Scope of Tax Court Authority in CDP Hearings (12/7/12)

If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the Appeals Office determination in a CDP Hearing, the taxpayer may file a petition to contest the determination in the Tax Court.  Section 6330(d), here.  In  a recent case, the Tax Court addressed the scope of the Tax Court's authority to remand to the Appeals Office and the IRS's disagreement with some of the Tax Court authority.  Van Camp v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-336, here.  The key parts are:

Remand of a CDP case to the Appeals Office may be appropriate in limited circumstances where there occurred some omission or error in the original hearing or in the record of the hearing. [Case citations omitted] 

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With regard to respondent's legal argument, we note generally that our jurisdiction in CDP cases is limited to a review of the Commissioner's CDP "determinations". Sec. 6330(d)(1). Once the CDP hearing is concluded, the statutory scheme provides a separate venue for review of a new collection alternative or to address a material change in a taxpayer's financial circumstance—namely, an appeal to the Appeals Office under its retained jurisdiction provided in section 6330(d)(2). The exercise of retained jurisdiction by the Appeals Office does not constitute a continuation of the original CDP proceeding, and the limitations periods that are suspended during CDP hearings are not suspended during review under section 6330(d)(2). The Commissioner's decisions made under section 6330(d)(2) cannot be appealed to this Court. See sec. 301.6320-1(h)(2), Q&A-H2, Proced. & Admin. Regs.; sec. 301.6330-1(h)(2), Q&A-H2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Consideration and hearings under section 6330(d)(2) are subsequent to and separate from the original CDP hearing and are solely administrative. 

Respondent disagrees with petitioners and with a suggestion made in a number of our opinions that we have the authority to remand CDP cases to the Appeals Office merely where a remand may be regarded as "helpful", "necessary", "productive", and/or due to "changed circumstances." See e.g., Kelby v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 79, 86 n.4 (2008); Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183; Kuretski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-262, at *11; Churchill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-182. Respondent contends that, absent the exercise of an abuse of discretion by the settlement officer or a defective or incomplete administrative record, this Court lacks any remand authority in CDP cases. 

In light of our factual resolution of the issue before us in these cases, we do not address that legal question.