7701(o) may then apply).

Basically, what I am saying is that the panel majority gets it right and the dissent gets it wrong.

Further on Murrin and Allen and the Unlimited Statute of Limitations for Fraud on the Return (4/30/26)

I read earlier this week an excellent article on Murrin v. Commissioner, 158 F.4th 527 (3d Cir. 2025), here, cert petition pending (see here). Bryan Camp, The New Forever Rule for Record Retention (Tax Notes March 3/25/26), here. Professor Camp is concerned, as he was in filing an amicus brief in Murrin, with the potential application to innocent taxpayers of § 6201(c)(1)’s unlimited statute of limitations for a “false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax.” Murrin held that the taxpayer’s fraud is not required and that a return preparer’s fraud would suffice to apply the unlimited statute of limitations for fraud. For further on Murrin, see my post Third Circuit Holds Taxpayer Fraud is not Required for 6501(c)(1) Unlimited Statute of Limitations, Creating Conflict (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 8/18/25; 10/17/25).

In an alarmist mode, Professor Camp concludes his article by stating that, unless the problem of § 6201(c)(1) applying to innocent taxpayers is fixed, “I think we must all advise our clients to keep their records . . . forever.” (Emphasis supplied.) What does forever mean in this context? That's a quibble. Professor Camp is not just content to provide that bottom line from Murrin but repeats his arguments in his amicus brief as to error in Murrin and the predicate tax court opinion in Allen v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (2007), here.

I encourage those interested in the issue (which I call the Allen issue) to read Professor Camp’s article. I have not recently stepped through the legislative and statutory history he discusses in support of his claims, but my recollection is that I was not then sure that they support his claims. In any event, I am sure that for a long period of time since the early tax law, practitioners, including me, assumed that § 6201(c)(1) required taxpayer fraud. Allen appeared out of the blue, so to speak. But now that, in Justice Kagan's words “we are all textualists now,” if we focus on the text of § 6201(c)(1), there is no textual reading that would limit its scope to taxpayer fraud if the fraud is on the return. In other words, at best regarding Professor Camp's claims, the actual text is ambiguous as to whether the text of § 6201(c)(1) requires the taxpayer's fraud.

Further, on the purpose of § 6201(c)(1), I do not conceive it is as a punishment provision but a recognition that fraud on the return makes discovery by the IRS more difficult. After all, the consequence of the unlimited statute of limitations is that the taxpayer pays the tax the taxpayer owed ab initio. True, the taxpayer may have to pay interest, but tax and interest are not penalties. The taxpayer Professor Camp is concerned about is the truly innocent taxpayer relying on a fraudulent preparer; for such a taxpayer there will be no penalty because (i) § 6662 civil penalty which does not apply with taxpayer reasonable cause (unless, for some § 6662 civil penalties, the reasonable cause exception does not apply which is not likely in an innocent taxpayer context) and (ii) § 6663 civil fraud penalty does not apply unless taxpayer fraud is involved. So, from that perspective, the truly innocent taxpayer suffers no penalty with respect to the fraud on the return; rather, he would just pay the tax and interest that are in the helpful metaphor, his dues for a civilized society.

That’s all I have on the merits of Murrin and Allen. Just a few more comments:

Interesting points from ABA Tax Online Presentation on Loper Bright (4/29/26)

I just attended online an ABA Tax Section Program titled: “Navigating Tax Guidance in a Post-Loper Bright World.” The ABA page on the program is here. The panel participants were very knowledgeable.

Early in the program, I asked the following question via the Q&A tool:

Under Loper Bright, if, after using all the tools of statutory interpretation, a judge still cannot determine whether the IRS interpretation or the opposing interpretation is the best interpretation (a state of equipoise on the interpretation), what does the judge do? Should the judge flip a coin, consult, his ouija board, follow his own preferred outcome, etc.?

I have asked a similar question in previous ABA programs, but the question was never answered. In today’s program, the question was answered—that is, at least an answer was proffered. I am not sure it is the right answer but it certainly echoed Loper Bright’s reasoning, such as it is.

So what was the answer? Basically, the answer given by the judge on the panel was that, with good statutory interpretation, the judge will always have something to tilt the judge to the best interpretation. (That is my paraphrasing and advanced apologies if I did not get it exactly right.) Actually, as the question was answered, I think the answer was hedged saying that he did not think it would happen very often (although that is from memory, I may be misremembering, and my notes don’t confirm that).

I think the essence of the answer was an echo of Loper Bright which is just flat-out wrong on the point of continuing possibility of ambiguity (equipoise). Loper Bright claimed by fiat that a judge should always be able to reach a single best interpretation with no need for a default rule such as Chevron deference to the agency interpretation. (For this, one must remember that a condition of Chevron deference was that the statute be ambiguous, meaning that the judge could not determine whether the agency interpretation or an opposing interpretation was the single best interpretation; if the court could determine the best interpretation, Chevron required the court to stop at Step One without any deference.)

District Court Invalidates and Vacates Listed Transaction Reporting Regulation (4/18/26)

In Drake Plastics Ltd. Co. v. IRS, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (S.D. Tex. 4/15/26), CL here, and GS here [to come], the court (Judge Lee Rosenthal) considered APA claims of invalidity of the regulations determinations of “transactions of interest” and “listed transactions” for micro-captive insurance companies (from the conclusion):

          The court grants in part the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction, (Docket Entry No. 58), and grants in part the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 63). The defendants (1) appropriately designated micro-captive transactions as transactions of interest through 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-11; but (2) exceeded their statutory authority in designating micro-captive transactions as listed transactions through 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-10. The court declares unlawful 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-10 and vacates it. The case is remanded to the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service for further agency action consistent with this opinion.

          The vacatur is stayed until May 1, 2026, to avoid taxpayer confusion on Tax Day. Cf. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (“Court orders . . . can themselves result in . . . confusion . . . .”). Final judgment is entered separately.

I am not sure what the last paragraph stay is about, but I do understand the holdings in the first paragraph.

The court’s holding turns upon interpretation of the statutory requirement that "transactions of interest" have the “potential” for tax avoidance but that “listed transactions” that have tax avoidance, at least presumptive tax avoidance, rather than just the potential for tax avoidance. The court reasoned that the IRS did not adequately explain microcaptive arrangements identified in the "listed transaction" regulation.

Judge Rosenthal is a very good judge, so I respect her analysis, even though I am not convinced that it is correct.

Microsoft Copilot AI Hallucinates on Chevron Deference (4/12/26)

I have previously written on artificial intelligence (“AI”) related to tax procedure issues. I write today to address AI hallucinations of the type that have been incorporated into briefs and, more rarely, even court opinions. By hallucinations, I mean (from Wikipedia, here): “a response generated by AI that contains false or misleading information presented as fact.” The specific instance I address here is false readings of judicial opinions in the context of Chevron deference.

Readers will recall that I have previously discussed the issue of Chevron deference and the demise of Chevron deference in Loper Bright. One of the issues I addressed but return to today is whether courts determined the best interpretation was an interpretation other than an agency interpretation but nevertheless deferred under Chevron to the agency not-best interpretation. My claim was that Chevron required statutory ambiguity which meant that the court could not determine the best interpretation; only when ambiguity existed could the court defer to (apply) the agency interpretation. Stated otherwise, if a court could determine the best interpretation, the statute was not ambiguous and the best interpretation applied at Chevron Step One (i.e., no deference to the agency interpretation). Extended, the claim is that courts did not defer to an agency interpretation when it was not the best interpretation; rather, courts only deferred when they could not determine the best interpretation. At least that is how Chevron should have worked.

Yesterday, I returned to AI, specifically MS Copilot, to address this issue. I link here for download an pdf from an MS Word file with my prompts (4 prompts with prompts 2-4 following through on the first prompt). I provide here prompts 1-4 which refine the inquiry and provide the Copilot response only to the final prompt:

PROMPT #1: can you please identify cases decided under Chevron in which a court explicitly stated its best interpretation and said that it was nevertheless deferring to a not-best agency interpretation?

PROMPT #2 Please provide direct quotations from each case.

PROMPT #3: Please provide pinpoint citations for each case. [JAT Note: pinpoint citations are local page cites.]

PROMPT #4: Please provide cases and quotes from cases where judges criticized Chevron for forcing them to accept worse interpretations.

I will copy and paste the answer to Prompt #4, but first a big red flag was presented in the response to PROMPT #2 when I asked for direct quotes. The response started with the following:

I can absolutely give you direct quotations, but there’s one important constraint: I can only quote one or two lines verbatim from each case, because judicial opinions are copyrighted. 

That claim is patently wrong. Case opinions are not copyrighted.

The following is Copilot's response to PROMPT #4 (I add some of my analysis in CAPS and RED TYPE with links to the cases):

COPILOT RESPONSE TO PROMPT #4: