After publishing this blog entry, a new article was published about Microsoft's transfer pricing planning and the audit. I discuss that article in my comments below (Comment #4.)
In
United States v. Microsoft, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8781 (W.D. Wash. 1/17/20),
here, the district court resolved a contentious summons enforcement proceeding started in December 2014. (See the CourtListener docket entries,
here.) Summons enforcement proceedings are supposed to be “summary in nature.”
United States v. Clarke, 573 U.S. 248, 254 (2014) (citing
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)).
So, why was this summons enforcement proceeding not so summary, taking just over 5 years to resolve? A hint at the answer is the amount of the tax savings involved (perhaps $5 billion over 10 years, achieved at a cost of $10 million (I don't think that planning included tax professional fees)), the promoter tax shelter context (involving one of the prominent bullshit promoter tax shelter players, KPMG, in the early 2000s), and the sheer number of attorneys appearing in the case (many of whom are amici). (For the attorneys, see the CourtListener list which may be reviewed by clicking on the “Parties and Attorneys on the CourtListener docket list above; the Government lists 4 attorneys, Microsoft lists 14 (included terminated attorneys), and the amici attorneys are more than I want to count; the relative imbalance between the attorneys for Government and attorneys for the parties opposing the Government reminds me of the old saying about Texas rangers–one mob, one Ranger; in this case one mob, 4 Government attorneys.)
Well, there is not much in the case. It is, after all, a summons enforcement proceeding where, once the minimal
Powell standards are met, the summons is enforced.
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). The Court thus early on ordered the summons enforced.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (2015). But that left the privilege assertions to be thrashed over, hence the delay.
So, what’s the context for this battle? Not surprisingly, high-dollar transfer pricing cost sharing arrangements that has drawn similar high dollar litigation with loads of attorneys. E.g.,
Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 926 F.3d 1061 17143 (9th Cir. 2019), reh. en banc den. 941 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2019) (with an analogous melange of attorneys, including amici). As the Microsoft Court said in the most recent opinion (the one linked in the opening paragraph):
Ultimately Microsoft did enter into cost sharing arrangements through technology licensing agreements. Because those cost sharing arrangements were required by law to be arm's length transactions, the design and implementation details are a central focus of the government's examination. The government expresses skepticism that a third party would be likely to enter into the agreements, thereby satisfying the arm's length standard, because the agreements contained several unique provisions. Dkt. #146 at ¶¶ 18-20. While many of the terms changed before and afterward the agreements were to have been formed, they remained favorable for Microsoft's income tax liability. Id. at ¶¶ 9-11. The government believes that the transactions were "designed and implemented for the purpose of avoiding tax." Id. at ¶ 20. n1
n1 The government expresses further skepticism on the basis that the agreements effectively netted the Puerto Rican entity $30 billion for the "routine" reproduction of CDs containing software and did not otherwise have a significant impact on Microsoft's operations. Dkt. #146 at ¶¶ 15-20.
Microsoft maintains that nothing was abnormal about its actions. [*7] Microsoft argues that transfer pricing disputes with the government were prevalent and, "[r]ecognizing the inevitability of an [Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")] challenge, Microsoft was determined to be adequately prepared to defend these cost sharing arrangements." Dkt. #140 at 6; see also Dkt. #143 at ¶ 23. To this end, and because of the complexity of facts relevant to corporate international tax, Microsoft employed KPMG "to help the lawyers provide legal advice" and to give its own tax advice. Dkt. #140 at 1; Dkt. #143 at ¶¶ 7, 10. Mr. Boyle, then Microsoft's Corporate Vice President and Tax Counsel, maintains that the materials at issue were prepared for his use and that they were "prepared in anticipation of an administrative dispute or litigation with the IRS over the Puerto Rican cost sharing arrangement, the pricing of the software sales to Microsoft, and other issues expected to be in dispute relating to those transactions." Dkt. #143 at ¶ 23.