Showing posts sorted by relevance for query ruble. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query ruble. Sort by date Show all posts

Saturday, September 21, 2013

Yet Another Bullshit Tax Shelter Goes Down; BB&T's Streak on Bullshit Tax Shelters Continues (9/21/13)

In Salem Financial, Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543, 2013 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1372 (9/20/13), here, the court (Judge Wheeler) rejects yet another bullshit tax shelter wrapped in complexity but no substance.  This one's acronym is STARS ("Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities") "The acronym "STARS" 
is not particularly descriptive of the transaction at issue. There is no indication of a loan in the acronym and there are no "repackaged securities" in the transaction. The evidence suggests that the concept of STARS began as something different, and only grew to include a loan when marketed to banks in the United States..  
The beginning of the opinion sets the tone (bold face supplied by JAT):
The BB&T STARS transaction was in effect for nearly five years, from August 1, 2002 through April 5, 2007. The purpose of the STARS transaction was to generate large-scale foreign tax credits for a U.S. taxpayer, which could be used to enhance revenue and reduce taxes in the United States. The amount at issue in this case, including the potential assessment of taxpayer penalties, is $772,144,153.45. This amount is comprised of the following: disallowed foreign tax credits ($498,161,951); disallowed interest deductions ($74,551,947.40); the tax paid on "Bx" payments from Barclays to BB&T ($84,033,228.20); disallowed transaction cost deductions ($2,630,125.05); and penalties ($112,766,901.80). 
The complexities of the STARS transaction, including the concept of a Bx payment, will become apparent below. Stripped to its essence, however, STARS called for the U.S. taxpayer, in this case BB&T, to establish a trust containing approximately $6 billion in revenue-producing bank assets. The monthly revenue from the trust was then cycled through a U.K. trustee, an act that served as a basis for U.K. taxation. Although the revenue was immediately returned to BB&T's trust, the assessment of U.K. taxes generated U.K. tax credits that were shared 50/50 between Barclays and BB&T. A $1.5 billion loan from Barclays to BB&T also was part of the structured transaction, although the loan was not necessary to the objective of generating foreign tax credits. The Barclays monthly Bx payment to BB&T represented BB&T's share of the tax credits, and had the effect of reducing the interest cost of BB&T's loan. The main question presented is whether the STARS transaction had any purpose other than to generate tax savings, and if not, whether penalties should be assessed against BB&T. 
The parties provided a STARS tax tutorial presentation to the Court on February 13, 2013 before the trial began. The Court held 21 days of trial in Washington, D.C. from March 4 through April 2, 2013. During the trial, the Court heard the testimony of 26 witnesses, of which thirteen were experts. The Court admitted deposition excerpts for eleven additional witnesses, principally from those persons who reside outside the United States or where the parties agreed that a deposition could substitute for relatively brief testimony. The Court received in evidence approximately 1,250 exhibits during the trial. The parties submitted post-trial findings of fact and memoranda of law on June 7, 2013, and post-trial reply briefs on July 3, 2013. The Court heard closing arguments on July 30, 2013.

Tuesday, September 24, 2024

Court Cannot Determine on Motion to Dismiss Malpractice and Related Claims from Bullshit Tax Shelter that the Statute of Limitations from 1997 Was Not Tolled (9/24/24)

In Cáceres v. Sidley Austin LLP (N. D. GA No 1:23-cv-00844 Dkt # 35 Opinion & Order dated 9/17/24), TN here and CL here, the Court denied the motion to dismiss filed by Sidley Austin (“Sidley,” the giant law firm, here). The Cáceres engaged R.J. Ruble, then a partner at the predecessor firm of Brown & Wood, to opine about a 1997 Midco transaction, an abusive tax shelter transaction in which the Cáceres sought to avoid the double tax upon sale of their corporate business. For an explanation of the Midco transaction, see FTP Practitioner Edition pp. 797-798 and Student Edition p. 537; and for Federal Tax Procedure Blog discussions of Midco transactions, here. Basically, tax shelter promoters use a variety of abusive techniques to avoid the built-in corporate level gain and then the sellers and the promoters share the tax thus illegally evaded, leaving the IRS without the tax. Usually, the promoters use a bullshit tax shelter to try to shield the corporate level tax, and when that tax shelter is denied, there is no money to pay the tax, requiring the IRS to seek the tax from third party such as the Cáceres.

At the motion to dismiss stage, the well-pled pleadings are analyzed to see if they pled sufficiently that, if the allegations and claims are true, a case had been stated. (This is before any factual development by discovery and cannot consider facts outside the complaint that a party may know; it is just a test of the sufficiency of the complaint.) The issue on the motion to dismiss was whether on the facts pled the statute of limitations barred the suit. The underlying transactions (including the legal opinion) were in 1997; this particular suit was brought in state court in 2023 and removed to federal court in 2023. Various claims in the complaint had statutes of limitations that were much shorter than the 20+ years that intervened from the 1997 accrual of the actions claim in the complaint. The question was whether, on the facts pled and claims made, the relevant statutes of limitations were tolled because of Sidley’s actions in hiding its alleged misconduct. The Court held that, on the facts pled, it could not determine that the statute of limitations had not tolled, so the case survived the motion to dismiss.

Perhaps the key fact was the IRS commencement in 2018 of a transferee liability suit under § 6901 against the plaintiffs as shareholders wrongfully sharing the corporate-level tax illegally avoided. See United States v. Henco Holding Corp., 985 F. 3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2021), here. (Of course, significant audit commotion would have likely preceded for years the filing of the transferee liability suit, but the issue was whether on the facts pled,  the plaintiffs had been fairly put on notice as to the causes of action at a time outside the limitations period.) As described by the Court, the Cáceres alleged (Slip Op. 14-15)

Saturday, January 25, 2014

Yet Another BullShit Tax Shelter Goes Down Flaming (1/25/14)

In NPR Investments, LLC v. United States, 740 F.3d 998 (5th Cir. 2014), here, following the Supreme Court's lead in United States v. Woods, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 557 (2013), here, the Fifth Circuit applied the 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty to the partnership's bullshit tax shelter (the Son-of-Boss (SOB) type shelter).  For discussion of Woods, see Supreme Court Applies 40% Penalty to Bullshit Basis Enhancement Shelters (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 12/3/13), here. The 40% penalty will, of course, be applied to the partners, which will then permit them to assert in a separate refund proceeding any partner level defenses they may be entitled to.

I could perhaps leave it at that, but there are some interesting features of the case.

Let's start with some the facts recounted by the Court:
Harold Nix, Charles Patterson, and Nelson Roach are partners in the law firm of Nix, Patterson & Roach, LLP. They represented the State of Texas in litigation against the tobacco industry and in 1998 were awarded a fee of approximately $600 million that is to be paid over a period of time. They also received fees totaling approximately $68 million in connection with tobacco litigation in Florida and Mississippi. Nix, Patterson, and Roach share the fees 40%, 40%, and 20%, respectively. 
Nix and Patterson have participated in at least two "Son-of-BOSS" tax shelters. BOSS stands for "Bond and Options Sales Strategy." Courts, including our court and the district court in this case, have described a Son-of-BOSS transaction as "a well-recognized 'abusive' tax shelter." Artificial losses are generated for tax deduction purposes. 
Before creating NPR and engaging in the transactions at issue in this appeal, Nix and Patterson invested in another Son-of-BOSS tax shelter, known as BLIPS. It involved sham bank loans, and our court considered various tax issues related to Nix's and Patterson's transactions with regard to that shelter in Klamath Strategic Investment Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States.
Further, here is a critical fact conceded apparently for strategic reasons:
The joint pre-trial order in the district court reflects that NPR, Nix, Patterson, and Roach conceded that NPR lacked a profit motive during 2001.
 All of the "investors" in SOB shelters claimed that their profit motive inhered in some long-shot investment razzle-dazzle which they called the "sweet spot," wherein the economic circumstances would line up to generate a profit from the adventure. Some of the taxpayers involved, although having large otherwise uncovered income, claimed that they did not consider the tax consequences at all but focused instead solely on the sweet spot opportunity.  However, the taxpayers in NPR (the ultimate taxpayers were involved by the attorney R.J. Ruble (since convicted of tax crimes for his participation in tax shelters, including SOB shelters) apparently did consider the tax consequences (duh!):

Monday, April 15, 2013

A Self-Proclaimed "Simple Man," "Utterly Uneducated" in Tax and Finance, but Still a Self-Made Multi-Millionaire Loses his Bullshit Tax Shelter Case (4/15/13)

JAT NOTE: This blog is the same as a blog posted earlier on my Federal Tax Crimes Blog.  See A Self-Proclaimed "Simple Man," "Utterly Uneducated" in Tax and Finance, but Still a Self-Made Multi-Millionaire Loses his Bullshit Tax Shelter Case (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 4/13/13), here.

In Kerman v. Commissioner, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7032 (6th Cir. 2013), here, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Kerman's claim for tax benefits or, at least, relief from penalties from a bullshit tax shelter, this one of the Cards variety that has met with uniform rejection from the courts.  I just gave you the final result.  But the opinion starts this way (usually you can tell the result from the opening):
A tax shelter can be legitimate — if the reported transaction has economic substance. But the shelter Mark Kerman participated in lacked such substance. The transaction had no purpose other than the creation of an income tax benefit. After Kerman claimed the benefit on his tax return, the IRS disallowed the deduction and imposed a valuation misstatement penalty pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6662(e), which was increased to 40 percent of the unpaid tax pursuant to § 6662(h). The tax court affirmed the IRS's decision. Kerman appeals, contending that the shelter was legitimate and that, even if it was not, the penalty should not be imposed. Because the transaction lacked economic substance and Kerman lacked reasonable cause or good faith to believe that it did, we AFFIRM.
I
A
Mark Kerman is a college-educated multi-millionaire.
Toward the end of the opinion another key signal dot is connected as follows:
Finally, Kerman argues, the tax court gave him too much credit. He's just a simple man, "utterly uneducated in the complex tax arena — let alone the more byzantine tax-shelter realm." Appellant's Br. 48. Consequently, he was forced to rely on personal advisors. And, he argues, his reliance was reasonable even if his advisors had conflicts of interest.
So, what should I say about the opinion?  Prudence and respect for my readers time counsels that I should not say anything except the bullet points from the case.  So, I won't.

Thursday, March 26, 2015

Two Courts' Approaches to Taxpayer Culpability in the Son-of-Boss Bullshit Tax Shelter (3/26/15)

I posted this blog entry on my Federal Tax Crimes Blog, but the topic is also applicable to Federal Tax Procedure:

I write today on two recent cases that evidence different approaches to taxpayer culpability for tax underpayment from "investing" in bullshit tax shelters.  These cases are CNT Investors LLC et al. v. Commissioner, 144 T.C. No. 11 (2015), here, and Kerman v. Chenery Associates, Inc. (WD Ky NO. 3:06-CV-00338-CRS 3/23/15), here.

For context, readers will recall that the Son-of-Boss ("SOB") tax shelter and the Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure ("CARDS") tax shelter are variations on the theme of no-cost (except promoter fees and reams of paper and commotion) tax benefits from thin air.  They have been the basis for several  prominent criminal prosecutions.  Courts have routinely called them too good to be true.  Most courts have reached that conclusion with respect to the type of sophisticated taxpayers who entered these shelters.  All of these shelters not only involved sophisticated taxpayers but required that those sophisticated taxpayers represent to the promoter and the issuers of the legal opinions that they had a profit motive independent of the tax motive.  In the context of the tax adventure in which that representation was made (tax benefits created from nothing except paper shuffling and payment of large fees to the promoters), that representation was bullshit.  That's my opinion and probably the opinion of most courts that have dealt with the issue.  I am some readers will disagree and I welcome their comments/corrections.

So, let's turn to the cases.  First, I will discuss the Kerman case.

Kerman was a suit by a taxpayer - "investor" against promoters of the adventure.  The originally named defendants were prominent players in the bullshit shelter industry:  Chenery Associates, Inc., Chenery Management, Inc., Sussex Financial Enterprises, Inc, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, R. J. Ruble, Roy Hahn, Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, HVB U.S. Finance, Inc.   The HVB defendants moved for dismissal of the remaining claims against it.

The IRS had prevailed in the Kerman's Tax Court case. here, and appeal, here, which had, successively, imposed the tax and the 40% accuracy related penalty.  (I will discuss this in more detail in discussing CNT Investors.)  For my blog discussion of the appellate case, see A Self-Proclaimed "Simple Man," "Utterly Uneducated" in Tax and Finance, but Still a Self-Made Multi-Millionaire Loses his Bullshit Tax Shelter Case (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 4/13/13), here. As a result, the Kermans conceded in their suit against the HVB defendants that:  "[i]ndisputably, the[y] participated in the abusive tax-shelter in conjunction with HVB."  Seizing on that concession, "HVB now contends that this admission is fatal to the Kermans' remaining claims against it under the theory of in pari delicto."

The Kerman court opened its discussion as follows:
The common law docntrine in pari delicto is a phrase that is short for the maxim in pari delicto potior est condition defendent is, which means: "In a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . is the better one." Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2626, 86 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1985) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 711 (5th ed. 1979) (alternation in original)). When applied, it serves as a defense that prevents two parties whose wrongdoing are found to be in pari delicto from recovering from one another for any damages that arose from that joint wrongdoing. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306, 105 S.Ct. 2622 (footnotes omitted). Courts apply the doctrine based on "two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers; and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality." See id.; see also In re Dublin Securities, Inc., 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir.1997) ("'No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.'"). 
In one germane application of the doctrine, a Kentucky court found that when two parties participate in a tax evasion transaction, they are deemed to be in pari delicto. Eline Realty Co. v. Foeman, 252 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Ky. 1952)(citing Stacy v. Williams, 253 Ky. 353, 69 S.W.2d 697; Middlesboro Home Telephone Co., v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 214 Ky. 822, 284 S.W. 104). This is true even if the plaintiff was induced to enter the transaction. Id. Here, the Kermans' admit that "[i]ndisputably, [they] participated in the abusive CARDS tax-shelter with HVB and the other Defendants." DN 227, p. 5. Moreover, they do not even dispute that, as a result, they are in pari delicto with HVB. Id. Instead, they argue that, regardless of whether they are in pari delicto with the Defendants, the defense does not bar their claims for rescission or under KRS §446.070 in this instance. We address these arguments in turn.