3rd Installment of ChatGPT Weekly Tax Procedure Case Watch (11/7/26)

I copy and paste below the ChatGPT Plus offering for this week (posted yesterday, 11/6/26) which can be viewed here. I have decided that, for each recommendation, I state under the category JAT Action my decision as to what to do about the recommendation. Also, I have decided to make changes or additions I think are appropriate to the ChatGPT content. I present those actions, changes, and additions with redline.

Federal Tax Procedure Case Watch

November 6, 2026 | Decisions issued October 31–November 6, 2026

This week's strongest recommendation is Kings Road Property, LLC v. Commissioner, 167 T.C. No. 14 (Nov. 2, 2026). It presents an unusually good opportunity to examine the Tax Court's treatment of jurisdictional deadlines, equitable tolling, statutory interpretation, and the Commissioner's efforts to obtain reconsideration.

A second worthwhile candidate, Pinckney v. Commissioner, concerns the relationship between civil tax examinations, criminal investigations, and civil fraud penalties.

1. Kings Road Property, LLC v. Commissioner — Equitable tolling, statutory interpretation, and reconsideration [JAT Link to GS here]

Highest priority

167 T.C. No. 14 (Nov. 2, 2026), Judge Buch.

Read the November 2 opinion

The Tax Court denied the Commissioner's motion to reconsider its September 21, 2026 opinion holding that the petition deadline under § 6234(a), governing BBA partnership proceedings, is nonjurisdictional and potentially subject to equitable tolling.

The Commissioner argued that the decision conflicted with North Wall Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. 143 (2025), which treated the former TEFRA partnership petition deadline as jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. Judge Buch explained that the Court had already considered and rejected that argument, including in Big Apple Tompkins Realty LLC v. Commissioner, 167 T.C. No. 7 (2026). The Court also declined to entertain new theories offered on reconsideration.

LAWS.com

Why this is particularly suitable for your blog

There are three potentially interesting issues, although the November 2 opinion does not itself reopen the merits of the original jurisdictional holding.

First, the distinction between TEFRA and BBA petition deadlines. The Tax Court acknowledges that the statutory language is nearly identical but reaches different conclusions because of differences in the statutory and administrative schemes. This presents a methodological question: How much weight should statutory context and administrative complexity receive when Congress uses substantially the same language?

Second, jurisdictionality and equitable tolling are separate questions. The opinion notes that a deadline can be nonjurisdictional yet not subject to equitable tolling, citing Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 188 F.4th 39 (1st Cir. 2026). This distinction is worth developing because the Supreme Court's clear-statement approach to jurisdictionality does not necessarily settle the availability of equitable tolling. [JAT Comment: I would say this differently and can summarize the categories as: Time limits in the IRC are of three types: (i) jurisdictional meaning that, since jurisdictional, the time limits in this category must be strictly met (meaning also no equitable tolling); (ii) time limits that are not jurisdiction but proper interpretation shows that the text means that the time limits are to be strictly met (meaning also no equitable tolling); and (iii) other time limits that do not require strict compliance and thus may be subject to equitable tolling.]

Third, the Commissioner's administrative-burden argument. The government warned that the Tax Court's interpretation would impose significant administrative burdens. That raises a question especially consistent with your recent work: Are administrative consequences legitimate evidence of statutory meaning, or are they policy considerations that cannot displace the best interpretation of the enacted statute? [JAT Comment: I am not sure that the opinion addresses this issue. I suppose that, at the extreme, any process issue raises the question in unanticipated cases of whether some glitch in the result of process produces a result that seems to fly into the anticipated application of the text. That may be something like the absurdity doctrine which requires courts to interpret statutory text to avoid absurd results. That is a big issue in statutory interpretation, but I don’t think this opinion is a good reason to launch into that discussion in a separate blog entry.]

Suggested title

Tax Court Refuses to Reconsider Equitable Tolling of BBA Partnership Petition Deadline—Does Administrative Complexity Determine Jurisdiction? (11/6/26) [JAT Comment: I use the parenthesis with date to show the date of blog posting, not the date of the opinion that I blog about.]

Recommendation: A full analytical post, but one that examines the November decision together with North Wall, Big Apple, and the September Kings Road opinion. The interesting subject is the doctrinal disagreement, not simply the denial of reconsideration.

JAT Action: I was aware of this second T.C. opinion in Kings Road and just did not think there was enough there to develop into a blog entry. Indeed, I read it, perhaps superficially, as saying nothing more than it had said in the first T.C. opinion in Kings Road, along with a reminder to the IRS not to file motions for reconsideration of previously rejected arguments. In that context, I was baffled as to why this was a T.C. opinion rather than a T.C. Memo opinion or even just an Order; the only “Held” in the syllabus is something already held in a T.C.  opinion from 1998. The Court had already held in the first Kings Road opinion that the result under BBA was different from the result under TEFRA. So, I just did not think there was enough there to blog. But I may be wrong simply because I do not understand why it is a T.C. opinion.

2. Pinckney v. Commissioner — Civil examinations, criminal investigations, and civil fraud [JAT Link to GS here.]

High potential, subject to closer review

T.C. Memo. 2026-113 (Nov. 4, 2026), Judge Morrison.

Opinion record on CourtListener

The Tax Court sustained substantial deficiencies and § 6663 civil fraud penalties arising from a tax preparer's underreported income and improper deductions. The case involved an IRS civil examination, a subsequent criminal investigation, a criminal conspiracy guilty plea, and extensive reconstruction of income from bank records.

LAWS.com News+1

Why it may be worth discussing

The interesting question is not whether the taxpayer's conduct was fraudulent. The record appears to provide substantial evidence of that.

Rather, I would focus on the intersection of civil and criminal tax enforcement.

The opinion reportedly contains an extended account of the transition from a civil examination to criminal proceedings. That invites examination of when a civil investigation becomes sufficiently criminal in character to implicate procedural safeguards and what effect, if any, the transition should have on the use of evidence subsequently offered in a civil deficiency case. [JAT Comment: I don’t think the opinion presents that issue, so that it would be a stretch to launch a blog entry discussing it.]

A second question concerns the clear-and-convincing standard for civil fraud. Where the Commissioner relies on bank-deposit reconstruction and evidence developed in criminal proceedings, how should the court distinguish proof of an underpayment from proof that some portion of that underpayment was attributable to fraud?

These are possible analytical directions, not assertions that Judge Morrison incorrectly applied the law.

Suggested title

Civil Tax Examination Leads to Criminal Prosecution and Civil Fraud Penalties—Some Procedural Questions Raised by Pinckney (11/6/26)

Recommendation: Worth reading closely before deciding whether to write. It may offer an interesting procedural discussion, but only if the court's account of the investigation reveals more than routine application of established principles.

JAT Action: Again, I was aware of Pinckney and just did not think there was enough in it to warrant a separate blog entry. I think readers of this blog will already understand the difference between a civil examination that follows a criminal conviction with restitution-based assessments (RBAs) after § 6201(a)(4) was enacted. ChatGPT’s discussion of the issues seems a bit muddled.

3. Glass Warehouse, LLC v. Commissioner — Corporate penalties and the burden of production [JAT Link to GS here]

Lower priority

T.C. Memo. 2026-111 (Nov. 2, 2026), Judge Fung.

Opinion record on CourtListener

The Tax Court disallowed $118,302 of claimed subcontractor expenses because the corporate taxpayer failed to substantiate them. It also sustained an accuracy-related penalty after rejecting an inadequately supported reasonable-cause defense based on reliance on a CPA.

A procedural point worth noting is that § 7491(c), which places the burden of production for penalties on the Commissioner in cases involving individuals, does not extend that burden to corporate taxpayers.

LAWS.com+1

The possible blog question is whether the different penalty burdens for individuals and corporations have a persuasive statutory or policy justification, particularly when closely held corporations operate through individual owners. [JAT Comment: This is more a policy issue rather than a procedure issue. I don’t think it appropriate for a blog entry; see the however paragraph immediately below).]

However, this appears to be a relatively straightforward application of established law, and I would not recommend a separate post unless a more detailed reading uncovers an interesting issue involving § 6664(c) or penalty procedures.

JAT Action: No blog entry appropriate.

Decisions screened but not recommended

I also identified Moiseshyn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-114 (Nov. 4), involving employee stock purchase plan income and substantiation, and Butler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-116 (Nov. 5), involving dependency-related credits and factual proof. Neither presently appears to offer the kind of broader procedural or interpretive issue you generally favor.

Leagle+1

Murphy Hollow, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-115 (Nov. 5), was also identified, but I could not sufficiently examine its reasoning to make a responsible recommendation.

JAT Comment: Murphy Hollow, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-115 (11/5/26), GS here) is just another bullshit conservative easement making bullshit valuation claims as this early paragraph indicates:

Murphy Hollow and Hales Gap borrow the shameless approach oft seen in the conservation easement oeuvre, i.e., dream up a lucrative, wholly fanciful, highest-and-best use for a property, hire a friendly appraiser willing to check his integrity at the door to provide palpably outlandish values, and entice tax-motivated investors to put money into the scheme to reap tax deductions. It does not take x-ray vision to see through this gossamer-thin stratagem.

Judge Urda makes adverse credibility determinations, finding the shelter’s experts less credible that the IRS’s expert. I also decided not to blog on Murphy Hollow. Valuation rejected; Gross Valuation Misstatement Penalty applies.

NicheDB

I excluded Morgan Run Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-112 (Nov. 3), because you already discussed it in your November 4 blog entry, Another Bullshit SCE Case the Shelter’s Experts Not Credible.

federaltaxprocedure.blogspot.com

I did not identify a sufficiently verified new Supreme Court, federal appellate, or federal district court tax-procedure opinion during this period that merits an additional recommendation. This is not a claim that no such decisions were issued.

Overall assessment

Priority	Opinion	Potential blog value
1	Kings Road	Excellent: jurisdictionality, equitable tolling, statutory context, administrative consequences
2	Pinckney	Promising: civil-criminal enforcement relationship and fraud proof
3	Glass Warehouse	Limited: corporate penalty burdens and reasonable cause

I recommend concentrating on Kings Road. Its principal attraction is the tension between nearly identical statutory language and different jurisdictional consequences under two partnership audit regimes. That issue connects directly with your continuing discussions of statutory interpretation, judicial methodology, and the limits of consequential reasoning.

One final qualification: I was able to examine the text of the November Kings Road opinion, but the primary texts of some other opinions were not fully accessible. I have therefore kept the other recommendations provisional rather than inventing doctrinal significance that the decisions may not support.