Good Review of Points Previously Covered in Class (9/28/15)

Lua v. United States, 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1235 (9/25/15), here, offers a good review of concepts we have studied in this case.

In Lua, upon completion of the audit, the unsophisticated taxpayers who did not have a representative signed a Form 4549 Income Tax Examination Changes.  This form has language "waiving their right to a notice of deficiency."  Section 6213(a), here, prohibits the IRS from assessing prior to issuing a notice of deficiency in income tax cases.  Section 6213(d) provides that a taxpayer may waive the right to receive a notice of deficiency, thus allowing an assessment without the notice of deficiency.  This waiver is often done on the Form 870, Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment, but also from the language quoted above, may be done on the Form 4549.  See Student Edition pp. 145-146 & 334-335.

Shortly after signing the waiver, the taxpayers engaged a tax professional.  The tax professional requested audit reconsideration in a telephone call to the agent and a day later confirmed the request in a letter to the group manager.

On November 26, 2007, the IRS assessed the deficiencies, but granted the request for audit reconsideration.  As a result of the audit reconsideration, the IRS ultimately reduced the amount of the deficiencies, but by that time the taxpayers had filed amended returns and, apparently protectively, payments substantially in excess of the amounts ultimately determined to be due.  It is a little fuzzy to me precisely what happened after the assessment, but it may not be critical for the points discussed below.  What appears to be in issue in this refund litigation is the amount paid up to the amount that was not abated in audit reconsideration -- in other words the amount determined due after audit reconsideration

1. Did the taxpayers waive the right to a notice of deficiency.

Yes.  The taxpayers did sign the Form 4549 which waives the notice of deficiency in clear language.  In this regard, the Court indicated in footnote 12 that the waiver had not been improperly induced.

2.  Did the taxpayers withdraw the waiver of the notice of deficiency.

No.  The taxpayers asked for audit reconsideration which is a separate procedure.  Audit reconsideration is addressed in the text.  See Student edition p. 452.

Principal Life -- A Masterpiece of Tax Procedure (11/29/13)

In my last Tax Procedure Class, we spent most of the class discussing Principal Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 786 (Fed. Cl. 2010).  The Court's slip opinion is here; students can link to a nonofficial version (Harvard Caselaw Access Project) but with local page citations, here.  I do ask, however, that students download the actual case with the local page citations. 

The reasons I think the case is important are: (i) it is a tax procedure case; (ii) it is a tour de force tax procedure case; and (iii) it covers a lot of ground that we covered earlier in the class.  I promised the students that I would post a blog on the case in order to help them learn Tax Procedure and, even, study for the examination.  THIS POSTING IS NOT INTENDED AND SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTUALLY READING AND STUDYING THE CASE.

Judge Allegra (Wikipedia here) introduces the case as follows:

"The procedural aspects of the tax laws are of overriding importance in many controversies," one commentator has noted, "eclipsing or making moot substantive issues such as the allowance of deductions or credits, recognition or deferral of income, and methods of accounting." Theodore D. Peyser, 627-3rd Tax Management Portfolio, "Limitations Periods, Interest on Underpayments and Overpayments, and Mitigation" at 1 (2010). At times, the questions spawned by these procedures take on an almost "metaphysical" cast, Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431, 436, 120 S. Ct. 1006, 145 L. Ed. 2d 949 (2000), like "when is taxable income taxed?" The ontology needed to solve such abstruse inquiries comes not from philosophical tomes, but from Chapters 63 through 66 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, which supply interfused rules mapping the contours of commonly-used, but frequently-misunderstood, tax concepts such as "assessment," "deposit," and "overpayment." 

Though the background provided by these rules can be numbing in its intricacy, the dispute presented by the cross-motions for summary judgment pending before the court can be stated simply: Plaintiff, Principal Life Insurance Company and Subsidiaries (plaintiff or Principal) argues that it is entitled to certain overpayments because its taxes were not timely assessed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Defendant responds that the taxes in question were timely assessed and that even if they were not, they are not recoverable as an overpayment. Plaintiff is wrong; defendant is right. It remains to explain why.

KEY FACTS: