What’s more, the Tax Court refused Hoffman’s request to reform the donation agreement. In the end, it was up to the Tax Court to grant this form of equitable relief. See Woods v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 776, 782–89 (1989); see also Kelley v. Comm’r, 45 F.3d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing Woods). And Hoffman hasn’t shown that the court’s refusal to do so was an abuse of discretion. See Greer v. Comm’r, 595 F.3d 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2010); Kelley, 45 F.3d at 352; see also Anchor v. O’Toole, 94 F.3d 1014, 1025 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing the general standard of review for denials of equitable relief).The Sixth Circuit seems to have been laboring under the notion that the Tax Court could have power to reform a contract between the taxpayer and a party not before the Tax Court. In the cases cited, contracts or quasi-contracts were between the taxpayer and the IRS. The Tax Court may also have been laboring under the notion that, had the taxpayer satisfied the requirements for reformation under Ohio law, it might have equitably reformed the contract. See e.g., Tax Court Order Dated July 12, 2017, here, Slip Op. 10-11 n. 7 (where the Court discusses the Ohio Law of reformation but concludes that the taxpayer had not met the summary judgment standard for putting the argument in issue).
I question whether the Tax Court has jurisdiction to reform a contract involving a taxpayer and a party not before the Tax Court. The cases cited by the Sixth Circuit involved contracts or quasi-contract like documents signed by the taxpayer and the IRS and are thus, in my mind, not authority for the power to reform a contract with a party not before the court.
