On Supreme Court U.S. (or is it U. S.) Citations and the Supreme Court's Tariff Opinions (1/22/26)

This blog entry is a bit of a detour from the domain of federal tax procedure. Specifically, this blog presents two more or less fringe disparate subjects. I divide the blog into two sections. The first is mundane: whether to space or not to space between U. and S. in Supreme Court citations? The second is a disjointed foray into the Supreme Court’s tariff opinions handed down Friday:  Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. ___ (2026), here (Slip Op.).

To Space or Not  to Space in U.S. (or it is U. S.) Citations, that is the Question

For those who review Supreme Court opinions in all official formats (Slip Opinion, Preliminary Print, and Final), the opinions format the citation to the official reports with a blank between U. and S.—e.g., Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo,  603 U. S. 369 (2024), here (Preliminary Print). I had not learned to cite without the space and had not paid attention to the Supreme Court's format (with space) until today as I was reading the slip opinion in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. ___ (2026), here (Slip Op.). So, I asked ChatGPT and received the following answer (with my prompt, with citations omitted):

Prompt: Please cite me authorities (judicial and otherwise) that discuss the difference between the Supreme Court's citation of its decisions as "U. S." (with a blank between U. and S. and other authorities (mostly commentary but also Courts of Appeals and case reporters) foregoing the blank between U. and S.

Chat GPT Response: 

The U.S. Supreme Court officially cites its own decisions using "U. S." with a space between "U." and "S." in the United States Reports (e.g., 5 U. S. 137), while The Bluebook, Courts of Appeals, most legal commentary, and case reporters standardize "U.S." without the space. This distinction arises from the Court's unique style conventions versus modern citation guides like The Bluebook, which enforce no space between adjacent single capital letters per Rule 6.1(a).

Supreme Court Practice ("U. S." with space)

The Supreme Court itself uses spaced citations in its bound volumes of the United States Reports, reflecting historical typography from early volumes like Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).8 This format appears consistently in official reporter headings and the Court's published opinions.

Other Authorities ("U.S." without space)

The Bluebook: Prohibits "U.S." with a space, mandating "U.S." for United States Reports (e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); spaces are reserved for abbreviations like "S. Ct." (Rule 6.1(a) and Table T1).

Courts of Appeals and State Appellate Guidance: U.S. Courts of Appeals briefs require "U.S." without parallels or spaces (e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). California Courts of Appeal cite as "450 U.S. 544." Washington Supreme Court style sheet specifies "__ U.S. __" without space in examples.

Legal Commentary and Libraries: Academic guides (e.g., Georgetown, Akron, Texas) uniformly use "U.S." per Bluebook rules, noting the official reporter preference but no space.356 Florida Bar Journal exemplifies 380 U.S. 343.

No judicial opinions directly litigate this spacing difference, as it is a typographical convention governed by style manuals rather than substantive law; conflicts are resolved by following local rules or Bluebook in lower courts and briefs.

I have done anecdotal checking on ChatGPT's response, enough to think this is right (hence, not an AI hallucination). Also, I checked in Google Scholar on Supreme Court cases; Google Scholar eliminates the blank, which means that Google Scholar does not offer exact replicates of the Supreme Court cases. By contrast, Lexis-Nexis retains the blank. My page search of Loper Bright in LN shows the blank 367 times in the main body of the reported opinion. I guess that means that when the Supreme Court citation is within the body of a quote, the space should be retained (or supplied if you get it from a third party source that strips out the space). However, I will usually default to eliminating the blank.

On Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. ___ (2026), here (Slip Op.). 

I offer a high level overview from my perspective (often contrarian). The bottom line is that a 6-3 majority held that IEEPA did not authorize to set tariffs, a taxing power constitutionally assigned to Congress. Congress had not “delegated”—in Supreme Court speak—that power to the President with the required specificity. (Echoes of the Major Questions Doctrine (“MQD”) that some of the Justices noise about in their opinions.)

Reading the opinions (170 pages in the Slip Opinion and I did read them at some level) made me wonder whether that was a good use of my time—or anybody’s time. Why did the Justices feel compelled to tilt with each other in their opinions (e.g., Justice Gorsuch for himself, Justice Barrett for herself, and Kavanaugh for himself, Justice Thomas and Justice Alito)? Does it really matter, for example, whether, as Justice Barrett and Justice Kagan claim, the result could be justified under normal statutory construction without the need to invoke the MQD? And, are the Justices verbally tilting among themselves really enlightening to anyone other than, perhaps (but only perhaps), themselves.

Aren’t most of the relevant public more swayed by the decision—the bottom-line holding, in this case that Trump lacks the tariff power under the IEEPA, rather than the reasoning ad nauseum as to why he does not or does have the power? See Justin Driver, The Insignificance of Judicial Opinions, 113 Cal. L. Rev. 2181 (2026), here.

I add that, at least for me, my assessment of Supreme Court (and other court) opinions is based on whether the bottom-line is consistent with my preferred outcome; sure I have noised in scholarly or pseudo-scholarly writings about Supreme Court opinions (such as the majority in Loper Bright which, I think, is poor on the scholarship at least as I understand the scholarship).

Miscellaneous other thoughts on Learning Resources:

1.The term “common sense” appears in several of the opinions, but obviously used to support whatever claims the respective Justices are making. I gather from anecdotal consideration of the deployments of the term that, among the Justices using the term, the sense may not be common.

2. Justice Barrett, a scholar with articles on statutory interpretation and canons says the following (Concurring, Slip Op. 3): “Strong-form substantive canons—canons instructing a judge to adopt “an inferior-but-tenable reading”—veer beyond interpretation and into policymaking.” Justice Barrett does not say in her concurring opinion that Chevron was such a strong form canon but that is the way some, even Justice Roberts, imagined Chevron to operate. (My research indicated that Chevron never applied if the court could determine the best interpretation—i.e., Chevron could apply only when the court could not determine the best interpretation.)

3. I learned one item I should have learned long ago. Justice Gorsuch offers up the following citation (Gorsuch, concurring Slip Op. 2, emphasis supplied by JAT):

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 779 (2022) (KAGAN, J., joined by, inter alios, SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (calling the doctrine a “special cano[n]” that has “magically appear[ed]”).

I don’t recall that, if I have ever seen or heard the term “inter alios” that it registered in my consciousness. So, I had to check it out. The difference between “inter alia” and “inter alios” is that the former refers to things and the latter to people. I stand educated now on this fine point, and will try to use the term in my speaking and writing enough so that I know it for future use.

For some good early offerings on Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, see:

• Jack Goldsmith, Quick Thoughts on the Tariff Decision and the President's Angry Reaction (Executive Functions 2/20/26), here.
• Steve Vladeck, 211. Making Sense of the Tariffs Ruling (One First 2/20/26), here.
• Adam Feldman, A breakdown of the court’s tariff decision (SCOTUSblog: Empirical Scotus 2/20/26), here.
• Adrian Vermeule, “How Clear is Clear?”: Tariffs Edition (The New Digest 2/21/26), here (I like how Vermeule works Chevron into the discussion).